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Statement of the Problem
Scholars have continuously concerned themselves with whether and to what
extent the American people, in their beliefs and attitudes, have moved toward bridging
the gap between democratic ideals and racial practices.’ For over three hundred years the
underlying tension of unreconciled segments ofAmerican society has induced fissures
and cracks in the foundation ofAmerican democratic ideals. Winthrop Jordan, in his
book White Over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550-1812, writes that “If
it were possible to poii the inhabitants of Jamestown, Virginia, concerning their reaction
to those famous first ‘twenty Negars’ who arrived in 1619,1 would be among the first at
the foot of the gangplank, questionnaire in hand.”2 Jordan shows through his research on
the founding of the first colonial settlements that racial imagery and beliefs were an
influential factor in the future subjugation of individuals ofAfrican descent. Alexis de
Tocqueville also noted the influence of race within American society when he
commented that “Negroes and. . . whites must either wholly part or wholly mingle.” He
‘Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo, Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and
Interpretations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 3.
2Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550-1812
(publisher, 1968), vii, as quoted in Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo, Racial
Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 3.
1
2
further added, “I do not believe the white and black races will ever live in any country
upon an equal footing.” Such commentary indicates that the accuracy of the prediction
by W.E.B. DuBois, that “The problem of the twentieth century will be the problem of the
color line,”3 was an incrimination of a centuries’ old legacy that continues to haunt the
American democratic ideals of equality, justice, fairness, and liberty.
One significant strategy for attempting to resolve the American problem of racial
tension is to understand and evaluate attitudes. Social scientists like Howard Schuman,
Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo engaged this strategy in Racial Attitudes in
America: Trends and Interpretations, and their fmdings indicate that racial attitudes over
time have changed improved. However, other analysts assert that while improvement can
be noted, there is evidence of resistance and backlash to the implementation of more
liberal social and political policies.
Clyde Wilcox and Barbara Norrander make the following statement in their
discussion of diversity of conceptions and theories for the understanding ofpublic
opinion: “In political science, the central concept of most public opinion research remains
the attitude.”4 Although various disciplinary defmitions of the word attitude emerge from
a scrutiny of various literature in the area, attitudes can be defmed as “an individual’s
affective orientation toward an object, favorable or unfavorable, at some degree of
3W.E.B. DuBois, “The Souls of Black Folks,” in WE.B. DuBois Reader, ed. David Levering
Lewis (New York: Henry Holt, 1920/1995).
4Clyde Wilcox and Barbara Norrander, eds., Understanding Public Opinion, 2~ edition
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2002), 3.
3
intensity.”5 Often the fonnation of attitudes follow prior social experiences and the
relative concretization of attitudes precede behavior. Additionally, attitudes are
important because they guide social behavior and are the intervening variables in
processes of social influence. They are helpful because they are an expression of values
and preferences; they serve a knowledge function, meaning that they help make sense of
ambiguous events; and they serve a utilitarian function, meaning that they can serve as
indicators ofpreference when aiming to secure individual interest.
What is interesting and important about the studies on attitudes is that attitude
researchers have not reached a consensus on the relationship that attitudes have with
other concepts. Wilcox and Norrander state that political scientists would consider
beliefs and opinions to be cognitive elements of attitudes; however, the linking of
attitudes to values, beliefs, opinions, habits, and identifications introduces complexities
that are not easily explained and are the source of discussion in the research area. Several
researchers have questioned whether attitudes are predictors of behavior, and assert that
correspondence should not be expected between attitudes and behavior, since other
powerful predictors of intention in individualistic cultures exist. However, attitudes and
opinions do provide “useful clues” to a person’s behavior and do have some influence on
political participation.
Within American political research, numerous studies have been conducted that
evaluate the attitudes and opinions of citizens about various policies and normative
values, but relatively few have been conducted to specifically evaluate the attitudes and
5Jon Krosnick, “Attitudes,” Lecture given at the 2005 Summer Institute in Political Psychology at
Stanford University, 11 July 2005.
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opinions ofAfrican Americans. Many of the studies on racial attitudes in the United
States have pointed to the steady improvement of racial attitudes of whites toward
African Americans, and these attitudinal trends are reinforced by other indicators, such as
the size, relative security, and potential influence of the black middle class.6 However,
Hanes Walton critically assesses the emphasis of attitudinal and behavioral studies on
white perceptions of blacks, and the relative absence of studies that center on an
examination ofblack perceptions of themselves and of whites. Relatedly, two critiques
are voiced by black social scientists, particularly political scientists, about the evaluation
of attitudes and opinions. One critique is that an implicit value claim is reinforced by the
continued selection and evaluation of the attitudes and opinions of dominantlin-groups
(e.g., whites), and the continued exclusion or limited inclusion of subordinate/out-groups
(e.g., blacks) from evaluative consideration becomes a normative practice. The social,
economic, and political impacts that result can be, and often are, unsettling and disturbing
for those excluded from the evaluative process — decisions, prescriptive and descriptive
evaluations, and conclusions are made with minimal regard to their perspectives and can
have maximum impact on their reality. The second critique is that too often black
attitudes and opinions are derived from secondary analysis of data collected from various
sources that are not expressly designed to evaluate or measure black attitudes. As a
result, questions are raised about the ability of the questions to uncover and project the
6This trend is discussed in Lawrence Bobo, James Kluegel, and Ryan A. Smith, “Laissez-Faire
Racism: The Crystallization of a Kinder, Gentler, Antiblack Ideology,” in Racial Attitudes in the 1990s:
Continuity and Change ed. Steven A. Tuch and Jack K. Martin, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997),
15.
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truths of black socioeconomic and political reality and whether the questions asked are
issues that are perceived as salient to blacks.
For several years a debate has been ongoing in literature about whether racialized
politics persist.7 Specifically, Lawrence Bobo points out that four questions have
dominated the literature exploring race: (a) Does prejudice really matter in a post-civil
rights era?; (b) Has prejudice declined, and if so, how much?; (c) Does prejudice still
have political relevance?; and (d) How does prejudice work in a multiethnic, multiracial
context? This debate has significant consequences for the study of black attitudes and
opinions because questions like “How should we begin to understand and interpret what
appears to be racialized?” and “How are politics and social relations, as well as attitudes,
changing as society becomes more racially and politically diverse?” need to be tackled.
A number of social scientists have attempted to address these questions. Many
researchers approach racial analysis through secondary analysis, but Lawrence Bobo
points out that examination of racial attitudes should involve a direct confrontation of
theory with measures expressly suited to concepts. These measures should be original,
be robust, and include an examination of context.
Rick Hill builds on this critique by asking the question: Why is there no grand
theory to guide the emergence and evolution of the field of black politics?8 Hill
maintains that the lack of a grand theory for the examination of black politics and black
7Racialized politics are politics heavily influenced by racial attitudes and outlooks. This view is
not shared by all social scientists; see work by Sniderman and Tetlock.
8Rick Hill, “The Study of Black Politics: Notes on Rethinking the Paradigm,” in Black Politics
and Black Political Behavior ed. Hanes Walton, Jr. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 11-12.
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political behavior must be supplanted by a new paradigm that encompasses such an
evaluation. Although this dissertation does not seek to provide a grand theory for the
examination ofblack politics as suggested by Hill, it is a recognition that more work must
be done to define and explore the political attitudes ofAfrican Americans, specifically in
light of ideological orientation.
It has been thought that party affiliation is a predictor of ideological orientation,
but this is not the case for many Americans, particularly African Americans. The social
policies begun by Franklin D. Roosevelt prompted most African Americans to shift
political support from the Republican Party, the party of Lincoln, to the Democratic
Party. Since this historical realignment, blacks have been a source of solid support for
the Democratic Party, even though many political scientists have noted a decline in
Democratic support for policies that support or advance the articulated policy agendas9 of
African Americans. As a result, black support for the Democratic Party has held
relatively constant, but with the 2004 presidential election being a high-water mark for
black voter support for the Republican Party since black voter realignment;
approximately 9 percent of blacks voted for President George Bush. Often blacks are
painted with a liberal ideological brush because this has been thought to be the classical
orientation of the Democratic Party and the relative positioning of blacks, but a closer
examination of black political attitudes and behavior reveals that the ideological
orientation of blacks spans the ideological spectrum regardless ofparty affiliation.
9Policy agendas referred here are those set by organizations that represent the interests of African
Americans, like the Congressional Black Caucus, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, the National Urban League, etc.
7
However, little work has been done that explores this heterogeneity. Even less work has
been conducted on the correlation between self-identified ideological orientation and
political attitudes.
Purpose and Significance of the Study
The study of racial attitudes is one of the longest running topics in the social
sciences.’0 Modem sampling and interviewing techniques have produced more survey
data on racial attitudes than on any other noncommercial topic.” As a result, those who
study race and racial attitudes have been major contributors to social change, and their
works have provided a catalog of information used to affect attitude, behavior, and
policy; this study aims to take its place in that collection. The purpose of this dissertation
was to analyze the political attitudes ofblacks in the eastern region of Texas and to
identify the relationship between ideological orientation and political attitudes. This
study is a significant contribution to the field ofpolitical science on two fronts. First, this
study expands the existing literature about black political attitudes. A number of existing
studies examine the political attitudes and opinions of Americans, as do studies that
evaluate African-American political behavior. Second, this research contributes to the
field ofpolitical science because limited research has been conducted on the political
attitudes of black Texans. Specifically, no studies of this kind have been conducted on
‘°A. Wade Smith, “Prologue: Reflection of Racial Attitude Research,” in Racial Attitudes in the
l990s: Continuity and Change, ed. Steven A. Tuch and Jack K. Martin (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
1997), 14.
“A. Wade Smith, “Prologue: Reflection of Racial Attitude Research,” in Racial Attitudes in the
l990s: Continuity and Change, ed. Steven A. Tuch and Jack K. Martin (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
1997), 14.
8
blacks in the eastern region of Texas. Most works on blacks in Texas are historical
analyses, biographies, and autobiographies. Dr. Alwyn Barr, a leading scholar on
African Americans in Texas, pointed out in 1988:
[That while] the quantity and quality of writings on black Texans. . . is
impressive,. . . there remains a clear need for studies of slavery, racial ideas,
religious activities and beliefs, fraternal groups, and the roles ofwomen. Other
topics awaiting additional analysis include sports, violence, migration, and
urbanization. The period since 1954 is particularly in need of historical treatment
in the areas ofpolitics, economic status, social and cultural changes, education,
family life, and civil rights.’2
In the almost twenty years since Dr. Barr issued the call for research on blacks in Texas,
little work has been done in response. These realities underscore the need for the analysis
and evaluation of blacks in the eastern region of Texas.
Research Questions and Hypothesis
This dissertation provides an assessment of the political attitudes and ideological
orientation of blacks in the eastern region of Texas by asking the following two
questions:
1. What are the attitudes of blacks in the eastern region of Texas on specific political
issues?
2. What correlation exists between the political ideological orientation and political
attitudes of blacks in the eastern region of Texas?
12Alwyn Barr, “Chapter 10: Black Texans,” in A Guide to the History ofTexas, eds. Light
Townsend Cummings and Alvin R. Bailey (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 107.
9
To answer these questions, an attitudinal case study was conducted using a survey
questiOnflaffe.
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that ideological self-identification is a
predictor ofpolitical attitudes. A null hypothesis was excluded from evaluation because
the inverse of the hypothesis cannot be proven satisfactorily by the data from this study.
However, several subhypotheses are used throughout the study to evaluate the
hypothesis, and they are detailed in the research fmdings section of the dissertation.
Scope, Limitations, and Delimitations of the Study
This study is concerned with the correlation between the ideological self-
identification and political attitudes among blacks in the eastern region of Texas. This
study is limited to an examination of the selected African Americans who currently reside
in the eastern region of the state of Texas. Additionally, given monetary constraints and
spatial expanse of the region, not all cities or towns that contain blacks in the eastern
region of Texas were evaluated.
Brief Analysis of Texas
Population and Urban-Rural Patterns
The population of Texas has continued to increase at a relatively high rate. The
only two significant interruptions of this pattern occurred during the period of the Civil
War (1861-1865) and its immediate aftermath and during the period of the Great
10
Depression of the 1 930s.’3 The state’s growth rate has consistently exceeded the
national growth rate by a very large margin—always by at least one-third and frequently
by much more.’4 Because Texas has consistently grown much faster than most other
states, its population rank has gradually increased until it now ranks third, following only
California and New York.’5
Many changes in the character of Texas’s population have resulted from more
than a century of rapid population increase and major economic transformations. One of
the most pronounced, and culturally significant, changes has been the transition from a
dominantly rural, agrarian population to a dominantly urban population. The urban-rural
pattern in Texas was transformed during the decades of 1940 through 1980. At the
beginning of the period, a large number ofpeople left their farms and small towns for
wartime jobs in the larger cities, and relatively few returned to their former rural homes
after World War jjl6
Urbanization in Texas is underscored by recent growth trends — the state’s
metropolitan areas accounted for over 91 percent of the state’s population growth
between 1999 and 2000.’~ Growth has primarily occurred in the large metropolitan areas
13Archie P. McDonald, Eastern Texas History: Selectionsfor the East Texas Historical Journal
(Austin, TX: Jenkins Publishing Company, 1978).
‘4BIDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http:I/bidc.state.tx.usloverviewl2-2te.htm.
15U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Social, Economic, and
Housing Characteristics, PHC-2-45, Texas, Washington, D.C., 2003.
‘6Archie P. McDonald, Eastern Texas History: Selections from the East Texas Historical Journal
(Austin, TX: Jenkins Publishing Company, 1978).
17BJDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http://bidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
11
ofAustin, Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio. During the 1990s, Austin increased its
population by nearly 50 percent.’8 Other areas with significant growth are metropolitan
areas located along the border with Mexico, such as McAllen, Brownsville, and Laredo.
One of the fastest growing regions in the state, the Lower Rio Grande Valley, is
composed of two adjacent metropolitan areas — McAllen and Brownsville. Together they
added 261,025 people between 1990 and 2000 — about the same as the increase for the
entire San Antonio metro area during the same period.’9
The three most populous cities are Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio, each of
which is among the largest in the United States.2° Collectively, these three cities contain
more than one-fifth of the total state population, and their standard metropolitan
statistical areas (SMSAs) contain nearly 50 percent of the state’s residents. Several
relatively large cities dominate other parts of the state. Three — El Paso, Fort Worth,
and Austin — exceed 300,000 population, and another nine cities exceed 100,000.21
However, the most rapid urban growth is not occurring in the central cities of the
metropolitan regions, but in their suburbs — especially around Houston and in the
‘8BIDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http://bidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
‘9BIDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http://bidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
2oj0~ L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
21John L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychlcov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: West-view Press, 1984).
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Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex.22 Based on 2003 census data, Texas had a population of
22,118,509, and the 2000 Census indicates that 82.5 percent of Texas’ population lives in
metropolitan areas.23
Urban growth, however, has not been restricted to the metropolitan regions. Most
cities that had more than 10,000 residents in 1970, registered growth during the next ten
years.24 The pattern is more varied for the smaller cities, especially in the less urbanized
parts of the state, even though many of the smaller cities are growing rapidly, a
substantial number continue to decline in population. The increasing concentration of
major industrial activity in the metropolitan regions and in the larger nonmetropolitan
cities offers better economic opportunities and attracts population from the smaller cities.
Another major contributor to urban growth during the last decade has been immigration
from other states.25
According to the most recent population projections from the Texas State Data
Center at Texas A&M University, the Texas population is expected to reach 33.9 million
by 2030. This would represent a near doubling of the state’s population from 17 million
22A metroplex is an area of 2 or more very close statistical metropolitan areas that converge upon
one another.
23BIDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http:/Ibidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
24Jolm L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
253olm L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westvjew Press, 1984).
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in 1990. Latinos will account for two-thirds of this growth and are expected to
outnumber whites by 2025.26
Most U.S. metropolitan areas show a direct relationship between the share of the
population that is foreign-born and the share of the population that speaks a foreign
language at home. Among the nation’s seventy-five largest metropolitan areas, however,
San Antonio and El Paso are clear standouts. Both cities show a markedly higher
proportion ofpeople speaking a foreign language at home, relative to the population that
is foreign-born. With strong historical and economic ties to Mexico, both San Antonio
and El Paso maintain a strong cultural heritage that includes the use of the Spanish
language.
The Texas State Data Center offers three different projections for the state’s
potential growth. Each scenario indicates that by 2015, the combined population of
Latinos and blacks in Texas is projected to outnumber the white population, and in 2030
the Latino population is estimated to be slightly less than white population projections.
By 2025, the Latino population is projected to significantly outnumber the white
population, and to be more than five times that of the black population. These scenarios
are simply projections of anticipated population growth for the state of Texas, but they
clearly imply changing social dynamics. Demographic changes are altering the dynamics
ofpolitics and also creating a new context for the relationship between racial minorities.
As black and Latino populations increase, the composition of neighborhoods
change and so do the composition of legislative districts. While an alteration in district
26Texas State Data Center, Internet, accessed 15 April 2000, http://www.bidc.state.tx.us/overview.
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composition toward greater minority membership does not necessarily translate into
more black and Latino legislators, it does mean that their community issues become more
salient to whomever is elected to represent them. For this reason, legislative strategies
employed by black and Latino legislators are important.
Labor. Employment Performance, and Income
The leading industries in Texas are educational, health, and social services and
retail trade. Texas employment gained 124,800 nonagricultural jobs in 2004. In
December 2004, Texas’ nonagricultural employment grew by 7,000 jobs. This was the
largest over the year gain since May 2001, and marked six consecutive months of state
nonagricultural job growth. The services sector has been Texas’ largest, employing 7.7
million people, and has been the engine for much of Texas’ growth, generating more than
two-fifths of the state’s net job gain since 1990.27 In recent years, Texas’ economy has
also diversified from oil and gas mining, with significant growth in the transportation and
utilities and wholesale and retail trade sectors. Texas accounted for a disproportionately
large share of U.S. growth in both sectors.
The Texas unemployment rate was 5.8 percent in December 2004,28 up from the
November 2004 rate of 5.7 percent, but well below the December 2003 rate of 6.6
27BIDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http://bidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
28BJDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http://bidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
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percent. The unemployment total in December 2004 stood at 592,300 people.29
Among the state’s metropolitan areas, Bryan-College Station continued to post the lowest
unemployment rate at 1.8, while McAllen-Edinburg-Mission had the highest rate at 11.6
percent. Overall, the median household income in Texas slightly exceeds the national
average, but some parts of the state are clearly among the poorest parts of the nation—a
prime example is Starr County in the Rio Grande Valley. Other parts of the state are
relatively wealthy—for example, Collin County, which is a very fast growing, largely
upper-middle-class suburban county near Dallas.30
Perhaps the most apparent spatial pattern in the distribution of household income
for Texas counties is the concentration of very low-income counties along the state’s
southern border with Mexico. This region is largely Latino, and most jobs are low-
paying and require relatively few skills.
Texas’ two largest metro areas, the Dallas principal metropolitan statistical area
(PMSA) and the Houston PMSA, have large concentrations ofjobs in fmancial and
business services as well as high-paying manufacturing jobs in electronics, motor
vehicles, chemicals, machinery, and aerospace.31 These two metropolitan areas have the
highest per capita incomes of any of the state’s metropolitan areas.
29BJDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http:/Ibidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
30BIDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 JanUary 2005: http:/Ibidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
31 .BIDC: Business and Industry Data Center, Overview of the Texas Economy, from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http://bidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
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Data for 2003 reveal that the median income of households in Texas was
$40,674 compared with the national median of $43,564.32 Eighty-three percent of the
households received earnings and 13 percent received retirement income other than
Social Security.33 Twenty-three percent of the households received Social Security, and
the average income from Social Security was $11,923.
In 2003, 16 percent ofpeople in Texas were in poverty, contrasted with 13
percent of the nation.34 Twenty-three percent of related children under 18 in Texas were
below the poverty level, compared with 13 percent ofpeople 65 years old or over. It is
also worth noting that 13 percent of all families, and 31 percent of families with a female
householder and no husband present had incomes below the poverty level in Texas.35
Minorities and Politics in Texas
Although the tradition of discrimination against and high incidence of poverty
among both black and Mexican Americans suggest a natural political alliance, the two
groups are basically separated both geographically and culturally.36 The 18.4 percent
Spanish-surnamed population is concentrated in south and southwest Texas, an area
32BIDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http://bidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
33BIDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http://bidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
34BIDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http://bidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
35BIDC: Business and Industry Data Center, “Overview of the Texas Economy,” from the Office
of the Governor of Texas, Assessed 4 January 2005: http://bidc.state.tx.us/overview/2-2te.htm.
36Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation ofSouthern Politics: Social Change and
Political Consequences Since 1945 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 328.
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where almost no blacks live.37 The 28 counties in which at least half of the people
have Spanish surnames are located on or close to the Mexican border. By contrast, the
black population, 12.6 percent of the total Texas population, is concentrated in an area
east of a line drawn roughly from Corpus Christi through San Antonio, Austin, and Fort
Worth to the Oklahoma border (see figure ~ Since 1950, the migration of blacks in
Texas has largely been rural to urban, but within the state.
37Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation ofSouthern Politics: Social Change and
Political Consequences Since 1945 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 328.




I I 0 — 1,000 persons (n=138)
I 1,001 — 10,000 persons (n~87)
10,001 — 100,000 persons (n=25)
100,001 — 630,184 persons (n=4)
Fig. 1. Map of black population in Texas based on 2000 Census data. Source: Texas
Office of Data and Statistics.
Compared with the rest of the United States as a whole, Texas has consistently
had a very young population. The disparity between the pattern in Texas and the national
pattern has frequently been quite pronounced. In 2003, the median age was 32.7 years,
and 29 percent of the population were under 18 years and 10 percent were 65 years and
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However, since the early 195 Os, the differential between the national and the
~s:rnedian ages has narrowed considerably.4°
Due to trends toward greater urbanization, the disparity in relative ages between
~counties and urban counties in Texas is apparent. Nearly 40 percent of the state’s
s have a population with a median age of thirty-three years or more, and none of
reach the state mean in the proportion of urbanized population.41 The populations
r growing urban counties are generally at or below the state median age.
Texas Politics and Political-Cultural Regions
In voting patterns, ideologies, political systems, and laws, the state of Texas
veals its diverse cultural origins and borderland status. Rarely have the people of Texas
of one mind politically, and even the legal system that governs them reflects a
t of cultures and internal contradictions.
The discussion of electoral sectionalism within Texas can be summed up by
,~ political regions. These regions reflect, to a considerable degree, culturallethnic
- ms. Lower-southern, upper-southern, midwestern, German, and Mexican-American
_tures each fmd a political expression. The Panhandle midwestern region is
iaracterized by traditional Republican strength, paralleled by conservative Democratic
~ntiment. The upper-southern counties, in an extensive belt from the Blackland Prairie
~kJ.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract ofthe United States: 2003 (l23~ Edition) Washington,
40John L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
D: Westview Press, 1984).
41John L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
~. Westview Press, 1984).
C
20
west to New Mexico, provide the main power base of the conservative Democrats.
The Latino borderland is divided rnto two political regions, including (a) the focus of the
traditional patron system in far South Texas, where a number of huge ranches survive,
and (b) the liberal Democratic! Raza Unida region in Southwest Texas, a product of the
Latino political awakening of the 1960s.42 In South Central Texas, the German counties
form an ultraconservative bastion of traditional Republican and conservative Democratic
power. On more than one occasion, the relatively small German region has decided
statewide elections in favor of the conservative forces. The German counties have
strongly opposed prohibition, the Ku Klux Klan, and populism.43
The Democratic Party has played a central role in the political development of
Texas since white Americans first settled in the region. The majority of early settlers
came from the American South and brought their past political allegiances with them.
The history of the Democratic Party in Texas can be divided into two major periods. In
the first period, from independence in 1836, through the presidential election of 1952, the
Democratic Party in Texas was the only viable party in the state.~ It dominated at all
levels. In the second major period, after 1952, the party faced a growing challenge to its
control of state affairs from the once ineffective Republican Party.45
423olm L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
“~John L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
~Handbook ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”
i1ttp~L/www.tsha.utexas.eduIhandbookIonljne/artjcles/vjewfDD/wadl .html (accessed January 4, 2005).
45Handbook ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”
iIttflLLWww.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/onljne/artjcles/vjewfDD/wadl .html (accessed January 4, 2005).
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The politics of race created tensions within Texas, particularly when the
Supreme Court overturned the state’s white primary law in the case of Smith v. Allwright
(1944).46 The success of the white primary as a method of controlling access to the ballot
box was closely tied to the fortunes of the Democratic Party. The device went through
several changes throughout its existence, but it relied heavily on a solid Democratic
dominance that made a Democratic primary victory tantamount to election. In 1927, in
JWxon v. Herndon the United States Supreme Court struck down a Texas law that
prevented blacks from voting in the Democratic primary.47 The Texas legislature then
authorized the Democratic State Committee to exclude blacks, and, when the Supreme
Court overturned this law in Nixon v. Condon in 1932, Texas repealed the law and left
control of the primary entirely with the Democratic Party.48 Since no state action was
now involved in the committee’s decision to exclude blacks from the Democratic
primary, in 1935 the court held the new Texas arrangement valid in Grovey v.
Townsend.49 Then came Smith v. Allwright. Though it initially opposed the decision, the
Texas Democratic Party came to rely on black voters.
During the 1950s the Texas Democrats wielded significant power in Washington
with Sam Rayburn as speaker of the House and Lyndon Johnson as Senate majority
~Handbook ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/onljne/artjc1es/vjew/DD/wad 1 .html (accessed January 4, 2005).
47Handbook ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”
itttp~//www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/on1ine/artjcIes/vjew/DD/wad1 .html (accessed January 4, 2005).
48Handbook ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”
hnp~L/www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/on1ine/artic1es/view/DD/wad1 .html (accessed January 4, 2005).
49Handbooic ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”
ilttpiliwww.tsha.utexas.edulhandbooklonline/articles/viewfDD/wadl .html (accessed January 4, 2005).
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leader. In the years after the 1952 presidential election, a two-party system began to
emerge. The gubernatorial administration of R. Allan Shivers (1949-57) instituted a
purge of the State Democratic Executive Committee and stacked its membership with his
supporters.5° Shivers also engineered a change in the election laws that permitted cross-
filing for both the Democratic and Republican primaries in the 1952 election. As a result
of the change, conservative Democrats also filed in the Republican primary, thus
reducing the number of Republicans that ran for office. The remainder of the 1950s can
be characterized by factional infighting in the Democratic Party among conservative,
moderate, and liberal backers.
The 1 960s was a period of decline in influence for the Democratic Party and a
period of Republican growth. Texas Democrats statewide were divided between liberals
and moderates. The assassination of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963,
traumatized the nation and shook the Democratic Party since it propelled Johnson into the
White House and created a need for a greater degree of accommodation between
moderate and liberal Texas Democrats. In 1964, Johnson carried his home state with
ease in the presidential race, but in 1968, Hubert Humphrey barely managed to carry the
state.
Liberals in the Texas Democratic Party reached a low point in the 1970s with the
defeat of Yarborough in the Democratic primary by conservative Democrat Lloyd
50Handbook ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”
http~//www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/artic1es/viewfDD/wad1 .html (accessed January 4, 2005).
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Bentsen, Jr.51 Bentsen successfully employed a strategy that conservative Democrats
in Texas later used against the increasingly viable Republican Party, namely, developing
a base of support among middle- to upper- income voters in the primaries, then drawing
from the traditional Democratic constituencies of lower income people, labor unions, and
minorities in the general elections. The 1972 gubernatorial election marked the
culmination of a gradual transition in Texas Democratic Party politics from an era when
elite leaders fighting behind closed doors over a conservative or liberal agenda dominated
party politics to an era of moderation and greater toleration for diverse views.52
In the 1970s and 1980s the Democratic Party in Texas also appeared more open to
the interests ofwomen and minorities. Groups such as the Mexican-American
Democrats and Texas Democratic Women gained a greater voice in party affairs. Also,
women and members of minorities could now be found in elected positions from the
governor down. Nevertheless, the state Republican Party continued to gain strength into
the early 1990s, demonstrating its ability to compete not only in gubernatorial and
senatorial races but in down-the-ballot offices such as state treasurer, agricultural
commissioner, state Supreme Court justice, and railroad commissioner, as well as various
county and local posts.53 By 1990, Republicans also held about a third of the seats in
both houses of the state legislature.
51Handbook ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”
http://www.tsha.utexas.edulhandbook/online/art ides/view/DD/wadl .html (accessed January 4, 2005).
52Handbook ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”
lit~p~//www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/on1jne/artjc1es/vjewfDD/wad1 .html (accessed January 4, 2005).
53Handbook ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/DD/wadl .html (accessed January 4, 2005).
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In 1993, the GOP held both United States Senate seats in Texas after Lloyd
Bentsen became Secretary of the Treasury. The growing strength of the Republican Party
among the Texas delegation served to dilute the power of Texas Democrats in
Washington.54 However, after the election of William Jefferson Clinton as president in
1992, Texas Democrats played a role in the executive branch, despite the fact that Clinton
did not carry Texas. Previously, Democrats had to win Texas in order to win the
presidency; no Democrat had won the White House since Texas entered the Union in
1845 without carrying the state.55 But Clinton was elected, and Texas Democrats’
political clout in Washington declined.
Of more recent origin are regions of conservative Republican strength in suburban
areas and in the huge Permian Basin oil field. The Republican lock on about a third of
the state’s electorate by the early 1990s had a double impact on the Democratic Party. It
encouraged the development of a more moderate leadership for party machinery and
pushed some individual Democratic candidates to try to appear more conservative than
their Republican challengers. In 1994, Republicans regained control of the governor’s
office with the election of George W. Bush. The gubernatorial elections of 1994, 1998,
and 2002 have secured the turn toward Republican leadership in the state of Texas.
54Handbook ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/on1jne/artjc1es/vjew/DD/wad 1 .html (accessed January 4, 2005).
55Handbook ofTexas Online, s.v. “DEMOCRATIC PARTY,”













This chapter presented a review of literature that examines black political
placement within southern politics~ The historical treatment of black political concerns,
including attitudes and behaviors, by scholars is addressed. Such a review is undertaken
because the racial and political legacies of Texas, particularly the eastern region, are
closely linked to the legacy of the South by a shared history. Additionally, literature that
evaluates concepts and variables explored within this study are presented.
Studies of Blacks in the South
Hanes Walton notes that “[ljiterature in black southern politics is quite diverse in
its scope and significance. There are studies of the region and of single states, and there
are sundry categories on leadership, elections, judicial impact, and the like. But despite
the wide variety of studies, certain basic realities connect them all.” These realities, as
identified by Walton include racism, black political actors, and the outcomes ofpolitical
‘Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994), 284.
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actionS and activities.2 Walton points out that while these realities are central to any
study of black politics, particularly southern black politics, the influence ofpolitical,
social, and economic contexts and the ability of blacks to function politically within the
existing paradigm cannot be ignored. The following works examine these stated realities.
In a study by Paul Lewinson, an historical approach is combined with a regional
survey to examine black voting. Lewinson asserts, “[D]isenfranchisement had been a
major factor in preventing southern blacks from voting and shows that black voting had
little to do directly with the politics of race.”3 The 1932 study uncovered that the few
black voters and very small number of black elected officials could do little to alter the
socially and politically pervasive racism.
Walton highlights in his study ofblack politics and black political behavior a little
known, unpublished study by Dr. Ralph Bunche conducted on black southern politics.4
Bunche’s study examined the influence of black voting patterns on public policy and
found that when the opportunity was present for black voter participation, they voted in
greater numbers than whites.5 This study by Bunche challenged the assertion made by
2Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994), 284.
3llanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994).
4Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994), 279.
5RaIph J. Bunche, “A Brief and Tentative Analysis ofNegro Leadership,” memorandum; “The
Programs, Ideologies, Tactics, and Achievements ofNegro Betterment and Interracial Organizations,”
memorandum; “Conceptions and Ideologies of the Negro Problem,” memorandum, Special Collections,
the Ralph Bunche Institute, Duke University, Durham, NC.
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Gunnar Myrdal in his study of race relations in America that southern blacks had not
sought to influence public policy, but rather had sought to end racism.
Studies were also conducted on the differences between black leaders who have
worked with the power structure of the South and those who did not, and on the impetus
for black political participation. Examples of this can be found in the 1960 study of M.
Elaine Burgess, the 1966 work of Donald Matthews and James Prothro, and the 1957
study by Hugh Price.6 Burgess developed a typology ofblack leaders based on her
examination of black leaders in Durham, North Carolina~ The typology identified four
types of leaders: conservatives, moderates, liberals, and radicals; and oriented black
southern politics in way that allowed for greater analysis in the larger context of black
leadership and political influence. The work ofMatthews and Prothro proved to be just
as influential in the study of black politics. Their community study of four cities
employed the techniques ofpolitical behavioralism with the aim of determining whether
individual-personal characteristics, enviromnental variables, or contextual variables were
the most significant factors affecting black political participation.7 What Matthews and
Prothro found was instructive; individual variables were less important than
environmental variables as affects on political participation. Walton indicates that this
6M Elaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth
Carolina Press, 1962); Donald Matthews and James Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, &World, 1966); Hugh Price, Negro and Southern Politics: A Chapter in Florida
History (New York: New York University Press, 1957).
7Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994), 280.
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study was unprecedented in its attempt to explain black political behavior in terms of
both individual and contextual variables.8
Hugh Price in Negro and Southern Politics conducted an in-depth case study of
black political behavior in Florida that explores the layers of influences that impact black
political activity. This case study, though limited to a single state, is able to achieve a
level of scrutiny that escapes broader studies. Detailed local analysis and coverage depth
provide insight into various factors and institutions that influence black political activity.
The direction of analysis in black politics shifted in the 1 960s as blacks in
American society fought increasingly to shift the existing oppressive political and social
paradigm and their place within. The 1967 treatise on black power written by Stokely
Carmichael (also known as Kwame Turé) and Charles Hamilton was revolutionary in its
examination of systemic racism in the United States. They asserted that “African
Americans could no longer afford to believe that their liberation would come through
traditional political processes: true and lasting social change would only be accomplished
through their unity and independence from the pre-existing order.”9 Carmichael and
Hamilton maintained the following:
Our basic need is to reclaim our history and our identity from what must be called
cultural terrorism, from the depredation of self-justifying white guilt. We have to
struggle for the right to create our own terms through which to define ourselves
and our relationship to the society, and to have these terms recognized. This is
the first necessity of a free people, and the first right that any oppressor must
suspend. . . . Political modernization is a critical step in a process that must take
8Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994), 280.
9Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics ofLiberation (New York:
Vmtage Books, 1967), back cover.
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place to rid society of racism. . . Political modernization includes. . . three
major concepts: (1) questioning old values and institutions of the society, (2)
searching for new and different forms ofpolitical structure to solve the political
and economic problems, and (3) broadening the base ofpolitical participation to
include more people in the decision-making process)°
These ideas were a moving force in the continued analysis of the black political context
and in the development of empowerment strategies. Several scholars responded to these
ideas through a reassessment of black political activities and black political leadership.
particularly, Harry Holloway in The Politics ofthe Southern Negro tried to address the
question posed by Carmichael and Hamilton of whether biracial coalitions advance the
black agenda. Carmichael and Hamilton pinpointed the shortcomings of such
relationships and advanced the position that blacks should mobilize themselves and
consider political third parties as an option; Holloway “stressed the importance ofwell-
intentioned whites in helping blacks obtain their political rights.” Based on his
empirical fmdings in Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, and Texas, Holloway
concluded that individual characteristics, not systemic and contextual factors, were
responsible for black political behavior. His fmdings showed that biracial coalitions were
only useful in certain political and social contexts.12 Carmichael and Hamilton, however,
suggest that biracial coalitions do little to advance the political position of blacks in the
United States. Walton indicates that Holloway’s book marked a critical change in the
10Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics ofLiberation (New York:
Vintage Books, 1967), 34-35, 39.
“Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ecL Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994), 281.
12H&~~ Holloway, The Politics ofthe Southern Negro: From Exclusion to Big City Organization
(New York: Random House, 1969).
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analYtical contexts of research on blacks in southern politics. “It had moved from a
concern with the contextual factors to a concern with the black individual and the role
that one person could play in the process despite the external factors.”3
A few years after Holloway’s study, Frederick Wirt introduced “one of a number
ofpioneering impact studies.”4 In an examination of Panola County, Mississippi, Wirt
found through an empirical examination that strong federal enforcement was necessary to
implement federal laws in the South. Wirt’s study is hailed as innovative for its ability to
empirically assess the success or failure ofvarious strategies to enforce public policy in
the South for the protection of blacks.
Other impact studies also assessed the ability of the federal govermnent to enforce
policies that had bearing on the political and social contexts ofblack reality in America.
A study by Donald Strong that focused on the 1957, 1964, and 1965 voting laws found
that the actions by federal judges did little to protect black voting rights or to enforce
these laws.’5 Additionally, Charles V. Hamilton found that the Justice Department of the
late 1960s had reverted to a pre-1965 judicial approach.16 His examination indicated that
sole reliance on the courts for the procurement, advancement, and protection of black
13Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994), 281.
‘4Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994), 282.
‘5Donald Strong, Negroes, Ballots, and Judges: National Voting Rights Legislation in the Federal
Courts (University: University of Alabama Press, 1968).
16Charles V. Hamilton, The Bench and the Ballot: Southern Federal Judges and Black Voters
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
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rights was a flawed strategy. The significance of the three above mentioned impact
studies was that they underscored Carmichael and Hamilton’s call for new strategies for
black empowerment and emphasized the gap between policy enactment and policy
enforcement through an examination ofpolicy outcome.
In the mid-1970s, work by historians about the southern context of black political
activities began to emerge. Walton identifies two of the earliest works as (a) a small
volume ofarticles about three black state legislators in Georgia during Reconstruction by
E. Merton Coulter and (b) a study by Charles Vincent of black state legislators in
Louisiana.17
New works on southern politics would emerge in the late 1980s, but due to
investigative shortcomings in some, it is questionable how far they advanced the study of
black politics.’8 Blacks in Southern Politics~ an edited volume, examines the history of
blacks in the politics of the region, mass and elite levels of black political participation,
the presidential campaign of Jesse Jackson in 1984, and the impact of political structures
and runoff elections on black political representation.’9 Another work by Harold Stanley
also examines blacks in southern politics, and his thesis argues that the 1965 Voting
Rights Act mobilized whites in the South to thwart the increase in black voter
‘7Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994), 282.
18Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in the South (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1987) as paraphrased in Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the
Tradition and the Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes
Walton (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 284.
19Laurence Moreland, Robert Steed, and Todd Baker, eds., Blacks in Southern Politics (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1987).
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registration.2° Stanley’s use of a limited number of blacks in the National Election
Studies undermine the investigative potential of his study. Earl Black and Merle Black
examined the impact that new southern leadership and the appearance of black elected
officials had on transforming the region.2’ Black and Black employ a questionable
conceptualization strategy when they attempt to explain black politics in terms of race
relations.
Race and Southern Politics
A classic work on race as a unit of analysis is V.0. Key, Jr.’s Southern Politics.
Key asserts, “. . . the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro.
Whatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later
the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro.~~Z~ Thus, the political and social contexts of the
South were whites’ response to the presence of blacks, underscoring the pervasive
influence of blacks on southern politics. Key established that blacks as the nucleus of
southern politics was more a factor oftheir presence and the impact of that presence on
the political economy.
The establishment of blacks as central to southern political life is expanded on in
the work ofAlexander Heard. Heard examined the impact of blacks on the balance of
20~o1d Stanley, Voter Mobilization and the Politics ofRace (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1987).
21Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in the South (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1987).
22k, 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics: In State and Nation (New York: Vintage, 1949) as quoted in
Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the Future,” in
Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton(Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1994), 284.
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power in the South and the reluctance of southern whites to institute a two-party
system for fear that blacks would upset the existing balance of power.23 Heard’s
contribution to the examination of black politics rests in his support for and exploration
of other paradigmatic realities. His work suggests that blacks could move beyond voting
as the primary means ofpolitical participation, and he offers recommendations toward
that end.
Researchers have revisited Key’s state-by-state approach since the Civil Rights
Movement, but they have largely ignored the theoretical foundation and focus laid by
Key and Heard.24 However, some scholars assert that the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 concretized Key’s position that blacks are
central to any examination of southern politics; thus, many studies on southern politics
now include sections, how ever brief, on black political behavior in the region or ina
particular state.
Race and Politics
The study of the influence and pervasiveness of race in American politics has
continued but instead of the southern political paradigm being the starting point of
examination, the movement in the study of black politics has been toward national and
city-specific studies. Walton notes that the trend in black political research has been to
move away from an examination of contextual influences and toward an understanding of
23Alexander Heard, A Two-Party South? (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1952).
24Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994), 286.
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causation at the individual level.25 While some studies do continue to examine
contextual influence from a regional perspective, the influence of the South and the role
of the southern political paradigm have been minimized ifnot disregarded. Others
embrace an approach that evaluates national-level influences on black political behavior,
but some of these studies, too, undervalue the influence of southern black politics.
Additionally, a review of this diverse arid vast body of literature uncovers varied
methodologies that have increasingly utilized sample survey methodology and aggregate
data analysis~
This newer body of literature can be divided into two categories, those that
continue to examine race as central feature ofpolitical activity and those that examine
race as one ofmany variables. What are missing from many ofthese studies are
methodological techniques that delineate and explore the layers of contextual influence.
Rick Hill attributes the divergence and departure from a contextual approach to the
absence of a delineated methodology for the systematic study of black political
phenomena.26 The study ofthe role and affect ofrace on political activities in isolation
of an understanding of the causation at the individual level and without consideration for
the contextual factors places a study at risk of drawing limited conclusions and being a
limited political resource.
25Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ecL Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994), 286.
26Rick Hill, “The Study of Black Politics: Notes on Rethinking the Paradigm,” in Black Politics
and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis ed. Hanes Walton (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 11-17.
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Martin Kilson recognizes that the political classes of different American ethnic
blocs exhibit three distinct politicization personas in their progression from a marginal
status to a more salient one. Type I is the alienation or protest persona; Type II is the
ethnic bloc empowemient persona; Type III is the systemic-convergence persona or the
transethnic persona.27 Black political development is evaluated by the three personae,
and Kilson concludes that the black political class development differs from the
development ofother ethnic groups because ofthe difference in the time periods and
political climate in which the metamorphoses have taken place and because of cleavages
in black leadership.
The goal of M. Mangum’s article is to account more fully for the influence of
psychological involvement on black voter turnout than currently exists in the literature.28
Using the 1996 National Black Election Study, several hypotheses are tested that detail
the potential ways the turnout decisions of black Americans are influenced by trust in
government, political engagement, and political efficacy at both the individual level and
the group level. Trust in government has an inverse relationship with turnout, while
political engagement has a strong and consistent positive effect. Mangum also found that
individual political efficacy does not factor into the black vote?s calculus, but group
political efficacy does. Further, a reexamination of the “mistrust-sense of efficacy”
27M&~ Kilson, “An Anatomy ofthe Black Political Class,” in The Politics ofMinority
Coalitions: Race, Ethnicity, and Shared Uncertainties, edited by Wilbur C. Rich (Westport, CT: Praeger,
1996), 13.
28M Mangum, “Psychological Involvement and Black Voter Turnout,” Political Research
Quarterly 56(1) (2003): 41.
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hypothesis is confirmed, but a test of the mistrust sense of efficacy” hypothesis
0~ncerfl1flg group political efficacy is not supported.
The civil rights era of the 1960s had a substantial positive impact on the political
context of the African-American community. But the Reagan and Bush presidencies
attacked and eliminated many of the reforms created in that period, negatively
transforming the political context of the African-American community. A Democratic
administration followed these Republican presidents, and this administration had the
option of rolling back the transformation, going along with the transformation, or doing a
little ofboth; since this was a centrist rather than a liberal democratic administration, it
was not clear which option or options would be implemented.29 Dawson tests the
hypothesis that the Reagan-Bush administrations pushed the political climate in this
country far to the right of the political spectrum, and African Americans were not
immune to the political trends that occurred in the larger political arena, to determine
whether this directly affected African Americans’ identification with the American
political party system. Specifically, he tests the proposition that African Americans’
identification with the Democratic Party declined during the Reagan-Bush eraS Using the
National Black Election Study of 1984-1988, Dawson suggests two aspects of groups
interests as important: the respondents’ perception that their fate was linked to the race as
a whole, and their belief that whites were economically better off than blacks.3° Dawson
2~ Mangum, “Psychological Involvement and Black Voter Turnout,” Political Research
Quarterly 56(1) (2003): 15.
30Michael C. Dawson, “African American Political Opinion: Volatility in the Reagan-Bush Era”
African American Political Power: The Political Context Variable, ed. H. Walton (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997), 135-153.
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asserts that these two factors presuppose each other, and together they powerfully
predict much of the micro-level political behavior and political opinion ofAfrican
Americans.3’
Katherine Tate posits that “black voting behavior is particularly influenced by the
political context.”32 Her analysis of the voting behavior of blacks in the 1984 and 1988
presidential elections supports her thesis that voting, as an important tool in the struggle
by blacks for racial equality, supports the use ofelectoral politics as a means of social
and economic group advancement.33 In his analysis of political context as a variable,
Walton fmds that “[t]he political context variable, which influences and shape political
behavior at either the individual or group level, is both dynamic and static as are the
elements in the context and the relationship between change and the context is
reciprocal.”34
Jordan and Kadalie assert that theoretically, contextual analysis stresses that
individual behavior is affected by the social and political milieu and not just by individual
31Michael C. Dawson, “African American Political Opinion: Volatility in the Reagan-Bush Era”
African American Political Power: The Political Context Variable, ed. H. Walton (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997), 153.
32Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), xi.
33Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993).
34Hanes Walton, “The Political Context Variable: The Transformation Politics of the Reagan,
Bush, and Clinton Presidencies,” in African-American Power and Politics: The Political Context Variable,
ed. Hanes Walton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 10.
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attributes or characteristics.35 As such, several theoretical and methodological
weaknesses and shortcomings stem from ambiguities that are inherent in a reliance solely
on aggregate data. They fmd the following to be true:
ReconceptualiZatiOfl of the political context variable is necessary because there
may be no true contextual effect at all, and attitudinal linkages that account for
any contextual effects observed must be identified. Moreover, an identification of
precise socioeconomic characteristics and environmental settings that one should
expect to produce a positive or negative race-based contextual effect on voter
behavior is still problematic; nonetheless, the literature strongly supports a
measurable link between social interaction and the contextual effects ofrace on
voter selection and choice in the electoral process. Racial issues remain
significant in the relationship between African Americans and whites~ Although
race has been a dominant political cleavage in the United States for most of its
history, racially specific issues appear to produce a more contextual effect than
demography or geography on voter behavior and choice.36
Hence, political context as a variable should be guarded against providing only a
urndimensional analysis, but the empirical and theoretical contributions to be gained from
exploring other dimensions ofAfrican-American voting behavior should also be
emphasized. As Jordan and Kadalie point out, “The analytical techniques employed to
analyze the political context variable assume that the structural determinants of white
political behavior are racial/demographic rather than economic or political.”37 They
further assert that the racial concentration hypothesis lacks credibility in a system
35Kenneth Jordan and Modibo Kadalie, “Prologue: The Conceptualization of a Variable” African
American Power and Politics: The Political Context Variable ed. Hanes Walton (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997), xxxii.
36Kenneth Jordan and Modibo Kadalie, “Prologue: The Conceptualization of a Variable” African
American Power and Politics: The Political Context Variable ed. Hanes Walton (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997), xxxv.
37Kenneth Jordan and Modibo Kadalie, “Prologue: The Conceptualization ofa Variable” African
American Power and Politics: The Political Context Variable ed. Hanes Walton (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997), xxxvi.
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whereby white attitudes and behaviors toward African Americans are shaped by the
resolve to inaintam socioeconomic and political control regardless of the levels of
residential density.38
Political Culture, Socialization, and Opinion
Political Culture
Matthew Holden wrote, “Since culture is behavior learned in cohorts, it follows
that when two groups are separated by legal or behavioral frontiers over any significant
time, some tendency toward cultural difference must develop.”39 Holden further
maintains that “. . . if they coexist within the same linguistic, economic, or political
system they must develop significant commonalities.”4° These observations highlight the
fact that blacks share cultural commonalities with whites, but that distinctive elements
also exist to constitute an identifiable black culture. Dr. W.E.B. DuBois identifies this as
the “twoness” that pervades black existence; blacks function dually within American
society—within mainstream culture and within black culture.41 Richard Delgado supports
this observation with his concept of dual pluralism which asserts that the political process
38Kenneth Jordan and Modibo Kadalie, “Prologue: The Conceptualization of a Variable” African
American Power and Politics: The Political Context Variable ed. Hanes Walton (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997), xxxvii.
39Matthew Holden, The Politics ofthe Black ‘Nation’ (New York: Chandler, 1973).
40Matthew Holden, The Politics ofthe Black ‘Nation’ (New York: Chandler, 1973).
41W.E.B. DuBois, “The Souls of Black Folks,” in WE.B. DuBois Reader, ed. David Levering
Lewis (New York: Henry Holt, 1920/1995).
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is ~ifurcated—reSp011dmg to the interests of mainstream and marginalized groups
differentlY.42
Fifty years ago Kroeber and Kluckhorn identified more than 150 relatively
distinct defmitions of culture in use.43 The situation has not improved with time. Smith
and Seltzer confme the defmition of culture to shared values, beliefs, and behavior that
constitute the meanings of a way of life.~ They identify several distinctive attitudes,
values, and behaviors that partially constitute the culture ofblacks in the United States.
First, blacks ofvarious social classes, to a greater degree than whites, were alienated or
distrustful of government and societal institutions as well as suspicious or distrustful of
the motives of other individuals. Second, blacks of all social classes were more religious
than whites. Third, blacks were distinctively a liberal group, especially on issues of the
economy and the welfare state.45
The perspectives of these scholars challenge the works of social scientists who
discount the existence of a distinctive black culture, much less a black political culture.
An example of such works is Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s The Civic Culture, in
which blacks were virtually invisible given that fewer than one hundred of the
respondents were black. From this, Almond and Verba drew the conclusion, “Thus, in its
42Richard Delgado, When Equality Ends: Stories about Race and Resistance (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1999).
~A. Kroeber and C. Kluckhom, Culture: A Critical Review ofConcepts and Definitions (New
York: Peabody Musewn of Archaeology and Ethnology, 1952).
~Robert C. Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Laitham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 12.
45Hanes Walton and Robert C. Smith, American Politics and the African American Questfor
Universal Freedom (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2003), 40.
42
initial formation and operationalization, the African American political subculture did
,,46
not appeaL
Moreover, to answer the question “What is African-American political culture?”
one must look to the work ofAfrican-American social scientists like Dr. W.E.B. DuBois
and Ralph Bunche and their examination ofpolitical consciousness.47 Political
consciousness is defined as supporting African-American political candidates, organizing
African-American political parties, holding state and national conventions, and forming
political caucuses and leagues.48 Walton and Smith also identify the concept ofpolitical
culture and divide into three components: (a) a cognitive component — knowledge and
beliefs about political reality; (b) an affective component — feelings with respect to
politics, political leaders, and institutions; and (c) an evaluative component — one’s
commitment to political values and ideas.49 Charles Hamilton and Matthew Holden
include additional components to the African-American political culture, including the
importance of the spoken word. David Easton offers insight in his redefmition of the
concept. Easton
acknowledges that various subgroups in the political system are distinguished
by race, ethnicity, language, religion, and the like may be relegated by different
normative and value systems and conceptions of authority, and these are regarded
~Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture as quoted in Hanes Walton and Robert C.
Smith, American Politics and the African American Questfor Universal Freedom (New York: Addison
Wesley Longman, 2003), 38.
47Hanes Walton and Robert C. Smith~ American Politics and the African American Questfor
Universal Freedom (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2003), 39.
48Hanes Walton and Robert C. Smith, American Politics and the African American Questfor
Universal Freedom (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2003), 39.
49Hanes Walton and Robert C. Smith, American Politics and the African American Questfor
Universal Freedom (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2003), 38.
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as political subcultures. Thus, a subculture or political subculture refers to
patterns that are dominant within the respective subgroups, but which other
members of the system may choose to ignore and reject without remorse, guilt,
shame, condemnation, or fear of sanctions. In short, there is not a single
homogeneous political culture but a composite of several subculture variations.50
Political Socialization
Political socialization refers to the process by which individuals acquire the
attitudes, values, and beliefs that comprise their political culture. Agents of socialization
include family, church, school, peer groups, the media, and political events.51 James
Banks indicates that “values, like attitudes and beliefs, are learned from the groups in
which the individual is socialized; we are not born with a set of values and do not derive
them independently.”52 The implications of such an assessment are profound. Even
though mainstream society identifies common norms and inculcates pervasive values
within members of that society, groups also inculcate individual members with the values
of their culture or microculture. Particularly in regional, ethnic, and racial communities,
some values that are deemed important are absent from other communities.
Gunnar Myrdal, in An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern
Democracy, “suggested that the political socialization process in black America was
dysfunctional because it failed to socialize blacks into the white ‘mainstream’ political
50Hanes Walton and Robert C. Smith, American Politics and the African American Questfor
Universal Freedom (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2003).
51Hanes Walton and Robert C. Smith, American Politics and the African American Questfor
Universal Freedom (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2003), 47.
52James A. Banks, Teaching Strategiesfor Ethnic Studies, 5th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
1991), 77.
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culture.”53 Myrdal’s thesis became very influential because few of the early
socialization studies analyzed African Americans; those that did appear offered support
to the Myrdal thesis. However, a few early studies did fmd some different realities about
African-American political socialization that deny the Myrdal thesis. E. Franklin
Frazier’s 1957 work challenges Myrdal’s assessment by engaging in an expansive
assessment of the Negro dilemma.54 Frazier provides a provocative treatment of race
relations from a world, rather than national, perspective and pays special attention to the
history of colonialism and its consequences. Historian Oscar Handlin also examines the
historical role of systemic oppression as a major contributing factor to the situation of
blacks in America.55 These two works were groundbreaking in their historical and global
assessment of the role of colonization and systemic oppression in creating a bifurcated
reality from blacks in America. The fmdings ofFrazier and Handlin center on a
contextual understanding of determinant factors; what they found was a reality that
created opportunity for a distinctive black culture to emerge, one that reinforces and
celebrates black life, allowing it to thrive and flourish in black America alongside a
mainstream culture.
Studies have found that one of the central agents of socialization in the black
community is the black church and religion. The family, the school, and peer groups, in
that order, are the next significant agents. Morris, Brown, and Hatchett also identified
53llanes Walton and Robert C. Smith, American Politics and the African American Questfor
Universal Freedom (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2003), 47.
54E. Franklin Frazier, Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 1957).
~Oscar Handlin, Race and Nationality in American Life (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor
Books, 1957).
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c~ivil rights protests and the black power movement as agents ofpolitical
soeializatiolt56 Other agents of socialization have been identified and include African
American Democratic presidential candidates, the Million Man March in October 1995,
social protests, and music. However, Adolph Reed, Jr. has critically challenged the
motives, messages, and meanings of these other agents, as well as the more central agents
of socialization.57 hi any case, these different socializing agents have served as
mechaiiisms that have allowed African Americans to learn and execute old and new
forms ofpolitical behavior and to formulate political opinions and attitudes.
Public and Political Opinion
Smith and Seltzer point out that public opinion has no precise, universally agreed
on definition. V.0. Key, in Public Opinion and American Democracy, links the term to
government, writing that public opinions are those “opinions held by private persons
which govenmient fmd it prudent to heed.”58 Lane and Sears, on the other hand, write
that “opinions have to be about something,” and the something they say depends upon
citizens’ attitudes toward government, policy, and policy makers.59 However previously
defined, scholars and the public generally understand public opinion to be opinions about
~Hanes Walton and Robert C. Smith, American Politics and the African American Questfor
Universal Freedom (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2003), 49.
57AdoIph Reed, Jr., Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene
(New York: The New Press, 2000).
58~ 0. Key, Public Opinion andAmerican Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961).
59R. Lane and D. Sears, Public Opinion (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964).
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the public. Political opinions are those opinions about government and aspects of the
political process.
Numerous surveys have been conducted to evaluate the public opinions of
Americans, but ofparticular interest to this study is the evaluation of the general publics’
opinions about political issues. Work by Kinder in 198360 and Sniderman in 199361 have
found that the “American public is in general indifferent and uninformed about politics,
political leaders, ideologies, and issues.”62 Smith and Seltzer point out that
[v]ery few Americans structure their opinions on politics in ideological terms, and
their views on issues tend to be ad hoc, inconsistent, transitory, and often
contradictory. These generalizations hold for virtually all issues — foreign and
domestic — except, that is, for race.63
Surveys over the past thirty years have been evaluated by political and social
scientist and have indicated a consistent decline in overt expressions of racist and white
supremacist attitudes among white Americans.64 Additionally, studies by Schuman,
Steeth, and Bobo in 1985, and Sniderman and Hagen in 1985, show that the principle of
60DOn Kinder, “Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion,” in The State ofthe
Discipline, ed. A. Finifier (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983).
61Paul Sniderman, “The New Look in Public Opinion Research,” in The State ofthe Discipline, ed.
A. Finifler (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983).
62Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 4.
63Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 4.
~See J. Condran, “Changes in White Attitudes toward Blacks, 1963-67,” in Public Opinion
Quarterly 43: 463 -76; H. Schuman, C. Steeth, and Lawrence Bobo, Racial Attitudes in America: Trends
and Interpretationg (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); and Robert Smith, Racism in the
Post-Civil Rights Era: Now You See It, Now You Don’t (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995).
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racial equalitY is now embraced by white Americans by an increasingly large margin.65
Although whites today are less likely to openly express racist views than in the past, the
mistaken conclusion should not be drawn that hostility regarding race has disappeared.
[jistead, it has become more subtle or covert. Works by several scholars indicate that
symbolic racism is prevalent; specifically, work by Sniderman and Hagen indicate that
whites have shifted from old-fashioned racism to racial resentments based on a
commitment to core American values, particularly individualism.~ Sears points out that
in this modern racism, blacks, according to whites, are not inferior and could get ahead in
society, but they lack the initiative or drive to succeed.67 Blacks disagree, viewing racism
and racial discrimination as the principal explanation for persistent inequalities between
the races, as indicated by Kinder and Sanders, and Smith and Seltzer. Kinder and
Sanders offer this summary:
Whites tend to think that racial discrimination is no longer a problem; that
prejudice has withered away; that the real worry these days is reverse
discrimination, penalizing innocent whites for the sins of the distant past.
Meanwhile, blacks see racial discrimination as ubiquitous; they think of prejudice
65H Schuman, C. Steeth, and Lawrence Bobo, Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and
Interpretations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) and P. Sniderman and M. Hagen, Race
and Inequality: A Study ofAmerican Values (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1985).
66See P. Snidennan and M. Hagen, Race and Inequality: A Study ofAmerican Values (Chatham,
NJ: Chatham House, 1985); D. Sears, C. Hensler, and L. Speer, “White Opposition to Busing: Self-Interest
or Symbolic Politics,” in American Political Science Review 73 (1979): 369-84; D. Kinder and L. Sanders,
Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996);
Lawrence Bobo, J. Klugel and R. Smith, “Laissez Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a Kinder Gentler
Anti-Black Ideology,” in Los Angeles Riots: Lessonsfor the Urban Future, ed. M. Baldassare (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1997).
67D. Sears, “Symbolic Racism,” in Eliminating Racism, eds. P. Katz and D. Taylor (New York:
Plenum, 1988).
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as a plague; they say that racial discrimination, not affirmative action, is still
the rule in American society.68
A small body of research exists that examines black opinion in its own right.
These studies highlight and investigate the various forces that shape black public opinion.
In their 1992 study, Smith and Seltzer found that on some attitudes there are few, if any,
racial differences between blacks and whites in political attitudes and behavior. These
areas included attitudes on moral issues, family values, illegal drug use, and some forms
ofpolitical participation. However, “on other attitudes the apparent race differences
disappear when class is introduced.”69 But they also identified three distinct sets of racial
attitudes that persisted even after controls were introduced for race. First, blacks were
found to be more religious than whites. Second, blacks were more alienated or distrustful
of the government. Third, blacks were distinctively liberal, particularly on issues of the
economy and the welfare state.
Other studies have corroborated the fmdings of Smith and Seizer. Allen, Dawson,
and Brown found that a distinctive black belief system existed that was strongly
influenced by religion~~° This study showed that religiosity constrained and biased
blacks’ interpretation of reality and contributed to a strong sense of racial group
identification and consciousness. Similarly, Brown and Wolford, Reese and Brown, and
68D Kinder and L. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 287.
69Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Race, Class, and Culture: A Study in Afro-American Mass
Opinion (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992).
70R. Allen, M. Dawson, and R. Brown, “A Schema-Based Approach to Modeling an African
Amencart Belief System,” in American Political Science Review 83 (1989): 421-41.
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Harris found that black religiosity contributed to political awareness, voting, and civic
activism.7’
Studies have also explored black opinion in terms of black voter identification
with the Democratic Party, support for the two presidential campaigns of Jesse Jackson,
and group solidarity. These studies have shown that “class divisions do not significantly
structure black partisanship, issue stance, or vote choice.”72 Finally, research by Dawson
has found evidence of an increased level ofblack nationalist or separatist thinking in
black mass opinion, especially among the poor and the youngY3 Indeed, Bobo, Kiugel,
and Smith also note a tendency toward support of certain aspects of black nationalism.74
Voting Behavior
Brooks and Manza address unresolved questions about the political alignments of
the middle class through an investigation of change in voting behavior among two of its
principal segments: managers and professionals. Among professionals, but not among
71R. Brown and M. Wolford, “Religious Resources and African American Political Action,” in
National Political Science Review 4 (1994): 30-48; L. Reese and R. Brown, “The Effects of Religious
Messages on Racial Identity and System Blame among Blacks on African Americans,” in Journal of
Politics 57 (1995): 24-39; F. Harris, “Something Within: Religion As a Mobilizer of African American
Political Activism,” in Journal ofPolitics 56 (1994): 48-65.
72Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 7.
73Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 4 and Michael Dawson, “Structure and
Ideology: the Shaping of Black Public Opinion,” paper prepared for presentation at the 1995 Annual
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1995.
74Lawrence Bobo, 3. Klugel, and Robert Smith, “Laissez Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a
Kinder Gentler Anti-Black Ideology,” in Racial Attitudes in the 1980s: Continuity and Change, eds. S.
Tuch and 3. Martin (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).
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managers, there has been a long-term shift away from support for Republican
presidential candidates to support for Democratic candidates. Competing hypotheses
about the sources of these trends are tested using data from the National Election Studies.
Jncreasingly liberal attitudes toward social issues, not changes in economic evaluations or
~0ciodemograph1C compositions, explain the growing tendency for professionals to vote
Democratic and their increasing divergence from managers. Party identification and
partisan affect substantially mediate the effects of social group membership, views of the
welfare state, and attitudes towards social issues. The relevance of these fmdings to
understanding the Democratic realignment of professionals and the stable Republican
• alignment of managers is discussed.
Manza and Brooks examine Pakuiski’s and Waters’ succinct summary ofmany of
the arguments that have purported to show that class is no longer useful as an analytical
tool. Focusing on their specific claim that class decisions are no longer relevant to
understanding political behavior in postindustrial capitalist democracies, Manza and
Brooks argue that Pakuiski and Waters’s assertions are based on a very narrow reading of
the contemporary research literature of the topic and that their conclusions are
unjustified.75 Indeed, recent research by the authors on postwar voting trends in the
United States reveals no evidence of declining class voting.
A study by Mutz and Mondak examines the effects of economic information
about groups on individual political judgments, and possible explanations for these
effects based on data from the 1984 South Bend, IN Study panel survey on presidential
75J. Manza and C. Brooks, “Does Class Analysis Still Have Anything to Contribute to the Study of
Politics?-Coniments,” in Theory and Society 25(5) 1996: 717-724.
I.
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vote choices (N = 1,500 respondents in three survey waves).76 Results indicate that
people often hold economic perceptions based on groups intermediate between the nation
and the family, and such perceptions affect choices in presidential elections. Rather than
being a function of group membership, identification, or comparison, however, a positive
voting influence appears to be a result of the perception that class groups have had
similar trends in economic performance. It is concluded that the effects of group-based
perception on voting behavior appear to reflect sociotropic concerns rather than just self-
interest.77
The impact of changes in district racial composition on representational
sensitivity to African-American policy preferences was examined through comparison of
the voting behavior ofwhite U.S. representatives before and after the 1992 redistricting
cycle.78 Analysis revealed that Democratic Party membership, prior ideological voting
patterns, and a strong district showing for President Bill Clinton had a strong positive
association with pro-African American 1993 voting behavior. Recently elected
representatives were less likely to vote pro-African American than representatives with
longer incumbency. Changes in district racial composition and rural nature of district had
no significant impact on Republican voting behavior. Increases in African-American
percenta~ges of district population were associated with greater sensitivity to African
76D C. Mutz and 3. J. Mondak, “Dimensions of Sociotropie Behavior: Group-Based Judgments of
Fairness and Well-Being,” in American Journal ofPolitical Science 41(1): Jan. 1997.
77D. C. Mutz and J. J. Mondak, “Dimensions of Sociotropie Behavior: Group-Based Judgments of
Fairness and Well-Being,” in American Journal ofPolitical Science 41(1): Jan. 1997.
7~L. M. Overby and K. M. Cosgrove, “Unintended Consequences? Racial Redistricting and the
Representation of Minority Interests,” in Journal ofPolitics 58(2) 1996: 540-550.
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American policy preferences among Democratic representatives, and decreases in
African~Ameflcan percentages were associated with less pro-African-American voting
79
behavior.
After adjusting for voter rationalization, two-stage analysis of a pooled National
Election Study dataset reveals party identification and assessments of incumbent
reputation to be significant factors in voter support at the individual level.80 The design
of a reciprocal model used in the analysis is described, noting the selection and
measurement of variables, predictors, and hypotheses.
Church and Attitudes
Angela Calhoun-Brown used data from the 1984 National Black Election Study to
analyze the impact of church attendance and church membership on electoral and
political participation, and on the psychological components of action -- consciousness,
system responsiveness, and governmental trust. It is found that, while church attendance
was not a very strong predictor ofpolitical involvement or of the differing components of
motivation, going to a political church was an extremely influential indicator of both in
the 1984 elections.8’ Calhoun-Brown also found that black evangelicals do not mobilize
with the Christian right. Evidence indicates that the major reason for this is not primarily
a lack of conservative positions on family values issues but major differences in affect
79L. M. Overby and K. M. Cosgrove, “Unintended Consequences? Racial Redistricting and the
Representation of Minority Interests.” Journal ofPolitics 58(2) 1996: 540-550.
80D W. Romero, “The Case of the Missing Reciprocal Influence: Incumbent Reputation and the
Vote,” in Journal ofPolitics 5 8(4) 1996: 1198-1207.
81Angela Calhoun-Brown, “African American Churches and Political Mobilization: The
Psychological Impact of Organizational Resources,” in Journal ofPolitics 58(4) 1996: 935-953.
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toward highly visible groups that provide much of the content of symbolic political
attitudes.82
Using data on grassroots party activists in the South, Clawson and Clark explore
the attitudinal structure of Democratic activists.83 Because of their socialization
experiences with both racial and gender discrimination, it is hypothesized that African
American women have a unique attitudinal structure regarding racial and gender issues
when compared to other activist subgroups. Results indicate the importance of race,
gender, and the black church for understanding the structure of African-American
women’s political attitudes. Unlike whites or black men, African-American women
locate issues of race and gender on a single dimension; whether abortion attitudes fit on
that dimension depends on the religious involvement of these activists.
Using self-identification as “fundamentalist” as an instance ofpoliticized group
identification, a study by Jelen suggests that simple group identification and simple
negative affect toward outgroups have independent effects on the direction ofpolitical
attitudes.84 Additionally, data from the 1960-1992 National Election Studies are drawn
on by Manza and Brooks to analyze the relationship between religion and political
behavior in U.S. presidential elections.85 The magnitude of the religious cleavage
82Angela Calhoun-Brown, “The Politics of Black Evangelicals,” in American Politics Quarterly
26(1) 1998: 29.
83R. Clawson and 3. A. Clark, “The Attitudinal Structure of African American Women Party
Activists: The Impact of Race, Gender, and Religion,” in Political Research Quarterly 56(2) 2003: 211.
MT. G. Jelen, “Politicized Group Identification: The Case of Fundamentalism,” in The Western
Political Quarterly 44(1) 1991: 209.
85 ,, .. . . . .J. Manza and C. Brooks, The Religious Factor in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1960-1992,
American Journal ofSociology 103(1) 1997: 38-81.
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renlams substantial, but has declined during the past nine presidential elections. The
single factor behind this decline is the reduction in support for Republican candidates
among denominationaflY liberal Protestants, whose changing voting behavior is a
function of their increasingly liberal views on social issues. The political alignments of
Catholics and conservative Protestants have been very stable relative to the electorate-
wide mean over this time period, and there is no evidence of increased political
mobilization among conservative Protestants.
Conclusions
This chapter presented a review of literature that examined black political
placement within southern politics. The review was designed to trace the historical
treatment of black political concerns, including attitudes and behaviors, by scholars.
Such a review was undertaken because the racial and political legacies of Texas,
particularly the eastern region, are closely linked to the legacy of the South by a shared
history. Literature that evaluated concepts and variables explored within this study were
also presented.
Chapter 3 provides the research design for the study. In addition to defming
variables and concepts central to the study, the following chapter discusses the survey




particularly in the study ofpolitical attitudes, it is essential to uncover the
potential impact that various national, regional, and local, as well as historical and current
realities have on the formation of cognitive and behavioral responses. Toward this end,
this chapter outlines the design of the study, discusses regions as a concept, and outlines
how the regional approach is used in this study. Additionally, East Texas as a region is
defined and the research methodology is provided.
Design of the Study
Harry Holloway in a 1969 classic work, The Politics ofthe Southern Negro: From
Exclusion to Big City Organization, discusses the importance of a contextual approach to
the examination of the political phenomenon that have shaped southern black political
reality. Methodologically, Holloway emphasizes the need to explore the background and
distinctiveness that have shaped the unique experiences of the southern black; the
spectrum ofpolitical patterns that have emerged as black political life in the South has
evolved must be couched in an examination of the historical developments and
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characteristics of the region.1 Building on this methodological assertion, this case
study examines the political attitudes of blacks in the eastern region of Texas. Case study
methodolOgY is a commonly used method because of its utility in exploring and
~xamIflmg a particular phenomenon in a specific location for a specific time period. A
regional approach to the case study is employed to allow for a localized examination of
black political attitudes.
Conceptual Framework
Region as a Concept
“The study of regionalism is the study of the relation between people and the
places in which they live.”2 Particularly in Texas, a state defmed by multiple and at times
overlapping regions, it is important to defme the approach of analysis. Regions can be
defined or identified in three ways: geographically, abstractly, and functionally. First, a
region can be defined geographically by identifying compass-based partitions or by
identifying terrain or climatic differences.3 The second defmition of region is that of
abstraction, in that the distinctions may be based on something as simple as a cultural
connotation. Perhaps most interesting is a regional defmition “revealed in the global
world of myth, literature, music, architecture, and popular culture which, in some regions
‘Harry Holloway, The Politics ofthe Southern Negro: From Exclusion to Big City Organization
(New York: Random House, 1969), 5.
2Wi11i~ R. Ferris, “Region as Art” in Regional Studies: The Interplay ofLand and People, ed.
Glen E. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 3.
3Louis Wirth, “The Limitations of Regionalism,” in Regionalism in America ed. Merrill G. Jensen
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1951), 382.
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like the South in particular, intensifies as the distance from the region increases.”4 The
third type of region is functional.
A functional region is an area that has been organized to function politically,
socially, or economically and can also have central points where the functions are
coordinated, directed, or dispensed.5 Examples of such are city halls, capital cities,
church buildings, farmsteads, and factories.6 Not all functional regions have clearly
defmed borders, nor do they engender internal homogeneity. The state of Texas provides
an excellent example of this. Texas houses three major and very different cultures —
Anglo American, African American, and Latin American. Anglo-American culture has
historically centered in northern and central Texas; African Americans overwhelmingly
reside in the eastern region of the state. Thus, East Texas is the center of black cultural
influence in the state; and Mexican-American influence has historically been focused in
the southern sections of the state. Another interesting aspect of functional regions is that
multiple regions may exist on differing scales that may overlap. At the same time, one
needs to be aware that powerfully functioning regions can act to create cultural
homogeneity within their borders, causing formal and functional regions to unite.
4William R. Ferris, “Region as Art” in Regional Studies: The Interplay ofLand and People ed.
Glen E. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 5.
5Louis Wirth, “The Limitations of Regionalism,” in Regionalism in America ed. Merrill G. Jensen
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1951), 382.
6Wj1li~ R. Ferris, “Region as Art” in Regional Studies: The Interplay ofLand and People ed.
Glen B. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 20.
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it should be remembered that all regions are abstractions.7 “Even if regions are
abstractions and do not exist, even if, mdeed, every place is unique, the concept of
regionalism remains useful.”8 All that is necessary is for one to accept the region as a
classification system, or geographical generalization. In fact, this view of “regions as
t.
classifications has been implicit in the Writings of some geographers for a century or
more.”9
Researcher Terry Jordan asserts that one can lump an array of unique places into
regional types for convenience. Jordan states the following:
Regions, then, are not an end in themselves, but merely descriptive and analytical
tools. They offer a useful framework for handling large amounts of diverse
information, for logical simplification. They facilitate systems of analysis by
providing the level of deliberate imprecision needed for investigation. The human
mind cannot cope with chaos, and devices such as regions allow [one] to avoid
such no-win confrontations.1°
Caution must be exercised, however, in the development of regional or any other
types of classification. Jordan further asserts the following:
1998), x.
Whatever regional classification [one] devise[sJ [it] must be designed for a
particular purpose. [One] must also realize that even with purpose-specific
regional classifications, subjectivity is always present — in the number of classes
[one] create[s], in the numerical borders [one] select[s] to separate classes, in the
rank order of defmin~ criteria, in the very selection of the traits that form the basis
of the classification.1
7The New Regionalism: Essays and Commentaries (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi,
8Terry G. Jordan, “The Concept and the Method,” in Regional Studies: The Interplay ofLand and
People ed. Glen E. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 11.
9Terry G. Jordan, “The Concept and the Method,” in Regional Studies: The Interplay ofLand and
People ed. Glen B. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 11.
‘°Terry G. Jordan, “The Concept and the Method,” in Regional Studies: The Interplay ofLand and
People ed. Glen E. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 11.
‘1Terry G. Jordan, “The Concept and the Method,” in Regional Studies: The Interplay ofLand and
People ed. Glen E. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 11.
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it is unportant to realize that an infmite number of classifications can be devised. Also,
no any smgle regional classification is best for all purposes 12
Failure to recognize that regions are abstractions that deal merely with categories
Within classifications can detract from one’s ability to synthesize knowledge and
diminish one’s capacity to rnvestigate cause and effect relationships.’3 “Equally
hazardous is the tendency to consider regions in isolation. They should never be taken
out of their world-wide context, because of the interconnectedness of things.”4
Defming East Texas as a Region
For the regional classifications to work, the inhabitants must believe that the
region exists. Most often inhabitants have a name for particular regions and know they
reside within its limits. However, three important realities should be considered
concerning the fluidity and mutability of regional classifications.’5 First, regions can
exist at different scales in a series of overlays and overlaps. Second, these popular
12Terry 0. Jordan, “The Concept and the Method,” in Regional Studies: The Interplay ofLand and
People ed. Glen E. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 11.
“Terry G. Jordan, “The Concept and the Method,” in Regional Studies: The Interplay ofLand and
People ed. Glen E. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 15 and Louis Wirth, “The
Limitations of Regionalism,” in Regionalism in America ed. Merrill (1. Jensen (Madison, WI: University of
Wisconsin, 1951), 382.
‘4Terry G. Jordan, “The Concept and the Method,” in Regional Studies: The Interplay ofLand and
People ed. Glen B. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 15 and Louis Wirth, “The
Limitations of Regionalism,” in Regionalism in America ed. Merrill G. Jensen (Madison, WI: University of
Wisconsin, 1951), 382.
‘5John L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry 0. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984) and Terry 0. Jordan, “The Concept and the Method,” in Regional Studies: The
Interplay ofLand and People ed. Glen E. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 15.
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perceptions change through time, often rather rapidly. Third, no two persons have the
same mental map.’6
One of the challenges of this study was defining the eastern region of Texas as
East Texas. Many works discuss the region, and there are as many defmitions and
regional distinctions as there are studies. Some researchers limited the northern border of
East Texas at Tyler, the western border at Palestine and Trinity, and the southern border
at Jasper. Others considered the Big Thicket area, while other limited their defmition to
the Piney Woods. Still others used Interstate 45 as a line of demarcation. In a study of
the geography of Texas, researchers Bean, Holmes, and Jorday-Bychkov used a
questionnaire to assess regional conceptualization among Texans throughout the state.
They found that aside from the popular geographical names given to Texas regions like
Piney Woods, Hill Country, and Panhandle, compass direction terms and “central” are
used by most Texans to describe various parts of the state.’7 A question on the
questionnaire used by Bean, Holmes, and Jorday-Bychkov was designed to reveal the use
and application of compass-direction terms by Texans. The question read:
Residents of most parts of Texas identify their home counties by using one of the
compass directions. Which, if any, of the following terms is used locally to
identify the location of your county? Check only the term(s) you have heard
used by the inhabitants of the county: East Texas; North Texas; South Texas;
West Texas; Central Texas; Northeast Texas; Southeast Texas; Northwest Texas;
Southwest Texas; none of these; other (specify).’8
‘6Terry G. Jordan, “The Concept and the Method,” in Regional Studies: The Interplay ofLand and
People ed. Glen E. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 11.
173~,i L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westvjew Press, 1984).
‘8Jolm L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westvjew Press, 1984).
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To be included in a directional-term popular region, a county had to (a) have a uniform
response from at least 51 percent of the respondents and (b) be contiguous with the bulk
of the counties in the region.19 The results found by Bean, Holmes, and Jorday-Bychkov
revealed the following:
West Texas was the largest region, composed of a wedge-shaped territory that
broadened to the west.2° Fort Worth, which has long claimed to be ‘where the
West begins,’ is, in fact, three counties removed from the easternmost reaches of
West Texas, and more of the respondents from Tarrant County, the site of Fort
Worth, identified with East, Northeast, and North than with West Texas. Based
on the survey results, Abilene in Taylor County, long touted as ‘out where the
West is at,’ was instead in the eastern part of vernacular West Texas.2’
The Bean, Holmes, and Jorday-Bychkov study also found that Southeast,
Northeast, Southwest, and North Texas were perceived as rather confmed border regions.
Of all the compass regions, East Texas received the highest overall degree of
identification and had the sharpest borders. The Trinity River marked most of its western
boundary. “Loaded with connotations of the Old South and the defeated Confederacy,
East Texas was seemingly the most potent popular region of any in the state.”22
Interestingly, some respondents to their study used the term Deep East Texas.23
To some respondents, this traditional term means the area immediately adjacent to
‘9John L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Byehkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
20John L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
21~~ L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
223olm L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
23JOlm L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
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Louisiana, but the majority perceived it as the southern half of East Texas, commonly
considered the Big Thicket. “Counties that are members of The Deep East Texas Council
Of Governments adhered to this latter, more inclusive defmition, as did many of the
questiollilaire respondents.”24
In their study, a second spatial defmition of East and West Texas was achieved by
looking at the responses for East, Southeast, and Northeast and those for West,
Southwest, and Northwest. The resultant border of greater West Texas seldom ranged far
from the 100th meridian, but the expanded East Texas region ran roughly from Dallas to
Houston.25 Central Texas, increasingly referred to as the Centex, occupied a sizable
block of counties positioned to the east of center in the state.26 South Texas, a sizable
region, had with rather blurred borders and spatially defmed the major Hispanic
stronghold in the state. It carries defmite ethnic connotations for most Texans.
“In some ‘lack of consensus counties,’ especially in the far western part of Texas
and the Panhandle, half or more of the respondents indicated that no directional terms
were in use locally.”27 These narrow transition zones served as buffers between most of
the regions. An exception was the Panhandle area, where a sizable undecided block of
counties was found. Interestingly, this area corresponds very closely to the part of Texas
24j0~ L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Byehkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
25JOlm L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
26Jolm L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CU: Westview Press, 1984).
27John L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CU: Westview Press, 1984).
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~~1ong1flgt0 the perceptual Midwest according to geographer Joseph Brownell.28
CuriouSlY, based on the study, some of Texas’s largest cities—including Dallas, Fort
Worth, El Paso, and San Antonio—were in the transition areas.
Defming East Texas for this Study
Clearly, the term East Texas refers to a way of life as much as a geographical
area. For the purposes of this research, East Texas is defmed as the region from
Texarkafla to Dallas-Fort Worth (Interstate 30), from Dallas-Fort Worth through Houston
to Galveston (Interstate 45) as illustrated in figure 2. The major cities included in this
regional designation are Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, and Galveston. Other large cities
include Nacogdoches, Beaumont, Tyler, Longview, and Texarkana. This defmition of
East Texas includes the Piney Woods region that is considered to be formal East Texas;
Dallas, which is considered to be in North Texas; and Houston, which is considered to be
in Gulf Port region (see figure 3).
28Jo~ L. Bean, William M. Holmes, Terry G. Jorday-Bychkov, Texas, A Geography (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984).
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Fig. 2. Map of Major Texas Highways.
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Employing the linkage approach used by Hanes Walton in Black Politics and
Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Approach, this study focuses on the critical linkages
between group position (the politicization of race) and political ideological orientation
and their influence in shaping the political attitudes and behavior of blacks in the eastern
region of Texas. In his analysis of political context as a variable, Walton fmds that “[t]he
political context variable, which influences and shape political behavior at either the
individual or group level, is both dynamic and static as are the elements in the context
and the relationship between change and the context is reciprocal.”29 Similarly, Jordan
and Kadalie assert that theoretically, contextual analysis stresses that individual behavior
is affected by the social and political milieu and not just by individual attributes or
characteristics.30 As such, several theoretical and methodological weaknesses and
shortcomings stem from ambiguities that are inherent in a reliance solely on aggregate
data. They find that “[ajlthough race has been a dominant political cleavage in the
United States for most of its history, racially specific issues appear to produce a more
contextual effect than demography or geography on voter behavior and choice.”3’
29Hanes Walton, “The Political Context Variable: The Transfonnation Politics of the Reagan,
Bush, and Clinton Presidencies,” in African-American Power and Politics: The Political Context Variable,
ed. H. Walton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 10.
30Kenneth Jordan and Modibo Kadalie, “Prologue: The Conceptualization of a Variable,” in
African American Power and Politics: The Political Context Variable, ed. H. Walton (New York:
Columbia University Press: 1997), xxxii.
31Kenneth Jordan and Modibo Kadalie, “Prologue: The Conceptualization of a Variable,” in
African American Power and Politics: The Political Context Variable, ed. H. Walton (New York:
Columbia University Press: 1997), xxxv.
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• Hence, political context as a variable can provide a unidimensional analysis,
but does not disregard the empirical and theoretical contributions to be gained from
exploring other dimensions ofAfrican-American political attitudes and behavior.
Clearly, group identity and perceived threats to/by the group have an impact on group
cohesion and positioflmg strategy. “The analytical techniques employed to analyze the
political context variable assume that the structural determinants of white political
behavior are racia1JdemOgra~3hic rather than economic or political.”32
~Past studies that established political context as a variable in the examination and
study of black politics include the work of Bunche and Key. Bunche’s work in the 1930s
and 1940s examined the influence of black voting patterns on public policy. He found
that when the opportunity was present for black voter participation; they voted in greater
numbers than whites.33 This study by Bunche challenged the assertion made by Gunnar
Myrdal in his study of race relations in America that southern blacks have not sought to
influence public policy, but rather have sought to end racism.
A classic work on race as a unit of analysis is the study by V.0. Key, Jr., entitled
Southern Politics. Key asserts, “. . . the politics of the South revolves around the position
of the Negro. . . . Whatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to
32Kenneth Jordan and Modibo Kadalie, “Prologue: The Conceptualization of a Variable,” in
African American Power and Politics: The Political Context Variable, ed. H. Walton (New York:
Columbia University Press: 1997), xxxvi.
33Ralph J. Bunche, “A Brief and Tentative Analysis ofNegro Leadership,” memorandum; “The
Programs, Ideologies, Tactics, and Achievements of Negro Betterment and Interracial Organizations,”
memorandum; “Conceptions and Ideologies of the Negro Problem,” memorandum, Special Collections,
the Ralph Bunche Institute, Duke University, Durham, NC.
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understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro.”34 Thus, the political
and social contexts of the South were white’s response to the presence of blacks,
~nderscOri11g the pervasive influence of blacks on southern politics. Key established
blacks as the nucleus of southern politics was more a factor of their presence and the
impact of that presence on the political economy.
Linkage Analysis
Linkage analysis asserts that the isolated analysis of the various factors that
impact black political reality should be supplanted with a broader analysis of these
factors as interconnected phenomenon that work together, to varying degrees, to shape
black politics. Jordan and Kadalie affirm this: “The politics of African America is
inextricably linked to the collective aspirations of a race to share in the social and
economic security and the educational and occupational opportunities allocated through
an often undemocratic process, which determines who gets what, when, and where.”35
Hanes Walton, in a “pioneering exploration” of the linkage between black politics and the
political behavior of the black community utilizes linkage analysis to examine seven
factors that shape black politics and behavior: theoretical, national, state-contextual,
procedural, gender, and enduring linkages.36 Walton asserts, “Any approach that
34v. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics: In State and Nation (New York: Vintage, 1949) as quoted in
Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the Future,” in
Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1994), 284.
35Kenneth Jordan and Modibo Kadalie, “Introduction: Black Politics During the Era of Presidents
Reagan and Bush,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1994), xxxvi.
36Hanes Walton, “Preface,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis,
ed. Hanes Walton (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994).
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enibraC~ only the latest practices in political science methodology in survey research
and fails to adjust it for factors other than individual ones is going to produce only a very
~-:: limited picture of black southern politics.”37 Approaches to the study of black politics
and political behavior should consider temporal segmentations because the black
experience can be divided into separate time frames or periods that unveil the layers of
diversitY in the black political experience and the contextual and systemic characteristics
for each period,38 and regionalisms should be considered because differing regions of the
United States and states have had various impacts on the cultural and political realities of
African Americans.
Contextual-Linkage Analytic Framework
For this study, the researcher devised a contextual-linkage analytic framework by
combining Hanes Walton’s linkage approach and the contextual approach proffered by
Bunche and Key. A contextual-linkage analytic framework asserts that various political,
economic, social systems are linked and have functioned over time and continue to
function as interrelated and detenninant forces in the shaping of black political context.
Within this study, the contextual-linkage analytic framework is used with particular
emphasis placed on the ideological orientation of blacks, rather than party affiliation, and
its linkage to the political attitudes of blacks in the eastern region of Texas.
37Hanes Walton and Daniel Brantley, “Black Southern Politics: A Look at the Tradition and the
Future,” in Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1994).
38Hanes Walton, “The Nature of Black Politics and Black Political Behavior,” in Black Politics
and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis, ed. Hanes Walton (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 3.
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Variables
The dependent and independent variables explored in this study are provided
below.
Dependent Variables
This study is concerned with examining the extent to which black political self-
identification predicts black political attitudes. The dependent variables for this study are
black political attitudes.
Independent Variable
A number of specific factors have been identified in existing literature as having
significant influence on the formation, transmission, and manifestation ofblack political
attitudes and behaviors. However, this study narrowly examines one such factor: self-
identified ideological orientation.
Major Concepts
A number of concepts are utilized in this study. Defmitions of these concepts and
related discussions are provided below, and where applicable, the operationalizations of
concepts for this study are also provided.
Race
Though a number of major concepts and variables used throughout this study are
powerful indicators of and influences on the formation ofpolitical attitudes and their
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manifestation in behavior,39 the most significant concept is that of race. Robert Allen
states:
Black people are not like other ethnic groups in American society. To begin with,
blacks came to these shores, not as immigrants seeking a better life, but as slaves
intended for use as forced laborers. The racist ideology erected to justify slavery
served after the Civil War to keep blacks oppressed and subservient....
Businessmen, infected by their own racist dogma, preferred to import foreign
labor. The advent of the civil rights movement, the monolithic structure of racism
began to show cracks, but then it was afready too late. Black people were to
enjoy the unfortunate distinction of being among the first surplus product of an
advanced American technology and economic system.4°
It is important to recognize at the outset that different white ethnic groups had
different experiences upon coming to America, some of which more closely parallel
those ofAfrican Americans. Nonetheless, the black experience in the United States is
unique, and thus analogies between that experience and those of any other immigrant
group must be drawn with great caution.4’
In the study ofpolitical attitudes, race has a significant role and has become an
increasingly problematic notion. Orlando Patterson prefers not to use the term at all, and
specifies that when it is used, the word race should be in quotation marks. Others call for
sharply distinguishing between race and ethnicity, with ethnicity being associated with
differences understood as cultural in nature, pertaining to such factors as language,
39See Sidney Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik, The Changing American Voter
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Sidney Verba and Gary Orren, Equality in America
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Robert C. Smith, We Have No Leaders: African Americans
in the Post-Civil Rights Era (Albany, NY: State University ofNew York Press, 1996); Paul Abramson,
Political Arntudes in America (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1983); Ronald Brown, “The Determinants
of Black Politicai Participation,” Ph.D. dissertation (University of Michigan, 1984).
40Robert Allen, Black Awakening in Capitalist America: An Analytical History (Garden City, NY:
Anchor/Doubleday, 1969), 51.
41Marcus D. Pohlmann, Black Politics in Conservative America (Boston: Longman Press, 1998),
4.
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religion, cultural tastes and practices, and nationality.42 Most social scientists view
race as a historically contingent social construction with varying salience over time.
Race is rooted in the human capacity to categorize and assign social meaning. As a
result, the practices and policies of government regarding race within American society
affect the understanding, interpretation, and reaction of racial groups with each other.
Relatedly, government responses to race can have serious consequences on social
behavior and policy interpretation and application. Similarly, the individual’s
interpretation of race affects intragroup and intergroup relations.
Ideological Orientation and Electoral Capture
Studies have shown that few voters have coherent, detailed ideologies and few
know much about politics. Donald Kinder summarizes decades of survey research on
ideology: “Precious few Americans make sophisticated use of political abstraction. Most
are mystified by or at least indifferent to standard ideological concepts, and not many
express consistently liberal, conservative, or centrist positions on government policy.”43
American political ideology is rooted in a liberal tradition that embodies
Madisonian view of democracy. The Madisonian conception of the nature of the
American system as articulated at the Constitutional Convention and later in the
Federalist Papers presupposes the desirability of a popular government, but with
safeguards to ensure that factions emerge and power is divided so that no one group
42’p~is definition of ethnicity was derived from a lectured delivered by Lawrence Bobo, “The
Political Psychology of Race,” Lecture at the Summer Institute in Political Psychology at Stanford
University (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University), 13 July 2005.
43Donald R. Kinder, “Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion,” in Political
Science: The State ofthe Discipline, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington, DC: American Political Science
Association, 1983).
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dominates politics. Additionally, liberalism in the United States promotes and
articulates a defense of liberty, equality, and justice. However, these values are
precariouslY balanced with support for individualism, competition, and government as a
neceSS~’Y evil.
James Madison tried to keep the relationship between the people and the
government as indirect as possible. In The Federalist, Madison outlined a system of
representation in which the representative can (a) act as a trustee of the people, exercising
judgment in the perceived best interest of the people or (b) serve as a delegate to collect,
synthesize, and report the opinions of the people.44 Additionally, the central government
was divided into three branches, each one step further removed from the people.
As initially conceptualized, government was to have a minimal role or serve a
negative function in the lives of citizens, but over time the scope of government was
expanded to protect individuals and their property, thus evolving into a positive state.45
Although the core values of the liberal tradition remained relatively the same, a value
hierarchy emerged as the government became an “active force in producing a better life
for its citizens.”46 The resultant effect was increased tension between values, like that of
liberty and equality as the Hobbesian-defined motive of self-interest manifested in a
material way, most notably in economics. The concept of equality in the marketplace and
~David Ingersoll, Richard Matthews, and Andrew Davidson, The Philosophic Roots ofModern
Ideology: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism, Islamism, 3”’ ed. (Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001), 61.
45For more discussion on this see David Ingersoll, Richard Matthews, and Andrew Davidson, The
Philosophic Roots ofModern Ideology: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism, Islamism, 3”’ ed. (Upper Saddle,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001), 74.
~David Ingersoll, Richard Matthews, and Andrew Davidson, The Philosophic Roots ofModern
Ideology: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism, Islamism, 3”’ ed. (Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001), 74.
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in the social schema became even more theoretical as economic and social constructs
of equality remained abridged.
Elite theorists, like Philip Converse, assert that people can be divided into two
groups — the elite who make all of the decisions and the masses that follow them.47
Converse, however, asserts that the elites have a greater understanding of their belief
systems compared with the masses that lack “idea constraint.”48 Power-elite theorists,
like C. Wright Mills, advance the position that economic factors in the United States have
produced a two-class society in which the power elite, a small group of people, who are
the economically powerful who maintain significant power-making capacity. The power-
elite frame of analysis reveals that the principles of democracy have been compromised,
along with many of its core values.
Because power is dispersed, pluralism views the political process as incremental.
Policy change requires extensive bargaining and compromise between groups, generally
leading to only a small or marginal political and policy change. This incrementalism may
appear to leave the status quo basically unchanged, but pluralist writings suggest that the
cumulative impact can be substantial. In the long run, pluralism suggests that most
groups can have some opportunity to influence policies important to them.
Pluralism tended to assume, or to take as givens, many issues that, while relevant
to politics, are not themselves political questions or issues unless groups are somehow
47David Ingersoll, Richard Matthews, and Andrew Davidson, The Philosophic Roots ofModern
Ideology: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism, Islamism, 3~ ed. (Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001), 77.
48Philip Converse, “The nature of belief systems in mass publics,” in Ideology and Discontent, ed.
D. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964).
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able to force them onto the political agenda.49 Research indicates, for example, that
socioeconomic status affects the likeithood ofpolitical participation and influence, but
pluraliSm~ in general, tends not to view the distribution ofwealth in society as a political
question. Pluralism is less inclined than other perspectives to ask what, if any, political
factors influenced or caused existing social and economic relationships to come about in
the first place.5° Pluralism tends not to place much emphasis on the broad social and
political structure.
Additionally, pluralism assumes that most groups, and by extension minority
groups, have some resources to draw upon to make their political influence felt.5’ It is
asserted that although minority groups may lack money and other key resources, they can
compensate for the lack. On this approach, in the long term, all legitimate interests get
their fair chance to influence the political process because the political rules of the game
are fair and apply equally to all groups.52 If a group’s goals are not achieved, pluralism
implies that (a) the group’s goals are not sufficiently widely shared, that is, there is not
enough political support or consensus for the group’s policy preferences to be enacted,
(b) the group has not used its resources effectively, or (c) both.53
49Rodney E. Hero, Latinos and the US. Political System (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1992).
50Rodney E. Hero, Latinos and the US. Political System (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1992).
51Rodney E. Hero, Latinos and the US. Political System (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1992).
52Rodney E. Hero, Latinos and the US. Political System (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1992).
53Rodney E. Hero, Latinos and the US. Political System (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1992), 14.
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Robert Dali raised the claim that interest groups often can and do promote
•jiniiil defects in a political system. In protecting and furthering their own interests,
entrenched grOUPS can “stabilize injustices and inequalities.”54 Because these groups are
powerful~ they can minimize or nullify changes that may be deemed necessary to lessen
political inequalitY Interest groups can also negatively affect civic consciousness m that
thcy encourage people to think only, or primarily, in terms of narrow self-interest and in
1he short term55 They also distort the public agenda because they may keep certam
issues off the agenda or define issues in ways advantageous only to themselves. They
may also “wrongfully appropriate public functions,” in that they tend to take major roles
not only in defming and implementing public activities and policies, and they do so in a
narrowly self-interested manner.56
Pluralism and research that implicitly holds pluralist assumptions takes the view
that ethnic-minority groups are but one more interest group in society.57 In relation to the
larger political system, the minority-group situation is not seen as all that different from
that of nonethnic racial groups competing to make their voices heard. Similarly,
pluralism seems to make little distinction between the situation of earlier ethnic groups,
such as the Irish and Italians, and that of Latinos and blacks.58 In these respects,
54Robert Dahi, Dilemmas ofPluralist Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).
55Rodney E. Hero, Latinos and the US. Political System (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1992).
56Robert Dahi, Dilemmas ofPluralist Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).
57Rodney E. Hero, Latinos and the US. Political System (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1992).
58Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 2~ ed. (New
Routledge Press, 1986).
76
similar to other perspectives that might address minority politics, such as
~lasS analysis.
a result, pluralism has been challenged on several grounds. The pluralist claim
~ps are essentially equal in resources or that group resources are noncumulative
most stronglY questioned. Research has shown that groups lacking in one
tend also to be lacking in others; groups with abundant resources in one area
,.~ them in others as well. Also, access and influence are not necessarily the
access may be only a prerequisite to influence.59 The argument that there are
L,
~points is likewise challenged. Critics contend that, with few exceptions,
~ that lack political influence at one level of politics tend to lack influence at
~1Iti~i
~ Additionally, pluralism is criticized for not being sufficiently attentive to the
economic system and for treating matters such as the distribution of wealth in
as natural and largely outside the realm of politics.6’
~ ~J~aul Frymer notes that the Democratic Party, during the presidency of Bill
~i~in the 1990s, demonstrated ambivalence toward African-American political
s. Frymer observes,
Party leaders believed that the Democrat’s identification with policies
explicitly designed to integrate blacks more completely into the nation’s social,
economic, and political institutions damaged their party’s appeal among key
5~Rodney E. Hero, Latinos and the US. Political System (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
60Rodney E. Hero, Latinos and the US. Political System (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
~Rodney E. Hero, Latinos and the US. Political System (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
77
~ groups of white voters. [Thus,j the active promotion of African-American
concerns made it difficult for the party to maintain the support it once had
received from the successful New Deal coalition of southern, working-, and
middle-class whites.62
To increase the standing of the Democratic Party among white voters, the party
began to shift away from the promotion ofAfrican-American concerns toward a position
that called for extensive reforms like welfare reform, cutbacks on employment benefits,
and general reduction in benefits that were perceived to aid the undeserving. Rhetoric
moved away from redressing racial injustice, and national party officials supported a
platform, perceived by them to be strategic decisions in the party’s interests, that
“downplay[edi the interests of their black constituents in order to broaden the party’s
electoral base and increase its chances in presidential campaigns.”63
Within the American political system, it has been understood that two-party
competition would reach out to groups not represented by the other party. As a result of
competition, parties will mobilize these groups to participate in electoral politics and
place the interests of these groups on the political agenda and represent them in the
legislative arena. But, in fact, as Lani Guinier, Ronald Walters, and Paul Frymer have
argued, political parties have not behaved in this way, particularly with regard to African
Americans, and one can go so far as to say that the party system provides incentives to
62Paul Frymer, Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 4.
63Paul Frymer, Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 6.
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marginali~ black political interests, for the party system exacerbates rather than
diminishes the marginalized position of a historically disadvantaged minority group.64
This reality has resulted in electoral capture, characterizes by Frymer as a milieu
when the group has no choice but to remain in the party. The opposing party
does not want the group’s vote, so the group cannot threaten its own party’s
leaders with defection. The party leadership, then, can take the group for granted
because it recognizes that, short of abstention or an independent (and usually
electorally suicidal) third party, the group has nowhere else to go. Placed in this
position by the party system, a captured group will often find its interests
neglected by their own party’s leaders. These leaders, in turn, offer attention and
benefits to grou~s of ‘swing’ voters who are allegedly capable of determining
election results. ~
Moreover, if party leaders see the group’s primary political interests as
ideologically opposed to those of a large segment of the public, they are likely to ignore
the group as they compete for those voters ideologically closer to the majority of the
nation’s voters. African-American political leaders have experienced great frustration
and difficulty in attempting to move their group from this captured position, for several
reasons:
1. black voters have remained loyal to one political party and not chosen to
turn toward the opposition;
2. as a group, they are ideologically to the left of center on a number of
important economic and social issues;
64See Paul Frymer, Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America (Princeton:
Prmceton University Press, 1999), 4; Lani Guinier, The Tyranny ofthe Majority (New York: Free Press,
1994); Lani Guinier, “The Representation of Minority Interests,” in Paul E. Peterson, ed., Class~i5~ing by
Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 24-25; and Ronald Walters, Black Presidential Politics
in America (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1988).
65Paul Frymer, Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 8.
that arises
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3. as a group, they are fmancially disadvantaged and unable to make large
contributions to national campaigns; and
4. the historical legacy of slavery, legal discrimination, and racism has left
large numbers of blacks in need of policies and programs not easily
provided by a government that favors an incrementalist approach to
politics.
All of these factors contribute to the electoral capture experienced by black
voters, but none of these factors in isolation are a sufficient explanation. The reasons for
this are that while black voters are ideologically liberal on a number of issues, they also
range from ideologically moderate to ideologically conservative on other issues.
Hanes Walton asserts that “black political behavior becomes (a) supportive in an
innovative reformist fashion, (b) reactive in an effort to maintain preferred positions, or
(c) creative in the development ofnew black political devices and techniques.”66 In the
electoral area, the supportive perspective encourages a quest for changes and
improvements in the position and economy of the black community through utilization of
the major political institutions. The reactive perspective is often utilized by and can
characterize the efforts of conservatives who wish to maintain their preferred positions
and the status quo. They operate within the mainstream ofpolitical institutions, not so
much to inhibit all black progress as to enhance the benefits of the privileged few. Many
of the conservative black spokesmen also argue for a reduced and restricted role of the
federal govermuent in the black community, particularly in the area of social programs
and emphasize personal responsibility and a return to fundamental values.
The creative perspective supports black political activity challenges what are
~Hanes Walton, Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1985), 30.
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understood as closed systemic channels, organizational inertia, and institutional
racism.67 “This behavior is exemplified by sit-in activity, protest, and direct action, i.e.,
conventional forms ofpolitical participation, and racial political entities such as black
~political parties, independent black political candidates, black pressure groups, and exotic
black political socializing devices and agencies.”68 Most of these creative forms of black
political behavior which arose as a result of systemic dysfunctions either enter the regular
systems and become supportive or remain outside the system.69
Walton found the old liberal-conservative continuum to be a powerful summary
tool, useful in determining the patterns in black political ideological placement. Table 1
~shows the self-designated divisions in the black community. Blacks in Walton’s
examination were asked to classify themselves on the liberal-conservative scale,
excluding racial concerns. A near majority of blacks, voters and nonvoters, classified
themselves ideologically as liberals. However, on racial matters with all other concerns
excluded, it was found that blacks in both categories are overwhelmingly liberal, with
only a very small segment labeling themselves as conservative (see table 2).
67llanes Walton, Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1985), 30.
68Hanes Walton, Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1985), 30.
69Hanes Walton, Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1985), 30-31.
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TABLE 1
Self-Ident1fi~ Ideological Positions in the Black Community: On Nonracial Matters
Ideological Position Black Voters Black Nonvoters
43% (216) 50% (123)
Moderates 38% (190) 37% (90)
ConserVatives 19% (96) 13% (33)
100% (502) 100% (246)
Source: National Black Survey, 1972-74.
TABLE 2
Self-Identified Ideological Positions in the Black Community: On Racial Matters
— Ideological Position Black Voters Black Nonvoters
Liberals 85% (428) 90% (222)
Moderates 10% (51) 7% (18)
Conservatives 5% (23) 3% (6)
Total 100% (502) 100% (246)
Source: National Black Survey, 1972-74.
These data reveal blacks not only have ideological positions on political issues, but these
ideological viewpoints are strongly affected by racial consciousness. One can conclude
that black political ideological orientation many vary on political and social issues, but on
matters of race, they take overwhehningly liberal positions.
Political Ideological Self-Identification
Political ideological self-identification is defmed as how one identifies their
political perspective on a political spectrum. For the purposes of this study, political
ideological self-identification is evaluated using several indicators: first, how blacks
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identifY the intenSitY of their ideological perspective on a graduated scale from
è*iremelY liberal to extremely conservative; second, with which political party one most
closely identifY and third, for which political party one most often votes.
Although a growing number of blacks voted Democratic during the New Deal era,
the surge in black identification with the Democratic Party was not until the 1964 election
of the Kennedy-Johnson administration.70 Scholars have attributed the initial shift of
blacks toward the Democratic Party as an economic, not racial, decision; whereas, the
surge in the 1960s was a response to civil rights and race issues.71 The Republican
administrations of Reagan and G.H.W. Bush in the 1980s and early 1990s, however,
signaled a rolling-back of many gains made during the civil rights era, and the centrist
Clinton administration in the 1 990s is accused of doing little to advance black interests..
In light of the stated trend and the political reality of blacks, of particular interest is
whether respondents continue to overwhelmingly identify with the Democratic Party or
has a shift occurred toward the Republican or independent parties.
While recent empirical studies of black partisanship have been unable to filly
explain why the majority of blacks are Democrats, researchers have been unable to find
any consistent critical differences between voters who identify themselves as black
Democrats and black Republicans.72 Additionally, analysis reveals that, independently,
70Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), 51-55.
71Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), 62, and Nancy Weiss, Farewell to the Party ofLincoln (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1983).
72Differences can found in the espoused ideologies of black conservative and liberal elites and
mtellectuals, but these differences are less pronounced among the mass of black voters who identil~’
themselves as conservatives and liberals. See Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black
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ideology, class identification, socioeconomic status have had no effect on black party
identiflcatiolt. However, black men and young blacks aged eighteen to nineteen are
more likely to weakly identify with the Democratic Party, and young blacks are more
likely to identify themselves as Independent.74
During the Reconstruction era, blacks overwhelming voted for the Republican
Party because it had been Abraham Lincoln’s political party. But since the presidency of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, blacks shifted their votes to the Democratic Party. “A case can be
made that black partisan realignment occurred as early as 1936, but it was certain by
l964.”~~ Clearly, the New Deal coalition that had been heavily oriented toward African-
American core interests had dissolved when in 1964, Republican presidential candidate
Barry Goldwater’s position on civil rights and state’s rights moved African Americans
away from the Republican Party. Since 1964, black support for a Democratic
presidential candidate has not fallen below 80 percent in a single election.
Political opinion survey evidence shows that black partisan identification and
voting tend to occur as a bloc. However, Reeves points out that whites also vote as a bloc
Voters in American Elections (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), 63. Also see Thomas
Cavanagh, Inside Black America: The Message in the 1984 Elections (Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for
Political Studies, 1985); I. A. Lewis and William Schneider, “Black Voting, Bloc Voting and the
Democrats,” in Public Opinion 6 (5), (1983): 12-15, 59; Ronald Walters, Black Presidential Politics in
America: A Strategic Approach (Albany, NY: State University ofNew York Press, 1988).
73See Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), 51-55.
74Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), 5 1-55.
75Byron D’Andra Orey and Reginald Vance, “Participation in Electoral Politics,” in K.C.
Morrison, ed. African Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA:
ABC-CLIO, 2003), 127.
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against black candidates when they run m elections.76 Blacks engage m racial bloc
voting, particularly when they can gain more.77 By bundling their votes together to
support a party that is more amenable to their agenda, blacks hope to have more control,
act as a counterweight, and command responsiveness. Ronald Walters has calculated
how the concentration of black voters in competitive urban areas and in the South
translated into control of electoral votes for Democrats in the 1976 election. According
to his analysis, black voters provided a critical balance of votes for Jimmy Carter in
major northern, border, and southern states.78 The political return for such support was
evident: Carter made significant alliances with black politicians and evidenced a strong
commitment to core issues on the black agenda.
Racially polarized voting, however, occurs when at least two racial groups vote as
a bloc for a set of different candidates. Polarized voting can become problematic because
it can lead to vote dilution. Davidson states that vote dilution occurs when the candidate
that a bloc supports loses in a district where election laws diminish or remove the
opportunity for representation.79 Lani Guinier characterizes vote dilution as a tyranny of
the majority that dooms African Americans in the political process to be permanent
losers.80
76Keith Reeves, Voting Hopes or Fears: White Voters, Black Candidates, and Racial Politics in
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
77Black bloc voting has played a significant role particularly at the local and state level in the
election of black officials, and is often an indicator of black political empowerment.
78Ronald Walters, Black Presidential Politics in America: A Strategic Approach (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1988), 36.
79Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1984).
80Lani Guinier, The Tyranny ofthe Majority (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 3-20.
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The classic case of racially polarized voting occurred with Jesse Jackson’s bid
for the Democratic presidential candidacy in 1984 and 1988. Even though he tried to
portray himself as one with an all-inclusive platform, hence the Rainbow Coalition,
Jackson was unable to attract support from whites while he received overwhelming
support from blacks in both years.
Another example of the outcomes of racially polarized effect is the voting that
resulted in the Reagan and Bush victories. The Republican Party became more
successful in the Reagan and Bush presidential elections by relying on Southern whites.
With the increase in race-baiting and racially hostile political rhetoric, the Republican
Party was able to mobilize southern whites with such an intensity that blacks were less
likely, even as a bloc, to determine the outcome of the national contests. Reagan carried
the South in both 1980 and 1984; Bush also prevailed in the South in 1988 (see table 3)81
81Byron D’Andra Orey and Reginald Vance, “Participation in Electoral Politics,” in K.C.




Presidential Electoral Votes, Southern Region, 1964-2000
Democrats RepublicansYear Independents*
1964 52 48
~1968 31 36 33
~ 1972 29 71




~ 1988 40 60
1992 38 45 17 —
1996 44 46 10
2000 43 55
~independent candidates were Wallace in 1968 and Perot in 1992 and 1996.
Sources: Data from Stanley and Niemi 2000, 118-119; Walton and Smith 2002, 161 as presented in Byron
D’Andra Orey and Reginald Vance, “Participation in Electoral Politics,” in K.C. Morrison, ed. African
Americans and Political Participation. A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003),
216.
During these Republican administrations, African-American core agenda items
were tabled and many civil rights gains were rolled back. The Reagan administrations
implemented a conservative agenda that aggressively attacked welfare and programs that
evolved or gained support during the civil rights era. The Bush administration continued
with this agenda and appointed a black conservative, Clarence Thomas, to the Supreme
Court to replace the liberal Thurgood Marshall.
Thus, bloc voting and its racially polarizing effect have often been characterized
as having a one-party dominant affect on blacks, who have historically voted
overwhelmingly for either one or the other political parties. Indeed, the African
American vote proved to be strategically important to the election ofBill Clinton in 1992.
Clinton received overwhelming support from black voters, particularly from those in the
South. “While Clinton did not carry the South in either 1992 or 1996, his overwhelming
III
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support among blacks there counterbalanced whites who remained in the Republican
fold~”82 Many black leaders helped Clinton campaign on issues that appeared to reflect
issues important to blacks — diversity and economic reform. The quality of return to the
black comfliunity for such solid support of Clinton, however, is questionable.
In “one of the most controversial elections since the 1876 Hayes-Tilden contest,”
the 2000 presidential election racial polarization among black voters was clearly evident
in the state where the outcome of the election hinged — Florida.83 Aggregate-level data
analysis reveal that African Americans overwhelmingly supported Al Gore, with 96
percent of the vote, compared with only 4 percent who supported George Bush;
approximatelY 56 percent of whites, on the other hand, supported Bush, while around 44
percent supported Gore.84
Political Identity and Political Perspective
Scholars have attributed the notion of linked fate in African-American public
opinion to the reason why data have shown blacks to possess a liberal bias. Several
scholars of black politics have noted the impact of the Reagan and Bush administrations
on transforming the context of ideological, political, and policy debates. Current studies
also identify the Clinton-Gore administration’s role in withering of the liberal state. One
82Byron D’Andra Orey and Reginald Vance, “Participation in Electoral Politics,” in K.C.
Morrison, ed. African Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA:
ABC-CLIO, 2003), 217.
83Byron D’Andra Orey and Reginald Vance, “Participation in Electoral Politics,” in K.C.
Morrison, ed. African Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA:
ABC-CLIO, 2003), 191.
~Byron D’Andra Orey and Reginald Vance, “Participation in Electoral Politics,” in K.C.
Morrison, ed. African Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA:
ABC-CLIO, 2003), 191.
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easilY identifiable objective of the three above mentioned administrations has been to
“discredit liberalism and to delegitimize the role of government in society and the
economY.”85 This attack on liberalism has manifested itself as attacks on federal
programS that were implemented or strengthened in the 1960s, attacks that result in
crippling cuts or an outright dismantling of these programs; public policy that emphasizes
individual responsibility, family values, and community-based assistance; and the
marginalization or discrediting of liberal black leadership that has sought to create space
for discourse and the advancement of conservative black leadership. Since the 1980s
there has been a systematic shift of policy discourse from a liberal posture toward a
conservative location. Liberalism is increasingly being discredited as a viable frame for
the shaping of policy.
Smith and Seltzer note:
However, to the extent that an element of the race-specific component of the
attack on liberalism was to transform the black community’s liberal inclinations,
the conservative movement has met with little success. The conservative
movement was able to manufacture a new conservative leadership formation,
constituted by academics, pundits, radio and television talk show personalities,
and appointed governmental officials.86
Harold Cruse and Adolph Reed, Jr. offer an alternative perspective. They assert
that the attacks on the liberal black political establishment have come not only from the
black right, but from the black left and black nationalists as well. But contrary to the
conservative movement, studies have shown that black opinion has become more liberal.
85Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 24.
86Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 25.
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Michael Dawson tests the hypothesis that the Reagan-Bush administrations
pushed the political climate in this country far to the right of the political spectrum, and
that African Americans were not immune to the political trends that occurred in the larger
political arena, to determine whether this directly affected African Americans’
identification with the American political party system.87 Specifically, he tests the
proposition that African Americans’ identification with the Democratic Party declined
during the Reagan-Bush era. Using the National Black Election Study of 1984-1988,
Dawson suggests two aspects of groups interests as important: the respondents’
perception that their fate was linked to the race as a whole, and their belief that whites
were economically better off than blacks.88 Dawson asserts that these two factors
presuppose each other, and together they powerfully predict much of the micro level
political behavior and political opinion of African Americans.89
Past studies have shown blacks to be liberal on economic spending and on the
welfare state. Specifically, this converts into preferences for governmental spending to
address the wide range of national problems and increased taxes. Typically, liberals
favor higher taxes to pay for domestic programs that are aimed at improving the quality
of life and standard of living for all. In these areas, data show blacks to be more liberal
than whites (see tables 4 and 5).
87Michael C. Dawson, Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Political Ideologies
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 76.
88Michael C. Dawson, “African American Political Opinion: Volatility in the Reagan-Bush Era”
African American Political Power: The Political Context Variable, ed. H. Walton (New York, Columbia
University Press, 1997), 135-153.
89Michael C. Dawson, “African American Political Opinion: Volatility in the Reagan-Bush Era”
African American Political Power: The Political Context Variable, ed. H. Walton (New York, Columbia
University Press, 1997), 153.
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TABLE 4
Public Opinion among Blacks and Whites, 1986-1992 (percent)
Whites Blacks
Race Policy
~i~rnent should see to school desegregation 35.6 82.9
~~&rnment should make special efforts to help blacks 11.9 39.9
preferential hiring 15.4 67.7
quotas 29.7 79.7
j~plicit Racial Issues
Solve underlying problems that give rise to urban unrest 48.3 71.7
‘ose capital punishment 14.4 36.9
Social Spending
Expand government services 41.5 72.0
Increase Social Security 60.2 82.0
Federal support for education 61.0 81.0
Increase support for Medicare 83.2 93.9
Government assistance to the poor 50.5 81.0
Alienation from Government
People like me have no say 13.3 28.3
Public officials don’t care 15.3 23.0
Distrust government 56.1 74.4
Government run by big interests 66.0 73.3
Source: Adapted from Kinder and Sanders 1996, 30 as presented in Morrison 2003.
TABLE 5
Racial Differences in Attitudes toward Government Spending, Selected Programs








Social Security 71 49
Parks 49 31
Highways 35 39
Improving Blacks’ Living Conditions 85 26
~pace 26 60
Source: General Social Survey, 1996 as presented in Smith and Seltzer 2000.
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“Of the ten programs or policy areas, black respondents gave the liberal
response on all except two: highway spending and space exploration,” observe Smith and
Seltzer.~° Past studies have shown that blacks also offer little support for defense
spending. This shows that blacks tend to favor spending on programs that improve living
standards rather than spending on programs that build infrastructure, support the military,
and space exploration.9’
Smith and Seltzer assert that “African-American adherence to liberalism in the
United States is historically and structurally rooted.”92 Historically, it has been the
actions of an activist federal government that (a) liberated blacks from slavery, (b)
restored civil rights in the 1960s, (c) and provided economic and social security during
the I 860s, 1930s, and 1960s. Historical observation also reveals that when the federal
government retreated from its activist roles, the status of blacks also declined.93 But the
reality is that blacks are disproportionately poor, jobless, and without adequate housing
and healthcare.94 In tenns of self-interest, it follows that poor blacks would favor an
expansive welfare state that provides a decent standard of social well-being.
/ 90Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 26.
91Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 26.
92Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 29.~
93Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 29.
94William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987)
and Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 29.
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Those in the conservative movement have argued that the black middle class
share a common interest with white counterparts in lower taxes and spending. But most
middle-Class blacks reject this class-based conception of interests. Instead, Smith and
Seltzer assert that their adherence to liberalism is, in part, cultural — a function of
historical memorY’ and a sense of linked fate with poor blacks. They also note that there
is a structural or economic basis; Charles Hamilton has pointed out that most of the black
middle class is employed in the public sector.95
Social Stratification and Class
In his discussion about American values and diversity, Danny Wilcox asserts,
“The inescapable fact is that America is a class-based society.”96 Disparity in wealth and
income are foundations of this society, and challenges the core American value of
equality and notions of fairness. Statistics have shown that the rich continue to get rich
while the poor get poorer. Yet, studies show that when asked about economic class
status, those that would more accurately be described as lower class and upper class also
identify themselves as middle class along with those who can be identified as truly
economically belonging in that category. The realities of class stratification translate into
social divisions. Income affects the type of housing one can afford, where one lives, the
schools that are accessible, access and quality of health care, and the odds of
incarceration.
95Charles Hamilton, ed., The Black Experience in American Politics (New York: Capricorn, 1973).
96Danny Wilcox, “American Core Values and Questions of Diversity,” in Problems ofDiversity in
the United States, ed. Larry Naylor (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 1999), 20.
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Social class identification within the black community is related to a number of
socioeconomic status indicators, including family income and whether the family
receives public assistance.97 In a 1994 analysis of the 1984 National Black Election
Study data, Katherine Tate uncovered interesting trends in black social class
identification. Tate found that affluent blacks are more likely to identify with the middle,
upper-middle, or upper classes; poor blacks were more likely to self-identify as poor or
working class. Additionally, the 1984 NBES study showed that a plurality of blacks
identified themselves as middle class (46 percent), while only 19 percent identified
themselves as poor; but other data show that black families living at or below the poverty
line has increased, as has the percentage of black families who can be classified as middle
class.98
Age and gender were also shown to statistically impact social class identity
among blacks. Older blacks are more likely to identify themselves with the poor or
working classes, and younger blacks are more likely to identify with the higher classes.
Tate suggests that the employment patterns of the sixties and seventies that consigned
blacks to the lower segment of the workforce still affect the perceptions of older blacks
about their social class status. Moreover, black women are more likely to identify with
lower-status groupings; Tate’s speculation is that this pattern may be a reflection of their
subordinate economic status resulting from grouping by gender and raceY9
97Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections enlarged
edition (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1994), 26.
98Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections enlarged
edition (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1994), 26.
99Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections enlarged
edition (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1994), 27.
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]3art Landry, wrote that a new black middle class emerged as a result of civil
rights legislation~ but E. Franklin Frazier has criticized the middle class for its
abandolm1e11t of racial consciousness and weakening of cultural ties as they seek
integration.’ The few empirical studies that have been conducted on the issue have
found that working-class blacks, not poor blacks, possess stronger racial consciousness
and identities.10’ Jackman and Jackman found that more than 60 percent of self-
identified middle-class blacks stated that they feel closer to their race, compared to only 5
percent of the self-identified poor and working-class blacks.’°2
Socialization
Socialization is the process by which opinions and attitudes about cultural norms
are transmitted from the larger society to individuals within society. Several agents have
been identified as socialization tools and they include, but are not limited to, family,
church, schools, political and social events, and the media. Socialization is a key process
in the politicization of individuals because it is through the socialization process that
individuals learn how to understand their social, political, and economic reality and how
to respond to the same. Because individuals experience and respond to socialization
‘°°Bart Landry, The New Black Middle Class (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1987) and B. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957).
‘°1See Gary Marx, Protest and Prejudice (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); Gerald Dillingham,
“The Emerging Black Middle Class: Class Consciousness or Race Consciousness?,” in Ethnic and Racial
Studies 4 (1981): 432-447; Mary Jackman and Robert Jackman, Class Awareness in the United States
(Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983); I. A. Lewis and William Schneider,
“Black Voting, Bloc Voting and the Democrats,” in Public Opinion 6(5) 1983: 12-15, 59.
‘°2Mary Jackman and Robert Jackman, Class Awareness in the United States (Berkley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).
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agents in varied ways, socialization is operationalized through interviews with selected
queStiOIMlaile respondents.
Alienation
Alienation can be defmecl as the perceived unresponsiveness of the political
system to the input of the individual. Feelings of alienation are often accompanied by
feelings of cynicism and suspicion that arise out of the shared history and experience of
racial oppression.’°3 Smith and Seltzer point out that mistrust of motives is not a
response limited to black-white interaction; black-black interactions also gamer relative
suspicion.’°4 These suspicions arise from the recognition by blacks that they are often in
a “subordinate environment in which one’s life chances are manipulable and manipulated
by others, black and white.”°5 Alienation is operationalized through responses to
questions about how responsive one believes the government to be to their individual
concerns.
Based on 1996 General Social Survey (GSS) survey fmdings, blacks as a
community were also more alienated than whites, as measured by trust in other persons,
confidence in the institutions of American society, and a fatalistic perspective on life (see
table 6).
103Robert C. Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 13.
104Robert C. Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 13.
‘°5Robert C. Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 13.
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TABLE 6
Racial Differences in Alienation
Blacks Whites
Alienation *
~e for themselves 69 54
advantage of others 64 39
~ be trusted 85 38
No sense planning for future 73 27
Source: General Social Survey, 1987 as cited in Smith and Seltzer, 2000.
*The questions on alienation were worded as follows:
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they mostly are just looking
out for themselves?
Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they go the chance, or would they
try to be fair?
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people?
There is no sense planning a lot — if something is going to happen, it will.
As pointed out by Smith and Seltzer, alienation can be viewed as a culturally
distinguishable attribute, and can provide a “useful analytic frame of reference” for
understanding some of the differences between whites and blacks on other issues.
Religiosity
Religiosity can be defmed in one of three ways: attendance at religious services,
one’s commitment to a particular religion, or the closeness one feels to God. One critical
failure in the research of scholars who have examined religiosity has been to distinguish
it from mere church106 membership. While further research can be conducted on the
influence of both or either on stimulating political participation, for the purposes of this
‘°6Religious services and church are used interchangeably, although the researcher is aware that
religious services can take place in or at other venues.
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study religi0s’~Y is operationa~~ as how often one attends religious services because
frequent attendance can imply one’s commitment to a chosen religion and a close
relationship with God. Religiosity is a significant concept because many, although not
all, places of worship that service black attendees, particularly black churches, are
politically active. The black church is the largest and potentially most powerful
institution in black communities, and studies have shown that blacks who attend activist
churches were more likely to vote in presidential elections in the past.107 “In general, the
overwhelming majority of blacks can be considered quite religious.”08 This reality
underscores the potential, as posited by religious scholars Lincoln and Mamiya, for the
church to serve as a mobilizing agent and stimulus for political activism.109
Churches were perhaps the earliest black formal organizations, being controlled
by African Americans in an otherwise dependent environment.”0 Slavery encouraged or
forced Africans to abandon their original cultures and traditions and embrace
Christianity. However, the church, which grew from “plantation-sanctioned worship
gatherings,” began to function as major centers for social, cultural, and political
‘°7Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), 95.
108Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993), 95.
109C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence Mimiya, The Black Church in the African-American Experience
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990).
‘10Lawrence Hanks, “Civil Rights Organizations and Movements,” in K.C. Morrison, ed. African
Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003),
123.
r 98activitY.” It is from within this context that many researchers frame their assertion
that the black church continues to serve as a central feature in the lives of many African
Americans.
The prime issue for any church, including the African-American church, has been
providing a place for spiritual growth and development. Regardless of denomination, the
black church has also had to confront the dehumanization of enslavement, postwar
sanctioned discrimination, civil rights mobilization, and social inequality.”2 As a result,
the church and its leaders have had prominent roles in the lives of their constituency and
in their communities. Ministers, in particular, have enjoyed a level of influence
unparalleled in formal and informal leadership positions.”3 As a moral authority who
enjoys closeness to the black community, black ministers have been able to easily
mobilize their individual congregations as a social and political force. E. Franklin Frazier
acknowledged this in 1974, and C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence Mamiya have also
asserted that the church provides political information to and encourages political
participation from its members.”4 Table 7 presents the leading black denominations and
estimates about their membership numbers as of 1989.
111La~ence Hanks, “Civil Rights Organizations and Movements,” in K.C. Morrison, ed. African
Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003),
123.
‘12Lawrence Hanks, “Civil Rights Organizations and Movements,” in K.C. Morrison, ed. African
Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003),
123.
“3Lawrence Hanks, “Civil Rights Organizations and Movements,” in K.C. Morrison, ed. African
Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003),
124.
‘14C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence Mainiya, The Black Church in the African American Experience
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990) and E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Church in America (New




National Baptist Convention USA, Inc. 75 31.6
~o~1Baptist Convention of America 2.4 10.1
~~~ssive National Baptist Convention 1.2 5.1
Black Methodists 4.3 18.2
African Methodist Episcopal 2.2 9.3
African Methodist Episcopal Zion 1.2 5.1
Christian Methodist Episcopal 0.9 3.8
Church of God in Christ 3.7 15.6
Other Black Congregations 1.4 5.9
White Protestant and Catholic Churches 2.0 8.4
Total 37.9 100
Source: Adapted from Lincoln and Mamiya 1990, 407 as presented in Lawrence Banks, “Civil Rights
Organizations and Movements,” in K.C. Morrison, ed. African Americans and Political Participation: A
Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 124.
In the past thirty years, however, African-American megachurches, televangelists,
and ministers independent of a church or denomination have emerged.”5 Prominent
among these ministers are T.D. Jakes, Frederick K. C. Price, Creflo Dollar, Barbara King,
and Juanita Bynum. Saving souls continues to be the primary mission of black churches
and their ministers, but this role has been expanded as they continue to advocate a holistic
approach to religion and spirituality.
“5Lawrence Banks, “Civil Rights Organizations and Movements,” in K.C. Morrison, ed. African
Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003),
127.
TABLE 7
Black Church Membership, Estimates, 1989
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The church has continued to serve as an agent for political socialization. Even
during the pre-Civil War period, churches encouraged liberation;”6 religious scholar
James Cone argues that the “black church was born in protest.”7 The National Baptist
Convention in 1982, under the leadership of Baton Rouge preacher the Reverend T. J.
Jemisofl, made it clear that the Convention and its member churches were going to take a
more active role in politics.’18 Jemison pledged to register more than three million blacks
and endorsed Jesse Jackson’s bid for presidential candidacy. Currently, the National
Baptist Convention, USA Incorporated continues to enjoy a relationship with several civil
rights leaders and groups, including the NAACP and Dr. Benjamin Hooks. Additionally,
a significant number of black pastors permit candidates and elected officials to petition
their congregations and utilize church facilities for political meetings and seminars.
Faith-based initiatives have also provided many churches with opportunities to utilize
government grant money for social outreach programs.
Smith and Seltzer concluded in their 1992 and 2000 books that the black
community is distinguishable because it was more religious than other racial groups)’9
Their results were based on questions from the 1996 National Opinion Research Center
‘16Jolm Brown Childs, The Political Black Minister: A Study ofAfro-American Politics and
Religion (Boston: 0. K. Hall, 1980).
117James Cone, Black Theology and Black Power (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1997), 94.
“8Robert Smith, We Have No Leaders: African Americans in the Post-Civil Rights Era (New
York: State University ofNew York, 1996), 99.
‘19Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Race, Class, and Culture: A Study in Afro-American Mass
Opinion (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992) and Contemporaly Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 23.
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General Social Sur~’ey (NORC-GSS), questions that replicate 1987 survey items.
Based on their findings, African Americans are more likely to indicate the following:
1. that they are strongly religious,
2. that they pray more frequently, and
3. that they believe that the Bible is literally true.’2°
Using data provided by Smith and Seltzer, Katherine Tate found in her examination of
black political participation in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections that blacks who
belonged to political churches were more likely to participate in politics.’2’ These
fmdings are illustrated in table 8.
TABLE 8
Racial Differences in Religiosity
Blacks Whites
Religiosity
Strongly Religious 46% 35%
Daily Prayer 73 55
Disapprove of Supreme Court school prayer decision 71 57
Believe Bible literally true 56 27
To be truly American one must be Christian 62 36
Source: General Social Survey, 1987 as cited in Smith and Seltzer, 2000.
It is interesting to note, however, that religiosity has often been discussed and
approached by scholars as a manifestation of Christian or Protestant beliefs. Other
religious beliefs and practices that have been embraced by African Americans are
excluded. A broader conceptualization of religiosity includes the religious and spiritual
experiences of all African Americans, and this conceptualization is utilized in this study.
‘20Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporaiy Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 23.
12tKatherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections enlarged
edition (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1994).
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~though a number of blacks adhere to many creeds, al-Islam is arguably the fastest
growing and the largest non-Christian religion. For this reason, a discussion of it, too, is
included.
African Americans and Islam
There are approximately four million Muslims in the United States. About two-
thirds of all Muslims in the United States are immigrants or their descendants and African
Americans constitute about one-third.’22 It is estimated that by 2015, Islam will be the
second largest religion in the United States and it has been described as the fastest
growing religion in the world.’23 Muslim writer Gisela Webb notes the following about
Muslims in America:
The Islamic community in America includes Muslim ‘conservatives,’ and
‘traditionalists,’ whose ideologies put them at odds with American secular values,
and Muslim ‘modernists’ who wish to be transmitters of Islamic values while
working within the framework o the American democratic tradition.’24
Most of the nonimmigrant Muslims in America are African-American converts to
Islam. For many African Americans, Islam has become a means of self-defmition and of
“choosing” to identify with a religio-cultural system that was other than the one that
‘22Gisela Webb, “Expressions of Islam in America,” Chapter 21 in America’s Alternative
Religions, ed. Timothy Miller (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1995), reproduced online for
Islamfor Today [journal online]; available from http://www.islamfortodav.COmlameflcal 1 .htm ; Internet;
accessed 12 May 2005.
123Gisela Webb, “Expressions of Islam in America,” Chapter 21 in America’s Alternative
Religions, ed. Timothy Miller (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1995), reproduced online for
Islamfor Today [journal online]; available from http://wwwislamfortOdav.COmlameflcal I .htm ; Internet;
accessed 12 May 2005.
‘24Gisela Webb, “Expressions of Islam in America,” Chapter 21 in America ‘s Alternative
Religions, ed. Timothy Miller (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), reproduced online for
Islamfor Today [journal online]; available from intpi/www.islamfortodaY.cOmlamerical 1 .htm ; Internet;
accessed 12 May 2005.
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failed to establish a racially inclusive society.125 The growth of Islam among African
Americans is also related for many as a religious faith that affirms their African heritage.
The roots of a “black Muslim” perspective can be traced to Timothy Drew (Noble
Dew Ali) and the founding of the Moorish American Science Temple in Newark in 1913,
as well as to the emergence ofElijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam.126 There
were/are some themes taught in the Nation of Islam that reflect traditional Islamic
teachings, however, such teachings as the “white man as devil” and the theory of the
origins of human history run counter to traditional Islamic accounts of human history and
purpose.
After the death ofElijah Muhammad, Warith Deen Muhammad, his son, took
over the Nation of Islam and formally brought the organization into mainstream Islamic
belief and practice. In 1985, Warith Deen Muhammad decentralized the organization and
delegated central responsibilities to local imams. Muhammad encouraged the merging of
African-American Muslims into the worldwide Islamic community, but this direction was
not accepted by all members, and Louis Farrakhan, a spokesman for Elijah Muhammad’s
teachings, broke away, maintained the name, and the centralized form of the
organization. Though Farrakhan tends to draw more media attention and many associate
black Muslims with either Farrakhan or Warith Deen Muhammad, a number ofAfrican
125Gisela Webb, “Expressions of Islam in America,” Chapter 21 in America’s Alternative
Religions, ed. Timothy Miller (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1995), reproduced online for
Islamfor Today [journal online]; available from http://www.islamfortoday.comlamerical 1 .htm ; Internet;
accessed 12 May 2005.
‘26Yvonne Haddad and Jane Smith, eds., Muslim Communities in North America (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994).
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American Muslims are not associated with either and identifS’ with other segments of
the Islamic cOmmunitY, such as Sunnis, Shi’ites, Sufis, and Salafiyya.
Third-Party Efforts
According to Dianne Pinderhughes, African Americans tend to support the
political party that is “most supportive of racial reform.”127 One of the early efforts of
blacks to choose a third party came in 1840, when some were attracted to the Liberty
Party, an organization that was almost exclusively dedicated to the abolition of slavery.’28
The party had several national conventions at which blacks participated as delegates, but
the party like other antislavery organizations had little success at the national level.
When the Republican and Democratic parties moved toward all-white
membership, African Americans sought political participation through alternative parties
and organizations. The Black and Tans, a term used in a Louisiana newspaper to
describe black members of the Republican Party, but never formally recognized by the
party, offered a means for blacks to continue a relationship with the national party.’29 In
the South, constituents of this race-exclusive satellite organization of the Republican
Party were not permitted to vote or even informally politically participate. The Black and
Tans ended in 1928 with the election of Herbert Hoover. Hoover dismantled the
leadership of the Black and Tans because of his commitment to securing the votes of
‘27Diane Pinderhughes, Race and Ethnicity in Chicago Politics (Urbana: University Press of
Illinois, 1987), 113.
128Hanes Walton, Black Republicans: The Politics ofthe Black and Tans (Metuchen, NJ:
Scarecrow Press, 1975).
‘29Hanes Walton, Black Republicans: The Politics ofthe Black and Tans (Metuchen, NJ:
Scarecrow Press, 1975).
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white Republicans. Although the Black and Tans did not characterize that the true
political behavior ofAfrican Americans, it did indicate efforts by blacks to be included in
electoral politics, even if it meant creating satellite organizations.
Other efforts by African Americans to organize third parties include the United
Citizens Party of South Carolina and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. In
1969, blacks in South Carolina organized the United Citizens Party; the party
successfully ran in 1970 and 1972 a slate of candidates at the local, state, and national
level and a write-in candidate in the 1970 gubernatorial election)3° The United Citizens
Party was successful in pressuring the state Democratic Party organization, which was
overwhelmingly supported by blacks, to appoint an African-American assistant
director.’31 The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party was organized in the early 1960s
to challenge the racial exclusion that persisted at all levels. The party’s boldest move was
challenging the seating of the regular Democratic Party at the 1964 National Democratic
Convention. While the challenge was unsuccessful in 1964, in 1968 the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party was successful in unseating the regular delegation.’32
School Busing and Affirmative Action
When the Supreme Court issued its famous 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education declaring that segregated schools were unconstitutional, it did not order that
130Byron D’Andra Orey and Reginald Vance, “Participation in Electoral Politics,” in K.C.
Morrison, ed. African Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA:
ABC-CLIO, 2003), 225.
131See Willie Legette, “The South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus, 1970 to 1988,” in Journal of
Black Studies 30 (2000): 839-858.
‘32John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana: University
Press of Illinois, 1994).
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schools desegregate. That order was issued one year later in what is known as Brown
II, when the Supreme Court instructed desegregation “with all deliberate speed.” But it
was not until 1969, fifteen years after the initial Brown decision, in Alexander v. Holmes
County Board ofEducation that states were ordered to desegregate their schools “at
once.”
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board ofEducation (1971) the Supreme
Court ordered the use of busing as a way to achieve racial balance or quotas at various
schools. Defacto segregation was ruled by the Supreme Court in Keyes v. Denver School
District No. 1 (1973) as being a violation of the Brown decisions even if the offending
school district had never practiced dejure segregation. The intent of the Court was to
end the intentional and unintentional practices of establishing separate and unequal
school districts.
These decisions by the Court were met with widespread protests by whites, who
challenged the implementation of these decisions with boycotts, flight to the suburbs, and
by sending their children to private schools. School busing was also the major theme of
several presidential campaigns, both liberal and conservative. Additionally, members of
Congress introduced legislation in 1974 to prohibit Court ordered busing; the measure
passed the House but narrowly failed in the Senate that adopted an amendment that
prohibited busing “unless the courts found that it was ‘needed to guarantee a black child
his constitutional rights.”133
‘33S. Rich, “Bus Ban Defeated 47 to 48,” in Washington Post, May 16, 1974 as quoted in Robert
Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporaiy Controversies and the American Racial Divide (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 31.
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However, in Milliken v. Bradley (1974) the Supreme Court began dismantling
bussing as a means of desegregating. “The Court overturned a lower court order that
required busing between largely black Detroit and its largely white surrounding
suburbs.”34 The majority decision agreed that the segregation was unconstitutional but
that busing was not required to comply with Brown. Since Milliken, the Court has
continued to move away from bussing as a way to desegregate schools. Thus, fifty years
after Brown, most of America’s urban schools remain segregated and most African-
American students still attend schools that are separate and unequal.
Polls on the issue of busing indicate its lack ofpopularity with whites, whose
support for busing has never risen above 25 percent. Moreover, black opinion on the
issue from the 1970s through the 1990s has never exceeded 60 percent.’35 The research
of social scientists Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo indicates that the predominant trends
regarding education between 1956 and 1983 are as follows:
1. By 1982, 9 out of 10 Americans responded positively to questions about
integration.
2. There has been a sizable gap between attitudes in the South and North, but over
time, the two regions have began to converge.
3. Acceptance of integration is positively and clearly associated with respondents’
education at each point throughout the timeperiod. They did note that the trends
in education are similar in the two regions.’ 6
‘34Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporai’y Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 31.
135Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 32 and L. Sigelman and S. Welch, Black
Americans’ Views on Inequality, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
‘36Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo, Racial Attitudes in America: Trends
and Interpretations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 77-78.
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“Affirmative action as a racial public policy had its origins in the Kennedy
Johnson and Nixon administrations.”137 In 1970, President Nixon issued Executive Order
No. 1246 that requiring all businesses that had contracts with the govermnent to “develop
an affinnatiVe action plan” that would include an analysis of the underutilization of
minority business and a specific plan for addressing this underutilization.138 Affirmative
action policies allowed the government and other institutions to utilize race, gender, and
ethnic minority status as a way to give special consideration to these historically
disadvantaged groups. “Like busing, affirmative action generated enormous controversy
and debate.”39 From 1970 to 1995, polls indicate that white support of affirmative action
has never exceeded 20 percent, whereas black opinion has always exceeded 40 percent.’4°
Racial Equality
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the conservative movement has sought to
change the context of the debate on race. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s conservative
scholars have advanced the argument that blacks in general have fewer material resources
(in terms of education, jobs, income, etc.), not because of racism or discrimination but
‘37Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo, Racial Attitudes in America: Trends
and Interpretations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 77-78.
‘38Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporaty Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 32.
‘39Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 33.
‘40Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 33 and C. Steeth and M. Krysan,
“Affirmative Action and the Public, 1970-1995,” in Public Opinion Quarterly 60 (1996): 128-58.
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because of their own shortcomings as individuals and as a community.’4’ The
argument is often presented that other ethnic groups have faced discrimination and
overcome it, why have not blacks?
Data show that whites are more likely than blacks to say that the conditions of
blacks have improved over the years, and whites see lack of individual motivation rather
than discrimination as the “main” cause of the lower status of blacks, whereas a majority
ofblacks see past discrimination as the main cause.142 These views are illustrated in table
9.
TABLE 9
Racial Difference on “Main” Causes of Black Inequality
Blacks Whites
Past discrimination 64 35
Lack of individual motivation 41 52
of inborn intelligence 10 10
Lack of chance for education 54 45
Blacks should overcome prejudice; work their way up like 54 77
fish, Jews, etc.
Conditions of blacks improved in recent years 36 65
Source: General Social Survey, 1996 in Smith and Seltzer 2000.
American Foreign Policy and War
“The opinions ofAfrican Americans on international affairs and U.S. foreign
policy have not been given much attention by students of public opinion or of American
‘41Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporaiy Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 34.
‘42Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporaty Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 34.
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politics.”43 Hardly anything is known about how the foreign policy views of blacks
compare to those of whites. Smith and Seltzer postulate that this part of a larger problem
— the minimal role of blacks in American foreign relations. However, the administrations
of George W. Bush have positioned two blacks in high profile foreign policy positions;
Cohn Powell served in the term as Secretary of State, and Condolezza Rice served in the
first term as National Security Advisor and the second term as Secretary of State;
additionally, African Americans are represented in large numbers in the armed forces.
“Despite this scholarly neglect, blacks have since the formation of the United States to
played a role in international affairs.”~ Walton and Smith state:
In their quest for universal freedom African Americans, who were born in foreign
affairs through African slavery and the slave trade, have turned to American
foreign policy to support policies of human rights and humanitarianism. An
appreciation of the universal freedom thrust of African-American politics must
include an understanding ofAfrican Americans’ role in foreign policy.’45
The following is an overview of racial difference in foreign policy to provide
context for the analysis of how survey respondents evaluated the War on Terrorism.
Tables 10 through 12 illustrate differences in black and white opinion about other
countries prior to September 11, 2001, the use of U.S. troops, and foreign policy goals of
the United States.
‘43Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 39.
‘~Hanes Walton and Robert Smith, American Politics and the African American Questfor
Universal Freedom (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 280.
145Hanes Walton and Robert Smith, American Politics and the African American Questfor
Universal Freedom (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 280.
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TABLE 10
Racial Difference in Attitudes toward Selected Countries







~ Canada 58 79
Source: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Foreign Policy and Public Opinion, 1994 in
Smith and Seltzer 2000.
*RespondefltS were asked to rate the countries on a “feeling thermometer” — a temperature of 50 equals
neutral, higher than 50 equals warm, below 50 equals cool.
TABLE 11
Racial Differences in Opinion on the Use of U.S. Troops in Hypothetical Situations of
Conflict (Percent Favoring Use of U.S. Troops)
Blacks Whites
North Korea invades South Korea 25% 41%
Iraq invades Saudi Arabia 39 53
Arabs invade Israel 27 44
Russia invades Poland 19 34
Russia invades Western Europe 33 56
Civil war in South Africa 38 16
Source: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Foreign Policy and Public Opinion, 1994 in
Smith and Seltzer 2000.
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TABLE 12
Racial Differences in Opinion on Foreign Policy Goals of the United States
(Percent Saying Goals are Very Important)*
Blacks Whites
~g standard of living/less developed countries 38% 20%
Defending human rights 45 33
preventing spread of nuclear weapons 85 74
~i~tIng world hunger 65 55
~iurce: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Foreign Policy and Public Opinion, 1994 in
Smith and Seltzer 2000.
*The question read: I am going to read a list of possible foreign policy goals the United States might have.
For each one, please say whether you think it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United
States, a somewhat important foreign policy, or not important goal at all.
For the most part, on foreign policy issues, the differences between blacks and
whites are not as large as those on domestic issues. Data show that whites were more
likely than blacks to identify various countries as vital to U.S. interests and to support the
use ofmilitary force in various parts of the world (the only exception is South Africa,
where blacks more so than whites would favor intervention in the event of a civil war).
Although a majority of blacks have negative attitudes toward North Korea and Iraq—
countries defined as post-Cold War enemies and rogue nations—they are less negative or
hostile than whites.’46
From August 1990 to February 1991, the Washington Post and ABC News
conducted twelve polls during the course of the Gulf War.’47 The polls asked about
‘46Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 45-46.
147Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary ConfroversieS and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 46.
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several issues; listed below in tables 13 through 15 are several opinions held by
blacks and whites at the beginning and end of the war.
TABLE 13
Race-Gender Differences in Opinion toward the Initial Bush Administration
Response to the Iraq Invasion ofKuwait
~ypportiflg Bush Decision to Send Troops to Persian Gulf
Blacks 40% Whites 77%
Men 52 Men 89
Women 31 Women 61
%Favoring US. Invasion to Force Iraqi Withdrawal
Blacks 29 Whites 28
Men 40 Men 30
Women 19 Women 25
% Favoring US. Taking All Action, Including Military Power to Force Iraqi Withdrawal
Blacks 68 Whites 60
Men 69 Men 71
Women 53 Women 63
Source: Washington Post/ABC News, August 1990 in Smith and Seltzer 2000
TABLE 14
Racial Differences in Approval of the War, January 18-February 27, 199 1*
Blacks Whites
January18 37% 66%
February 18 30 66
February 22 24 66
February 24 57 87
February 27 36 74
Source: Washington Post/ABC News in Smith and Seltzer.




Racial Differences in Opinion toward the War after the Cease-Fire
Blacks Whites
~~val of Bush handling of Gulf War 88% 96%
~pp~oval of overall Bush job performance as president 69 52
Would vote for Bush in 1992 59 80
Was the war worth fighting? (% yes) 72 90
Was war for economics and oil or for moral principles? 51 69
(% saying moral principle)
Source: Washington Post/ABC News, March 1991 in Smith and Seltzer 2000.
In the early stages of the Gulf crisis when G. H. W. Bush dispatched troops, there
was virtual unanimity in the establishment media and among national political leaders in
support of the President.’48 Throughout the subsequent debate leading up to the
congressional debate, vote, and the war, “Few criticisms challenged fundamental aspects
of the administration’s policy. In particular, nearly all reported critics as well as
supporters agreed that Iraq must be unconditionally dislodgedform Kuwait byforce, if
necessary.”149 Not only was the debate narrow, the president, Republican congressional
leaders, and television and newspaper commentators frequently used the Hitler-and-Nazi-
Germany frame. This propaganda campaign was developed, tested, and marketed by the
influential Washington public relations firm Hill and Knowlton)5°
148Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial
Divide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 54.
‘49R. Entman and B. Page, “The News before the Storm: The Iraq War Debate and the Limits to
Media Independence,” in Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US. Foreign Policy in the Gulf
War, eds. W. Bennett and D. Paletz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 94-95 as quoted in
Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporary Controversies and the American Racial Divide (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 54.
150S. Trento, The Power House (New York: St. Martin, 1992).
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From the beguiling of the crisis until the cease-fire, most blacks opposed the
initial dispatch of troops, the buildup to the war, and the war itself. Only at the end did
majorities of blacks support the war. What these race differences in opinion on the war
tend to show is that most black Americans apparently ignored mainstream, establishment
framing of the issue and/or employed alternative frames. Historically, blacks have been
skeptical about America’s foreign wars, especially in the so-called Third World. This
may reflect to some extent African-American identification with the colonial people of
the world, who like themselves have suffered from white exploitation and racial
domination. Finally, 25 percent of the troops serving in the Gulfwere black (including
30 percent of the army ground troops and 50 percent of the female troops).’5’ Thus,
African Americans may have been concerned about the prospects of disproportionately
high black casualties in a prolonged conflict. As it turned out, the war was short and
relatively costless in terms of injuries and deaths to Americans (about a hundred
casualties iii the brief ground war).
Assumptions
The following assumptions were made at the onset of this study.
1. Respondents were able to discretely identif~r their ideological orientation and
political attitudes.
2. An examination of the variables selected for the study are sufficient enough to
provide a picture of black political reality in East Texas.
151Robert Smith and Richard Seltzer, Contemporaty Controversies and the American Racial





Black churches of various denominations, civic groups, fraternities and sororities,
and social clubs were identified and contacted to (a) identify a large number (at least
1000) ofAfrican Americans in East Texas who exhibited the diversity of characteristics
found in the East Texas black population and (b) aid in the administration and completion
of the surveys. The objective was to obtain a cross-section of the black population in
East Texas. One thousand survey questionnaires were administered; 507 were returned;
405 were completed and used for data analysis.
Paper questionnaires
The survey questionnaire was designed utilizing various questions from the
following surveys:
1. National African-American Election Study, 2000
2. Black Political Attitudes and Behavior Survey, Atlanta 1998
3. National Election Study, 2000
4. Gallup Polls
Additionally, questions with original wording were designed by the researcher.
Paper questionnaires were used for the study survey because they are a relatively
easy and inexpensive way to gather data, and were used for several reasons. First, the
questions on a paper questionnaire have no intonation, as is the case with phone or
person-to-person surveys, and may be less subject to questioner bias. Second, paper
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questionnaires are less limited geographically because it costs less to mail a survey
than it does to send an interviewer to distant locations. Moreover, paper questionnaires
provide more of a sense of anonymity for the participants than does a personal interview.
Finally, paper questionnaires allow the respondent time to think over answers and choice
of time and place for filling out the questionnaire.
Sampling
Purposive sampling was utilizes because it involves selecting a sample based on
the presence of certain characteristics necessary to answer questions. This sampling
method was used and ensured that all completed questionnaires were from East Texas
blacks.
Design Issues
In the design of the survey instrument, three issues were considered: the format or
layout of the questionnaire, the wording and types of questions asked, and the scales used
for the answers. Each of these areas influenced whether the questionnaire recipient
answered the questions and return the questionnaire.
Format
The questionnaire was short, one page front and back, with sufficient space left to
make the survey look easy to read. The ease of response is often a critical factor in
survey design because potential participants will throw away the questionnaire or
procrastinate if the survey looks as if it will take a long time to fill out.
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Question Order
Most experts advise putting an interesting question first to capture attention.
Questions that may be perceived as easy will be placed first on the survey and the
questions were grouped so that one question logically leads to the next. A Likert scale
was be utilized, but the same scale was not be utilized throughout the entire study
because to the nature of some of the questions and their responses. Sensitive or difficult
to answer questions were put near the end of the questionnaire so that a level of trust
could be built with the respondent through the easy earlier questions. Finally, the
questions were arranged so that the more general questions come before the specific ones.
Motivating Respondents
Response rates seem closely tied to motivation, so it is important to consider ways
to increase the motivation of potential participants. The following list gives the ways this
researcher motivated participants:
1. Create a credible image: A cover letter accompanied each paper questionnaire and
was on Clark Atlanta University Department of Political Science letterhead. As
well, an inkjet printer was used to print both cover letter and questionnaire to
provide a consistent professional appearance.
2. Appeal to altruism: Most people want to help a good cause, so the cover letter
clearly pointed out the purpose of the survey and the good cause that was aided by
the participants’ response.
3. An easy-to-do appearance: The paper questionnaire was tested on five people to
estimate easy of completion and to assess the effectiveness of the questionnaire’s
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appearance. Additionally, an addressed stamped envelope was included for
ease of return.
Data Analysis
Once data were collected and coded, they were analyzed using the Statistical
Program for Social Sciences (SPSS) 11.0 for Mac computers and 13.0 for Windows.
SPSS was used to analyze each research question. Frequency and bivariate analyses were
conducted on all survey item answers to determine the different levels of responses by the
sample populatiàn. T-tests were conducted to evaluate the relationship strength or
correlation existing between the dependent and independent variables. The following
statistical tests were conducted on data to yield research fmdings: lambda, Goodman
Kruskal’s tau, Somers’ d, chi-square based Cramer’s V, gamma, Spearman Correlation,
and Pearson’s correlation coefficient.
Survey Questionnaire Rationale
Forty-six questions comprise the survey questionnaire used to collect data about
black East Texans’ political attitudes and behaviors (see Appendix B). The following is
an outline of the questions and an explanation of the data they were designed to gather.
Questions 1-9
These questions utilized a six-point Likert scale to determine perceptions of
effectiveness of various strategies for social improvement. Questions 1 and 3 inquired
about govermnent spending for public programs for the poor and minority contracts,
respectively. Questions 2 and 7 inquired about continued bussing and mixed-income
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sousing; the aim of the questions was to narrowly assess attitudes about community
concerns of education and housing options. Attitudes about crime and punishment were
indicated by respondents in questions 5, 6, and 9; attitudes about sentencing for crimes
related to illegal drugs, police profiling, and increased police power were points of
interest. Question 8 inquired about attitudes concerning allowing prayer in schools.
Quçstions 10-30
Using a six-point Likert scale, questions 10-30 were designed to collect
significant data by asking respondents about levels of agreement or disagreement
‘regarding several socioeconomic and political issues. The following list outlines the
issues and corresponding questions:
1. Healthcare: Question 10
2. Racial equality: Question 11
3. Immigration: Questions 12 and 21
4. Personal responsibility: Questions 13 and 14
5. Reparations: Questions 15 and 16
6. Financial health: Questions 17 and 18
7. Govermnent responsiveness! Alienation: Question 19
8. Government trust: Question 20
9. Limits on civil liberties: Question 22 and 24
10. Racial profiling: Question 23
11. Perceptions of major political parties: Question 25
12. Abortion: Question 26
13. Stem-cell research: Question 27
14. Gay marriages: Question 28
15. Iraq war: Questions 29 and 30
Questions 31-36
Questions 31-38 asked respondents about their ideological orientation and
political activity; these questions collect data using a combination of open-ended
questions and variously scaled Likert-styled measures. Specifically, questions 31 and 32
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asked respondents to identify their ideological orientation using a nrne-point Likert
scale and to identify which political party they most closely identify using an open-ended
question~ respectively. Questions 33-36 asked respondents about their participation in the
election process, specifically about voting, and about the frequency in which they engage
in discussions about politics.
Questions 37-38
Question 37 asked respondents whether they believe blacks, other racial
minorities, women and the poor could form an influential political alliance. This
question was designed to assess perceptions about the prospects of blacks working
together with other groups to pursue a political agenda. Question 38 inquired about the
frequency of attendance to religious services.
Questions 3 9-46
Demographic data were collected from questions 39-46. Residential ZIP codes
were collected to ensure that respondents reside in the study defmed area of East Texas;
gender was collected to ensure that an acceptable number of respondents are male and
female; and respondents were asked to identify with an age range to ensure that all ages
are represented in the study at a significant level. Educational attainment and household
income ranges were also requested, as were marital status and number of children in the




This chapter outlined the rationale for the study by defming concepts central to
the study and providing details about the research methodology. The survey
questionnaire is outlined and the statistical tests performed for data analysis are given.
Chapter four further connects the racial and political legacies of Texas to the
South. An historical examination of blacks in Texas is presented in the next chapter and
provides a context for the evaluation of the ideological orientations and political attitudes
of blacks in the eastern region of the state.
CHAPTER 4
HISTORY OF BLACKS IN TEXAS
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide context for the evaluation of blacks in
Texas. By tracing the history of blacks in the state of Texas up to the present, context is
established for the evaluation of their social, political, and economic realities.
Early Arrivals, 1528-1865
People ofAfrican descent are some of the oldest residents of Texas. Since the
arrival of Estevánico in 1528, African Texans have had a long heritage in the state.
Estevánico, a Moor, accompanied Spanish explorer Alvar Nuflez Cabeza de Vaca across
the territory known as Texas.’ Other pioneer Africans accompanied the Spanish into the
Southwest, and some settled with them in the region known today as Texas. By 1792,
Spanish Texas numbered thirty-four blacks and 414 mulattoes.2 However, Mexico’s
opposition to slavery kept the black population very small before the Texas Revolution.
1AJ~ Barr, Black Texans: A History ofNegroes in Texas, 1528-1971 (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Co., 1973).




Unlike Estevánico and some of the Africans who inhabited the province prior to
settlement by Ang1oAmericai~, most African Americans entered the area as slaves. The
first Anglo-Americans who settled in Texas came from the southern United States and
were accustomed to using African slaves as an important source of labor.3 During the
first fifteen years of white settlement in Texas, from 1821 to the Texas Revolution of
1836, slavery grew very slowly.4 In the mid-1830s, only 10 percent of the people in the
Austin and DeWitt colonies and 13 percent of the residents in East Texas were black.5
On the eve of the Texas Revolution only about 5,000 blacks were enslaved in Texas.
With independence from Mexico, however, whites made African slavery an integral part
of the state’s economic development, and the institution of slavery grew rapidly. In
Texas as a whole at the time of independence in 1836, perhaps 12 percent of the people
were slaves, a proportion very much in keeping with the dominantly upper-southern
character of Texas at that time. By 1835, a population of about 4,200 had accumulated,
scattered in colonies such as Bevil, Tenaha, San Augustine, and Nacogdoches. The
majority of these East Texans were upper southerners, but many were slaveowning
planters from the coastal states who had been attracted by the fertile Redlands area. A
dramatic increase in the black population occurred with the influx of slaveholders from
the Lower South after the war of independence from Mexico. By 1840, the proportion of
3Alwyn Barr, Black Texans: A History ofNegroes in Texas, 1 528-1971 (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Co., 1973).
4Alwyn Barr, Black Texans: A History ofNegroes in Texas, 1 528-1971 (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Co., 1973).
5Alwyn Barr, Black Texans: A History ofNegroes in Texas, 1528-1971 (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Co., 1973).
125
blacks in the population had risen to one-fifth, and by the time of the Civil War to almost
one-third.6 By 1849, 11,000 African Americans were enslaved in Texas; by 1859, 58,000
were enslaved, and by 1860, 182,000 — 30 percent of the Texas population.7 In thirteen
counties of East and Southeast Texas, blacks formed a majority by 1860, even exceeding
80 percent in plantation-dominated Wharton County.8 Their distribution closely
paralleled that of the white lower southerners and was clustered east of the Texarkana
San Antonio line.
According to Randolph Campbell, slavery in Texas was similar to that in other
parts of the American South. While the treatment ofAfrican Americans and Africans
enslaved in Texas may have varied on the basis of the disposition of the individual
slaveowners, it was clear that white Texans, in general, accepted and defended slavery.9
Moreover, slavery in Texas had all the characteristics that made it successful in other
parts of the South. For instance, slaveholders dominated the state’s economic and
political life. The government of the Republic of Texas and, after 1845, the state
legislature passed a series of slave codes to regulate the behavior of slaves and restrict the
6Alwyn Barr, Black Texans: A History ofNegroes in Texas, 1 528-1971 (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Co., 1973).
7Alwyn Barr, Black Texans: A History ofNegroes in Texas, 1528-19 71 (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Co., 1973).
8~yn Barr, Black Texans: A History ofNegroes in Texas, 1528-1971 (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Co., 1973).
9Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
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right of free blacks.’° White Texans also restricted the civil liberties ofwhite opponents
of slavery in order to suppress dissent about the institution.
Antebellum Texas, 1846-1861
Coming primarily from the southern United States and bringing with them the
institution of slavery, the earliest Anglo migrants in the 1 820s began making Texas
southern.” They created a predominantly agricultural, slaveholding economy and
society. By the 1 850s, three quarters of the state’s families were headed by natives of the
South, approximately 25 percent of those families owned at least one slave.12 The slaves
themselves constituted about 30 percent of the total population, numbering 38,753 in
1847; 58,161 in 1850; and 182,566 by 1860.’~ Virtually all of these southern-born
slaveholders and slaves lived east of a line extending from the Red River at the ~
meridian southward to the mouth of the Nueces River, thus, the eastern two-fifths of the
state, an area as large as Alabama and Mississippi combined.
Texas differed from most other states of the Old South in notable ways. It had a
large concentration of immigrants from Europe, primarily Germans, who arrived during
the 1840s and 1850s. By 1860, at least 20,000 residents of German birth lived in Texas
‘°James Marten, “Slaves and Rebels: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1861-1865,” in
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 40:3 (January 1937), 169-99.
“Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
‘2Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003). Also see Francis E. Abemethy, ed., Tales From the Big Thicket (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1966).
13Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
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in search of cheap, rich land and fleeing political repression and revolution.’4 Texas also
differed form the rest of the South in having a southern frontier occupied primarily by
citizens of Mexican rather than Anglo ancestry and a western frontier populated by
Indians. 15
Three-quarters of all families drew their livelihood from farming, about two-
thirds of the farmers in antebellum Texas, including an even greater percentage of
Germans, owned no slaves and practiced subsistence fanning. The one-third of
antebellum Texas farmers who owned slaves produced food for their families and
cultivated cash crops as well. Farms owned by slaveholders were notably larger than
those owned by nonslaveholders, averaging about one thousand acres in size. Farmers
and planters who owned slaves produced 90 percent of all cotton grown in antebellum
Texas. A few Anglo migrants focused on cattle raising, and a handful produced sugar,
but only a few of the state’s counties had the appropriate climate.’6
The booming agricultural economy of antebellum Texas created considerable
social mobility among whites; the region’s free population had a class structure with a
distinctly southern look. At the top were slaveholding planters, wealthy merchants and
14Randolph Campbell, An Empirefor Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1821-1865
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989).
15Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
16Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier. African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998). For more information see Randolph Campbell, An Empire
for Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1821-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1989); Aiwyn Barr, Black Texans: A History ofNegroes in Texas, 1528-1971 (Austin: Jenkins Publishing
Co., 1973); Tamara Miner Haygood, “Use and Distribution of Slave Labor in Harris County, Texas, 1836-
1860,” in eds., Howard Beeth and Cary D. Wintz, Black Dixie: AfroTexan History and Culture in Houston
(College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1992).
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professionals. The upper class consisted of a limited number; the great majority of
antebellum Texans, two-thirds of the free population, were the middle-class or yeoman
class.’7 These people owned a small share of land and most were farmers, skilled
tradesmen, teachers, clerks, and city dwellers. At the bottom of the free population social
ladder were poor whites, which were 25 percent of families. Most were tenant farmers,
overseers, day laborers, and clerks. Finally, the free population of antebellum Texas
included a small groups ofAfrican Americans who were not slaves. The census listed
fewer than 400 in the state in both 1850 and 1860.18 In the eyes of most whites, their
presence threatened slavery by demonstrating that blacks were capable of freedom, thus
encouraging unrest among those who were enslaved. Consequently, harsh constitutional
and statutory restrictions on free blacks existed throughout the antebellum years. After
1836, no “free person of color” (defmed until 1858 as having one-fourth or more African
blood and thereafter as having one-eighth African blood) could live in Texas without the
permission of the legislature.’9 A few gained such approval during the 1830s and 1840s;
virtually none after 1850. Those free blacks permitted to stay in Texas were often
subjected to the same laws as slaves.20
17Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
‘8Alwyn Barr, Black Texans: A History ofNegroes in Texas, 1528-1971 (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Co., 1973).
19See Harold Schoen, “The Free Negro in the State of Texas: Legal Status,” in Southwestern
Historical Quarterly 40:3 (January 1937), 169-99 and Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe
Lone Star State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
20Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
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Most slaves came to Texas with their masters as they moved from the Old South.
Others, although not a majority, entered Texas as merchandise sold through the interstate
slave trade.2’ The state’s newspapers during the 1840s and 1850s regularly carried
advertisements placed by slave traders in New Orleans and Shreveport as well as those in
Galveston and Houston.22 By 1860, slaves were one-third of all antebellum Texans.23
A majority of Texas slaves belonged to farmers who owned at least ten
bondsmen.24 Most slaves, male and female alike, labored at both the cultivation of crops
and the myriad of everyday chores. Working hours extended, as one slave put it, “from
can see to can’t see,” meaning from sunrise to sunset.25 A small minority, 5 percent or
less, of Texas slaves lived in towns and worked as domestic servants or day laborers.26
Slaves had no legal rights ofmarriage or family, but most lived a large part of
their lives in a family setting. Some masters took care not to separate family members,
21Randolph Campbell, An Empirefor Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1 821-1865
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989).
22Randolph Campbell, An Empirefor Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1 821-1865
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989).
23Randolph Campbell, An Empire for Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1 821-1865
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989).
24Randolph Campbell, An Empirefor Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1821-1865
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989).
25George P. Rawick, ed., The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography vol. 4, The Texas
Narratives (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1972), part 2.
26Randolph Campbell, An Empire for Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1821-1865
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989).
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but others showed no concern at all. Many, and perhaps all, slave families were
disrupted.27
Slaves adopted a variety of behavior patterns in response to their circumstances as
human property.28 Most bondsmen fell into three categories. A minority behaved as
loyal servants who identified with their masters and were obedient and faithful. The
extent to which such slaves internalized the behavior patterns of the loyal servant as
opposed to engaging in deliberate accommodation for the purposes of getting along will
never be known. Other bondsmen hated their masters and rebelled in numerous ways,
large and small. Some acted on their hatred simply by day to day troublemaking. They
worked grudgingly, broke equipment, mistreated livestock, and constantly misbehaved.
Other slaves took their resistance to the point of running away. Some runaways
headed back to the homes and families they had left when removed to Texas; some
attempted to just hide out in the neighborhood; but thousands headed for Mexico —
Mexico would not extradite slaves.29 Most Texas slaves adopted a behavior pattern that
involved being neither a loyal servant nor a rebel of any sort. This meant taking a clear-
eyed view of owners and seeing that no one who held human property deserved great
respect or loyalty.
27For more information, see Barry Crouch, “The Cord of Love: Legalizing Black Marital and
Family Rights in Postwar Texas,” in Journal ofNegro History 79:4 (Fall 1994), 334-51.
28James Marten, “Slaves and Rebels: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1861-1865,” in East Texas
Historical Journal 28:1 (1990), 29-36.
29James Marten, “Slaves and Rebels: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1861-1865,” in East Texas
Historical Journal 28:1 (1990), 29-36. Also see Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone
Star State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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As a largely rural society “marked by underdeveloped cultural institutions, crude
amusement, and violence, antebellum Texas was very much a man’s world.”30 In Texas,
women had no political rights, and were barred from serving on juries and witnessing
wills. On the other hand, married women could keep title to property they owned prior to
marriage, had a community property right to everything acquired while living with their
husband, and full title to property acquired after divorce or upon the death of their
husband. Women had the right to sue for divorce, property settlements and child custody
arrangements.3’
The Constitution of 1845 permitted all adult white males to vote and hold state or
local office without having to meet any taxpaying or property-holding qualifications.
Adult males of Mexican descent were considered “white” and generally accorded the
same privileges, leaving women, “Indians not taxed, Africans and descendents of
Africans” as disfranchised groups.32
When antebellum Texans went to the polls to vote, they generally elected
members of the slaveholding elite to run state and local government. These officeholders
were more than four times as wealthy on average than the typical family head.33
30Randolph Campbell, An Empire for Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1 821-1865
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989) and Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History
ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
31Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
32Leon Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath ofSlavery (New York: Vintage Books,
1979), 33.
33Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
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~‘Leadership by a minority whose status depended on the ownership of slaves introduced
an element of aristocracy and guaranteed a pro-southern cast to antebellum Texas
~ politics.”34
Texas during the Civil War, 1861-1865
“The southern consensus and one-party politics that characterized the political
climate of antebellum Texas did not eliminate political conflict.”35 While politicians did
not question the morality of slavery, or the importance of securing its future, they
disagreed on how to best protect it. The question became should Texas secede from the
Union or try to protect the institution of slavery while remaining a part of the Union.
Some Texans held that unless Congress agreed to permit slavery in all the territory taken
from Mexico, passed a stronger fugitive slave law, and stopped abolitionist agitation, the
South should secede from the Union.
The election ofAbraham Lincoln as president of the United States led to
spontaneous grassroots movements in Texas that condemned him and encouraged
secession.36 Then-governor Sam Houston fought secession, but the secessionists ignored
the governor’s arguments and issued a call for a convention to be held on January 28,
1861. The 177 delegates who assembled in Austin were overwhelmingly southern in
34Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
35Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
36M1an C. Ashcrafi, “East Texas in the Election of 1860 and the Secession Crisis,” in ed. Archje P.
McDonald, Eastern Texas History: Selectionfrom the East Texas Historical Journal (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Company, 1978), 95-109.
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background and mterests 91 percent were born m slave states and 72 percent owned
slaves ~
A committee quickly drafted an ordinance of secession that repealed the
annexation ordinance of 1845, and returned Texas to its status as a sovereign state.38 The
state’s voters approved in a referendum held on February 23, and the ordinance took
effect on March 2, 1861, the 25~ anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of the
Republic of Texas from Mexico.39 The secessionists carried the popular vote and won by
104 of the state’s 122 organized counties.4° Every East Texas county except lightly
populated Angelina, which had relatively few slaves, voted in affirmation.
Once the voters approved secession, the convention reassembled and on March 5
adopted an ordinance making Texas part of the Confederate States of America. The
convention declared the governor’s office vacant, thus, ousting Sam Houston who
protested the legality of such an action.41 President Abraham Lincoln twice offered
Houston military assistance to help him keep Texas in the Union, but Houston left Austin
~A1lan C. Ashcraft, “East Texas in the Election of 1860 and the Secession Crisis,” in ed. Archie P.
McDonald, Eastern Texas History: Selection from the East Texas Historical Journal (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Company, 1978), 95-109. Also, Alwyn Barr, Black Texans : A History ofNegroes in Texas,
1528-1971 (Austin: Jenkins Publishing Company, 1973)
38Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
39Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
40Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
41Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
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in late March 1861 as the Confederate flag flew over the state capitol. The reality was
that slavery was an economic and social interest that the state of Texas was willing to
forcefully defend.
Secession from the Union did not immediately result in military action, instead it
was the removal of all federal troops that left western and southern borders vulnerable.42
Most Texas soldiers in the Confederate Army did not see service east of the Mississippi
River.43 By January 1865, the Confederacy had clearly lost the war in the West, and
Texas escaped any major invasion of its interior by Union armies during the war.~’
With no invasion to disrupt its agricultural economy, Texas continued to produce
food and raise livestock. Texas agriculture remained so productive during the war, in
large part, because the conflict did not disturb slavery in any major way. Texas slaves
did not rebel or run away in large numbers during the war, and only a handful served in
the Union army —47 of the total 98,594 black Union soldiers recruited in the Confederate
states.45 While Texas slaveholders perceived loyalty, the reality was that federal troops
never penetrated the interior of the state to provide encouragement for runaways.46
42Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
43The War ofRebellion: Official Records ofthe Union and Confederate Armies (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1902), series 1, vol. XXII, part I, 449, 450.
~Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1 990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
45The War ofRebellion: Official Records ofthe Union and Confederate Armies (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1902), series 1, vol. XXII, part I, 449, 450.
46Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
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Slavery remained so secure in Texas during the war that thousands of slaves were
brought in for safekeeping from other states in the Confederacy where federal troops had
overrun plantations. “Refugeeing” began in 1862, and continued through most of 1864.~~
Most of the refugee masters and slaves lived along the middle Trinity and Brazos Rivers
in the interior of East Texas.48
On June 2, 1865, Confederate military leaders in Texas boarded a Union warship
at Galveston and signed articles of surrender.49
Reconstruction, 1865-1876
Reconstruction in Texas began in mid-June 1865 with the arrival of occupation
troops at Galveston on the coast and Marshall in the northeastern part of the state.
General Gordon Granger immediately began paroling Confederate soldiers and
announced the Emancipation Proclamation, making June 19, or Juneteenth, a day of
celebration for Texas blacks.5° However, it took time for Gen. Granger’s orders to
become known or obeyed across the state. Some slaves remained in bondage many years
after Juneteenth.
47Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
48Archie P. McDonald, Eastern Texas History: Selectionsfor the East Texas Historical Journal
(Austin: Jenkins Publishing Company, 1978).
49Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998); Eugene H. Berwanger, The West and Reconstruction
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Most slaves greeted freedom with joy. Some sang, danced, cried, and left
immediately; still others asked for leave passes.51 In some cases, however, whites did not
permit such celebrations. One slave reported that in the city of Crockett, the slave patrol
whipped one hundred celebrators.52 Even those slaves left free to celebrate soon found
their joy constrained. Some cities had hostile policies that did not permit blacks to
congregate or move in. A large group ofwhites in Freestone County passed a general
resolution in 1865 vowing not to hire any blacks and to horsewhip any freedman who
tried to contract with Anglos. Some slaveowners told their slaves that they had to be
gone by sunrise, while still others poisoned the slave water wells, killing many before
they could leave. In Harrison County, most slaveholders freed their bondsmen before
owners in neighboring Rusk County, and a number of freedmen were killed as they
crossed the county line. A number of slaveowners refused to free their slaves. One
freedman remembered his owner saying, “How are you going to eat and get clothes and
such?”53 Along the Texas coast, some whites convinced freedmen to board ships that
would carry them to a better place. The ship captains then took them to Cuba and other
countries to sell them back into slavery. As late as 1867, some coastal whites went into
Smith County offering jobs to blacks as boathands. These businessmen transported
51James Smaliwood, “Black Texans During Reconstruction: First Freedom,” in ed. Archie P.
McDonald, Eastern Texas History: Selectionsfor the East Texas Historical Journal (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Company, 1978).
52Leon Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath ofSlavery (New York: Vintage Books,
1979).
53George P. Rawick, ed., The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography vol. 4, The Texas
Narratives (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1972), part 2.
r
137
hundreds to the coast, divided the blacks into crews and sailed away to Brazil. Before
reaching port, they would chain the freedmen and prepare them for sale.54
Most accepted Gen. Granger’s advice, at least immediately after freedom -- that
they stay where they were and work for wages, because they had nowhere else to go. A
comparison of 1860 and 1870 census statistics reveal no massive shifting of the
population occurred.55 The percentage of black population remained relatively stable in
all parts of the state. This is due, in part, to many blacks who left old masters going only
a few miles before hiring out to a new employer and others relocating throughout the
state to rejoin families; still others moved to the nearest town.
Most hoped to live in peace with whites and concentrate on supporting themselves
and their families in the ways that they knew — primarily small-scale farming. They
wanted to acquire small parcels of land on which they could support themselves, and they
had a strong desire to educate their children. Before the Freedmen’s Bureau, blacks
bought educational materials, and organized schools. Blacks also organized mutual aid
societies. In Houston, the Reverend Elias Dibble organized a mutual aid society to help
freedmen with members paying a $2.50 initiation fee and $.25 weekly dues. The society
54James Smaliwood, “Black Texans during Reconstruction: First Freedom,” in eds. Archie P.
McDonald, Eastern Texas History: Selectionsfor the East Texas Historical Journal (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Company, 1978) and George P. Rawick, ed., The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography
vol. 4, The Texas Narratives (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1972), part 2.
55James Smallwood, “Black Texans During Reconstruction: First Freedom,” in ed. Archie P.
McDonald, Eastern Texas History: Selectionsfor the East Texas Historical Journal (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Company, 1978), 132.
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quickly collected an $80 relief fund. Many religious organizations and churches also
founded benevolence agencies.56
Reconstruction began according to a plan established by Abraham Lincoln in
1863 and continued by his successor Andrew Johnson in 1865.~~ Lincoln made virtually
no place for the freedmen in his original plan for Reconstruction. They received freedom
and nothing more. Andrew Johnson cared even less about what happened to African
Americans. Thus, when Reconstruction began in Texas, the situation was not particularly
threatening for whites.
Andrew Jackson Hamilton was appointed by President Lincoln as an agent of
Presidential Reconstruction.58 His primary responsibility was to bring Texas back to its
proper constitutional relationship with the Union. This meant registering eligible voters —
those who could take the oath of amnesty promising future loyalty to the United States —
and supervising the election of a convention to revise the state constitution. One key
revision the state constitution would be the elimination of all references to slavery.
Voters were to approve the new constitution, elect new state and local officials, choose
U.S. Representatives and a new state legislature that would select U.S. Senators. Once
56James Smaliwood, “Black Texans during Reconstruction: First Freedom,” in ed. Archie P.
McDonald, Eastern Texas History: Selectionsfor the East Texas Historical Journal (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Company, 1978), 132.
57Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
58Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
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the President approved satisfactory completion of these steps, Presidential Reconstruction
of Texas would be complete.
On September 5, 1865, the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned
Lands, which was established by Congress under the Department ofWar, set up its Texas
headquarters in Galveston with the primary responsibility of helping blacks adjust to
freedom.59 The Freedmen’s Bureau, as it was commonly called, drew opposition from
whites as it tried to supervise labor contracts, established schools, and protected freedmen
from violence.60 Nevertheless, by January 1866, Freemen’s Bureau agents had set up
offices in Marshall, Waco, and Columbus and was on it way to becoming a major factor
during Reconstruction in Texas.6’
However, the new state legislature immediately indicated that it intended, as far as
possible, to restore prewar conditions in Texas. The legislature refused to ratify the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the legislature passed laws similar to the
black codes, adopted by other southern states at the time, to codify the state constitution’s
denial of equality to African Americans.62 Freedmen were given the right to acquire and
59Bariy Crouch, The Freedmen ‘s Bureau and Black Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1992).
60Mton Homsby, “The Freedmen’s Bureau Schools in Texas, 1865-1879,” in Southwestern
Historical Quarterly 76:4 (April 1973), 398, 415, 417.
61Mton Hornsby, “The Freedmen’s Bureau Schools in Texas, 1865-1879,” in Southwestern
Historical Quarterly 76:4 (April 1973), 398,415, 417. Also see James Smaliwood, “Black Texans during
Reconstruction: First Freedom,” in ed. Archie P. McDonald, Eastern Texas Histoty: Selectionsfor the East
Texas Historical Journal (Austin: Jenkins Publishing Company, 1978) and James Smallwood, Time of
Hope, Time ofDespair: Black Texans during Reconstruction (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press,
1981).
62James Smaliwood, Time ofHope, Time ofDespair: Black Texans during Reconstruction (Port
Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1981).
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sell property, to make and enforce contracts, and to sue and be sued in court. However,
blacks could not serve on juries, testify against whites, vote, or hold office. Also, blacks
were denied a share of the public school fund and restricted from intermarrying with
whites. Railroad companies had to provide separate accommodations for whites and
blacks. Finally, the legislature passed elaborate contract, vagrancy, and apprentice laws
designed to assure control over black workers without restoring slavery or mentioning
race.63
As Reconstruction went forward in 1866 and 1867, those who objected to
conservative control faced intimidation and terror. Black laborers complained of being
cheated or even driven off the land that they worked without pay. The Bureau’s attempts
at establishing schools often met violent resistance, and unionists insisted that the local
justice system afforded no relief.64
From 1865 to 1867, Presidential Reconstruction in Texas created state and local
governments controlled by a combination of prewar Unionists and former secessionists,
with the latter holding the upper hand.65 In the fall of 1866, Republicans, using the
attitudes of southerners and the conditions of blacks and Unionists in the old Confederacy
as their primary weapon, swept the midterm congressional elections and took two-thirds
63Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
64For more information, see Alton Homsby, “The Freedmen’s Bureau Schools in Texas, 1865-
1879,” in Southwestern Historical Quarterly 76:4 (April 1973), 398, 415, 417.
65Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
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control of both Houses.66 In March 1867, Congress passed the first of four
RecoflStIllCtiOn Acts that in effect began the process anew in the former Confederate
states, this time under the U.S. Army.67 When a new constitutional convention
assembled in Austin on June 1, 1868, 78 of its 90 members were Republicans. Nine
blacks, the first African Americans elected to public service in Texas, served as
delegates.68 The new constitution was approved and ratified by the people of Texas, and
E.J. Davis, a Republican, was elected governor.69
At the same time, the infamous Ku Klux Klan, which began in Tennessee in 1865
and played a major role in the opposition to Congressional Reconstruction in the South,
did not operate as a unified organization in Texas, but groups with names such as the
Kniglfls of the White Camellia and Knights of the Rising Sun carried out Klan-type
activities —nightriding, threats, whippings, and murder — especially in eastern counties.70
The U.S. Congress legalized slave marriages in March 1865.~’ After 1865,
thousands of couples obtained licenses and took vows in civil or religious ceremonies to
66~~ Moneyhon, Republicanism in Reconstruction Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1980).
67Carl Moneyhon, Republicanism in Reconstruction Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1980).
68Alwyn Barr, “Black Legislators in Reconstruction Texas,” in Civil War History 32:4 (December
1986), 340-52.
69Alwyn Barr, “Black Legislators in Reconstruction Texas,” in Civil War History 32:4 (December
1986), 340-52.
70Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998) and Leon Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long (New York:
Vintage Books, 1979).
71Barry Crouch, “The Cords of Love: Legalizing Black Marital and Family Rights in Postwar
Texas,” in Journal ofNegro History 79:4 (Fall 1994), 334-51.
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establish or renew their commitments. Other freed people attempted to reunite families
separated during slavery. Postwar black Texans also asserted their new freedom by
founding churches. Soon after emancipation, black Texans voluntarily withdrew from
white churches. By 1870, at least 150 black churches operated in the state, and the
numbers increased dramatically during the rest of the century.72
Black churches were usually the first institutions in the emerging African-
American communities. They were places ofworship and community centers, where
social events, political meetings, and sporting events took place. The long relationship
between the state’s African-American churches and colleges were also established during
this period.73
As freedpeople flocked to dozens ofurban communities, usually called freeman
towns, across the state they created shantytowns usually on the edges of established
communities.74 Voluntary separation was often expressed in the creation of independent
black churches and separate communities. By 1875, black Texans had created thirty-nine
separate towns and villages in fifteen Texas counties to escape white political and
economic control.75
72James Smaliwood, Time ofHope, Time ofDespair: Black Texans during Reconstruction (Port
Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1981).
73Howard N. Rabinowitz, ed., Southern Black Leaders of the Reconstruction Era (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1982).
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75Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1 990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
143
The conservative Democrats regained control of the state legislature in 1872, and
began to effectively roll-back many of the developments under Republican leadership.
The Democrats abolished the Texas state police and wrote a new constitution that
acknowledged black suffrage, but reestablished white supremacy.76
Post-Reconstruction, 1876-1927
Reconstruction lasted only a short time in Texas. Democrats regained control of
the state in 1873 and proceeded to reverse many of the democratic reforms instituted by
black and white Republicans. Between 1874 and 1900 the gains that African Americans
had made in the politk~al arena were virtually lost. In the 1890s, for example, more than
100,000 blacks voted in Texas elections. But after the imposition of a poli tax in 1902
and the passage of the white primary law in 1903, fewer than 5,000 blacks voted in the
state in 1906. In addition, segregation was established in all facets of public and private
life in Texas for African Americans.
The Texas cities — San Antonio, Dallas, and Fort Worth — constituted an anomaly
in the discussion of blacks in this region of the United States. In 1910, because no Texas
city exceeded 100,000 inhabitants, they were not among the region’s largest urban
centers. Yet, the Texas cities’ combined African-American populations totaled. 65,949,
76c~j Moneyhon, Republicanism in Reconstruction Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1980).
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and Houston’s 23,929 residents exceeded the combined black population of the five
largest cities in the western United States.77
Most of the newcomers to Houston, Dallas, Fort Worth, and San Antonio had
been tenant farmers and sharecropper families of east and south central Texas.78
Segregation overwhelmingly characterized Texas cities, distinguishing them from other
western urban centers and tying them to the South.79 In virtually every regard, blacks and
whites existed in separate worlds, prompting the term city within a city. Additionally,
schools were segregated. Dpring the 1870s and 1880s, many white Texans were opposed
to the idea ofproviding extensive educational opportunities for blacks. By 1891, state
legislation segregated railroads, and by 1905 city ordinances segregated local and public
transportation and public accommodations.8° Custom and law separated blacks from
whites in city hospitals and jails and excluded the former from libraries and swimming
pools. African Americans in Texas’ largest cities generated opportunities for black
businessowners and professionals, but blacks also began to work toward the dismantling
of the Jim Crow social order in the twentieth century.
77Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
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Segregation in Texas was so entrenched that few legal challenges were mounted
in the nineteenth century. “Segregationalist ideology was so overwhelmingly supported
by the white populace that African-American leaders were reduced to arguing for
equitable appropriations for separate facilities that never equaled that ofwhites.”8’ In
Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio, public transportation and accommodations, schools,
and eventually neighborhGods were segregated by law. Dallas blacks won a case in 1916
that overturned a residential segregation ordinance, but nothing succeeded in stemming
the tide of segregation that restricted the rights of black Texans by the early twentieth
century.
Additionally, African Americans faced severe difficulties to equitable educational
resources in Texas because ofwhite taxpayers’ opposition to building and supporting all-
black public schools; more than two-thirds of the facilities for African-American pupils
in the 1 880s were in churches, barns, and other rented buildings. Virtually all the high
schools for blacks, such as Dallas’s Colored High School, founded in 1892, were in the
state’s largest cities, further restricting educational opportunity for the state’s mostly rural
populace.82
In spite of opposition, however, efforts to further black educational opportunities
moved forward. During the initial phase of Reconstruction, the Freedmen’s Bureau took
the lead in establishing elementary and secondary schools for the former slaves. By May
81Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998). Also see Merline Pitre, Through Many Dangers, Toils, and
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1866, the Bureau has set up more than 100 schools across the state, though primarily
staffed by white Southerners. Where funds and volunteers were available, white
Northern religious denominations also established elementary and secondary schools.
Groups such as the Freedman’s Aid Society, the American Missionary Association, and
the American Baptist Home Mission Society were in the vanguard of these early efforts.
Also, black religious organizations such as the African Methodist Episcopal Church and
the Colored Methodist Episcopal Church sought to Christianize and educate the former
slaves.
The 1870s and 1880s were a dramatic and progressive period in the history of
black higher education. Northern missionary and religious groups established dozens of
colleges across the South. In most states, the efforts of these groups predated the
establishment of public black colleges. This was the case in Texas, where the first black
private college was established in 1872, while the state’s first black public college did not
appear until 1878. The first black college established in Texas was Paul Quinn College,
founded in Austin in 1872 by a small group of circuit-riding pastors of the African
Methodist Episcopal (AME) church. Other private colleges established included Wiley
College in 1873, Tillotson College in 1877, Bishop College in 1881, Guadalupe College
in 1884, Mary Allen College in 1886, Texas College in 1894, St. Philip’s College in
1898, Butler College in 1905, and Jarvis Christian College in 1921. State-supported
higher education for African Americans began in 1878, with the founding of Prairie View
State Normal School (now Prairie View A&M University), and continued with the state
taking over Houston College for Negroes in 1947, and restructuring it as Texas State
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University for Negroes. The name was later changed in 1951 to Texas Southern
University.
The African-American urban existence spawned one distinctive female social
activity, the black women’s clubs. Middle-class black women assumed leadership ofall
African-African women and promoted respectability and reform. Clubwomen sought
self-education, cultural and intellectual improvement, and mutual self-help and support.
Also the clubs also engaged in “racial uplift,” which usually meant encouraging
education and moral rectitude among lower-class black women. African-American
women’s clubs sprang up in virtually every community that had a concentration of black
women. They established daycare centers, nurseries, and industrial schools or led
campaigns to close pool halls and gambling dens.83 Their history is long and illustrious;
for example, the Heart’s Ease Circle ofKing’s Daughters, organized in Austin, Texas in
1894, created a home for the elderly that served the community for nearly a century.84
In 1913, Dr. W.E.B. DuBojs embarked on a promotional tour through Texas,
California, and the Pacific Northwest.85 The tour signaled recognition of the region’s
crucial role in the campaign for racial justice and equality.86 “DuBois’s tour also
83Ruthe Winegarten, Black Texas Women: 150 Years ofTrial and Triumph (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1995).
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recognized the importance of western and southwestern urban black communities.”87 By
the second decade of the twentieth century the center of black life was increasingly
urban. African-American communities in Houston and Dallas rivaled those in other
states.88
The Great Depression, 1930-1942
The Great Depression ravaged black communities throughout the 1930s. In
Houston in 1931, black unemployment approached 40 percent compared with 17 percent
for white workers.89 Statistics cannot completely convey the sense of loss and despair.
Churches collected clothing and food, and provided the homeless with temporary shelter.
In 1931, black churchwomen in Houston organized soup lines and dispensed food.9°
However, they and the rest of the nation increasingly looked to the local, state, and
federal government to address their plight.
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Howard Beeth and Cary D. Wintz, “Historical Overview,” in eds., Beeth and Wintz, Black Dixie: Afri
Texas History and Culture in Houston (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1992).
89Robert Prince, A History ofDallasfrom a Different Perspective (Dallas: Nortex Press, 1993) and
Howard Beeth and Cary D. Wintz, “Historical Overview,” in eds., Beeth and Wintz, Black Dixie: Afri
Texas History and Culture in Houston (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1992).
90Howard Beeth and Cary D. Wintz, eds., Black Dixie: Afri-Texas History and Culture in Houston
(College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1992).
149
Even New Deal agencies did not guarantee public employment or relief.9’ Willis
Johnson, an unemployed black worker, moved to Houston from Louisiana during the
Great Depression and told an interviewer, “Relief is the only thing that I know anything
about, and about all I know about that is that I have never been able to get any of it.”92
Johnson’s view was confirmed by Lorena Hickok, a “confidential investigator” for then
President F. D. Roosevelt’s advisor Harry Hopkins. Traveling across tl~e nation in 1934,
Hickok gave firsthand accounts of relief efforts. She reached Houston in April and
wrote: “At no time. . . since taking this job, have I been quite so discouraged as I am
tonight. Texas is a Godawful mess. . . relief in Houston is a joke.”93 New Deal agencies
operating in Texas, including the National Recovery Administration, the Civil Works
Administration, and the Works Progress Administration, discriminated against local
blacks, prompting the Houston Informer, at first a supporter of the New Deal in 1936, to
print, “Texas Negroes don’t benefit much one way or the other whether Roosevelt or
Landon is in.”94
The Great Depression encouraged leftist activism. The political left, including
Communist-inspired popular front organizations, such as the Unemployed Citizens
91Harvard Sitkoff, A New Dealfor Blacks: The Emergence ofCivil Rights as a National Issue
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
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League, League of Struggle for Negro Rights, National Negro Congress, and
International Labor Defense, mounted civil disobedience campaigns to confront racial
discrimination in the region’s cities.95 In March 1930, 500 mostly black women and men
descended on Houston’s city hail in a Communist-organized demonstration to demand
emergency unemployment and the abolition of racist legislation.96 In 1934, 700 Dallas
activists organized an eleven-day city hail sit-in protesting cuts in federal WPA jobs for
the area.97 Such demonstrations rarely gained their immediate objectives. They did,
however, introduce the concept of direct action to small communities and brought
together working-class people of various races over social justice issues.98
Like eastern black voters, Depression-era African Americans in Texas embraced
the Democratic Party. This transition was encouraged by white liberal politicians who
represented the left-liberal wing of the Democratic Party.99 Elsewhere in the state
African-American social leaders Antonio Maceo Smith and Reverend Maynard H.
Jackson, Sr., of Dallas organized the Progressive Voters League, which challenged the
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all-white primary system and developed a black constituency in the Democratic Party.’°°
By 1932, most African-American voters in the state had made the transition to the
Democratic Party.
Despite economic difficulties, a number ofAfrican-American urbanites purchased
homes. In response to this move on the part of blacks, restrictive covenants emerged. By
1940, Houston covenants (reinforced by a state law enacted in 1927) produced several
all-black enclaves throughout the city, “like islands set apart,” according to urban
historian Blame Brownell.10’ The 1942 WPA Guide to Dallas claimed that Oak Cliff,
Deep Ellum, and other segregated communities that housed the city’s 43,000 African
Americans “grew through the natural tendency of these people to live among their
kind.”02 Additionally, the evidence points to a pattern of violence against those who
sought to live elsewhere. The Dallas Express reported a dozen bombings in 1940 against
blacks who moved into all-white neighborhoods.’°3 Such violence prompted then-Mayor
Woodall Rogers to write letters advising black residents not to relocate in white
residential areas and to white homeowners urging them not to sell to African
100Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1 990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
101Clement Vose, Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive
Covenant Cases (Berkley: University of California Press, 1967).
‘°2As quoted in Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the
American West, 1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
‘°3Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American Wes4
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
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Americans.104 Ultimately, the city bought property in “sensitive areas” to prevent
residential integration.
Houston and Dallas blacks encountered segregation and discrimination via city
ordinance or state law. Segregated movie theaters and swimming pools were common in
Dallas. Most blacks in the nation faced defacto public school segregation, but in Texas
as elsewhere in the South, the separation was dejure. Houston segregation received
national attention in 1928, when white Texas Democrats, hosting their party’s national
convention, separated black delegates and spectators by a chicken wire fence.’°5 In
Dallas, as late as 1936, only twenty-seven of the city’s four thousand acres ofparks were
open to African Americans.
Also in 1936, one of the most significant achievements of blacks in the state was
their participation in the Texas Centennial. This event was important because it allowed
African Americans to highlight the contributions that they had made to the state’s and the
nation’s development. The Negro Day event held in Dallas as the black celebration of
the Texas Centennial proved to be an important opportunity for black Texans to meet and
plan strategy to end the segregation and discrimination that they faced.’°6 Three
organizations emerged from the Negro Day celebration of 1936: the Texas State
Conference of Branches of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, the Texas State Negro Chamber of Commerce, and the Texas Negro Peace
‘°4Robert Prince, The History ofDallasfrom a Dtfferent Perspective (Dallas: Nortex Press, 1993).
‘°5Howard Beeth and Cary D. Wintz, eds., Black Dixie: Afro-Texas History and Culture in
Houston (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1992).
‘°6Robert Prince, A History ofDallasfrom a Different Perspective (Dallas: Nortex Press, 1993).
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Officers Association (now the Texas Peace Officers Associations).’°7 All three
organizations had as their objective to improve the situation of blacks in Texas. The
Texas Centennial was a watershed event for African Americans. After it they launched a
campaign to win the citizenship rights that the state’s segregation laws and racist tradition
denied them.
Community after community organized branches of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Founded in New York in 1909, by 1919
eleven branches existed in Texas.’°8 The largest was the twelve-hundred member San
Antonio branch. The Texas branches’ legal campaign over black participation in the state
Democratic primary was one of the longest efforts of any of the NAACP’s legal
challenges. Texas, which levied a poll tax, never barred African Americans from voting
in general elections, but most black voters were effectively disfranchised because they
were denied access to the Democratic primary in a one-party state. In January 1921, the
Houston City Democratic Executive Committee passed a resolution expressly prohibiting
blacks from voting in the coming primary election. In response, Charles Norvell Love,
editor of the Texas Freedman, filed suit against the Harris County Democratic Party.’°9
107M~ Barr, Black Texans: A History ofNegroes in Texas, 1528-1971 (Austin: Jenkins
Publishing Co., 1973).
‘°8Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
‘°9Robert V. Haynes, “Black Houstonians and the White Democratic Primary, 1920-45,” in eds.
Howard Beeth and Cary D. Wintz, Black Dixie: Afro-Texas History and Culture in Houston (College
Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1992).
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This led to a legal war between black Texans and leaders of the state Democratic
Party, and led to four U.S. Supreme Court decisions between 1927 and 1944.110 Shortly
after Love lost his lawsuit, the 1923 Texas legislature enacted the Terrell Law, which
expressly said: “In no event shall a Negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic
primary election.. . in. . . Texas.” The law prompted another lawsuit by El Paso
dentist Lawrence A. Nixon, who quickly emerged as the symbol of the Texas suffrage
campaign.
NAACP attorneys from the local branch and the national office won Nixon v.
Herndon before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1927.112 Subsequently, the Texas legislature
modified the exclusion statute to satisfy the Court, but in 1928, having been denied a
Democratic primary ballot, Nixon again filed suit. The Court in Nixon v. Condon (1932)
again ruled in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the state Democratic Party
convention rather than the legislature had the power to bar blacks from voting in the
primary.
For twelve years the Texas Democratic Party tried to limit the impact of the
Supreme Court rulings while African Americans fought to widen their scope. Local
black leaders such as James M. Nabrit and Carter W. Wesley of Houston, C.A. Booker of
“°Robert V. Haynes, “Black Houstonians and the White Democratic Primary, 1920-45,” in eds.
Howard Beeth and Cary D. Wintz, Black Dixie: Afro-Texas History and Culture in Houston (College
Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1992).
“Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
112Michael Lowery Gillette, “The NAACP in Texas, 1937-1957” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Texas at Austin, 1984).
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San Antonio, and Richard D. Evans of Waco, all pursued various legal strategies against
county Democratic organizations.’13 El Paso party officials allowed only two black city
residents, Nixon and a pharmacist, M.C. Donnell, to vote in the July 1934 primary,
providing them with ballots marked “colored.”4 Black Texas voters received an
additional setback the following year when the U.S. Supreme Court in Grovey v.
Townsend upheld the Democratic Party’s right to limit its membership.
In 1941, the NAACP launched a fmal assault. Pressured by the Houston branch
and working under Thurgood Marshall’s leadership the NAACP found a test case.115
Harris county election judge S.E. Allwright denied a primary ballot to Dr. Lormie Smith,
a Houston physician. In Smith v. Allwright, the U.S. Supreme Court voted eight to one in
January 1944 to declare the all-white primary unconstitutional.”6 The NAACP had won
one of the greatest legal victories of its thirty-four year history. The actions of the
NAACP remained dominant, but two other organizations, the National Urban League”7
“3Co~ey Bryson, Dr. Lawrence A. Nixon and the White Primary (El Paso: Texas Western Press,
1974).
114Conrey Bryson, Dr. Lawrence A. Nixon and the White Primary (El Paso: Texas Western Press,
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“6Darlene Clark Hines, “Elusive Ballot: The Black Struggle against the Texas Democratic White
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and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA),”8 had moderate success
organizing blacks in Texas during this period.
World War II and Postwar Texas, 1943-1950
The world war and expanding work opportunities resulted in an influx of black
workers into urban centers and regional factories and shipyards.”9 Without a doubt the
migration strengthened civil rights organizations and encouraged antidiscrimination
legislation. But migration also increased overcrowding in black communities and
accelerated the physical deterioration of the residential neighborhoods.’20 African
Americans faced long-standing restrictive covenants that, coupled with population
increases, meant unprecedented concentration, creating black urban ghettos.’2’
The black communities in urban Texas barely grew even as the cities became war
production centers. Aircraft firms in Dallas and Fort Worth, and shipbuilding companies
in Houston hired few black workers. In May 1943, the Dallas Express claimed that “26
major war plants in Dallas do not employ Negroes in skilled jobs.”22 Only concerted
protest by local African-American leaders, manpower shortages eventually forced North
‘18Tony Martin, Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Struggles ofMarcus Garvey and
the Universal Negro Improvement Association (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976).
1T9William H. Harris, The Harder We Run: Black Workers since the Civil War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982).
‘20Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
121Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
‘22Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
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American Aviation in Dallas and Consolidated-Vultee in Fort Worth to hire black
workers in skilled positions.’23 Much of the same pattern held in Houston. With the
exception of the Hughes Tool Company, which hired its first black workers in 1918, few
manufacturing plants in the city employed African Americans. The Houston Informer
reported in December 1942, that the Houston shipping company, the largest employer in
the city, “refuse[d] to hire qualified and competent skilled workers who were colored.”24
Ultimately, many black Texas workers joined the migration to the west coast.
The Beaumont, Texas, riot in 1943, however, was the largest wartime racial clash
and the third most violent in the nation after Harlem and Detroit. Beaumont became a
war production center in the early 1940s when Pennsylvania Shipyards, Inc., began
building liberty ships.’25 Between 1940 and mid-1943 the city grew from 59,000 to
80,000.126 On the afternoon of June 15, 1943, the wife of a white shipyard worker
reported to police a story of rape by a black man. As word of the incident spread,
approximately 2,000 shipyard workers dropped their tools and marched on the two black
residential districts in the city.’27 The rioting and looting ended 24 hours later, only after
‘23Randolph Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History ofthe Lone Star State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
‘24Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
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‘26Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
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the arrival of 1,800 Texas national guardsmen, contingents of the Texas Rangers, and
neighboring police and sherifPs deputies. Three black residents and one white resident
lay dead, four hundred people were injured, and most of Beaumont’s African-American
businesses and dozens of homes destroyed. Twenty-five hundred blacks fled the city by
foot or automobile, many never returned. The day after the riot ended medical examiners
proved that the women had not had sexual intercourse during the 24-hour period
surrounding the alleged assault.’28
African Americans shared the nation’s joy on Victory in Europe Day (V-E Day)
1945. Yet celebration soon turned to anxiety. By the war’s end the federal government
and industrialists were scaling back war-related production and employees. In 1947,
thousands ofAfrican Americans who had been “essential workers” only two years earlier
were unemployed.’29 Postwar blacks continued to campaign for adequate housing. The
war’s end further concentrated blacks in the shipyard ghettos. By 1949, blacks in many
cities were the majority ofpublic housing residents.’3° Conversely, white migrants often
became the new suburbanites in residential areas closed to black homebuyers.
African-American concentration in public housing generated an array of
consequences. New cleavages developed in urban politics. As blacks became identified
with public housing and the government programs that assisted its residents, white city
128James A Burran, “Violence in an ‘Arsenal of Democracy’: The Beaumont Race Riot, 1943,” in
East Texas Historical Review 14:1 (Spring 1976) and James S. Olson and Sharon Phair, “The Anatomy of a
Race Riot: Beaumont, Texas, 1943,” in Texana 11:1 (Winter 1973), 64-72.
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and suburban homeowners opposed public housing and other programs that assisted the
poor.13’ Race and property ownership became the dividing line in postwar urban politics
in Texas, eclipsing class divisions and rivafry between newcomers and old residents.
Black voters supported liberal politicians who embraced their civil rights agenda.
In Texas, the black electorate grew dramatically after the Supreme Court’s 1944 Smith v.
Allwright ruling, which eliminated the all-white primary. African-American groups, such
as the Progressive Voters League and the United Citizens for Democracy, began to
challenge conservative Democratic Party leadership.’32 The growing black electorate
also changed old political practices. Texas Representative Wright Patman’s initial
response to Smith was a pubic declaration that blacks would vote in his district “over my
dead body.”33 Two years later he was shaking hands at African-American church
picnics in Fort Worth. Lyndon Johnson’s courting ofnew black voters helped in his
eighty-seven vote victory in the Senate primary election in 1948.’~~
The Civil Rights Movement in Texas, 1950-1970
Texas provides a particular vantage point for re-examining the civil rights era.
Historians of the period have focused on national legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act
‘31Melvin James Banks, “The Pursuit of Equality: The Movement for First Class Citizenship
among Negroes in Texas, 1920-1950” (D.D.S., Syracuse University, 1962).
‘32Mw~ Barr, Black Texans: A History ofNegroes in Texas, 1 528-1971 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
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of 1964, or on the efforts in the South to confront Jim Crow. Civil rights activities in
Texas utilized an alternative form of civil rights activism — direct-action protests.
Though often inspired by southern campaigns in Birmingham or Selma, direct-action
protests in Texas had similar goals. Black Texans confronted job discrimination, housing
bias, and school segregation.
Civil rights activity took two distinct forms. The legal campaign used the courts
to desegregate public schools, which many came to view as central to economic and
political advancement. But many blacks also engaged in demonstrations, sit-ins,
boycotts, and other civil disobedience activities to eliminate discrimination. In terms of
strategy, tactics, and objectives, protests west of the Mississippi River paralleled those to
the east. However, in Texas many of these protests occurred in a milieu where African
Americans were only one of a number of groups of color. The region’s multiracial
population moved civil rights beyond black and white. The movement in San Antonio
reflects this complexity.
San Antonio’s huge Chicano population created a different racial atmosphere
from that of Houston, Dallas, and Fort Worth, the other major central Texas centers of
civil disobedience. In 1960, Mexican Americans constituted 40 percent of the population
in San Antonio, as opposed to black’s 7 percent.’35 Although there had been some
attempts at political alliances between the two groups, they lived on separate sides of San
Antonio in largely separate worlds. One of the differences was the level of
135Robert A. Goldberg, “Racial Change on the Southern Periphery: The Case of San Antonio,
Texas, 1960-1965,” Journal ofSouthern History 49:3 (August 1983), 349-74.
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discrimination. San Antonio public accommodations regularly excluded blacks yet a
1941 city ordinance prohibited discrimination against anyone because of racial origin
from “one of the [Latin American] Republics.”36 Despite the ordinance, Anglo San
Antonians considered Latinos nonwhite and widely discriminated against them. A few
Chicano activists, recognizing their commonality with African Americans, joined the
black direct action protests that began in March 1960.137 Yet much of the Chicano
population represented a paradox to black activists. Their presence in the city deflected
prejudice from African Americans, but because they suffered less discrimination than
blacks, most Chicanos, their leaders, and their organizations remained silent on
discrimination against blacks.
After the Brown ruling in 1954, many schools moved slowly to desegregate
facilities. By 1959, the NAACP’s chief attorney, Thurgood Marshall, had joined several
Houston attorneys and initiated Ross v. Houston Independent School District. The
Houston Independent School District (HISD), at that time with 177,228 students,
maintained the nation’s largest legally segregated school system.’38 However, little
progress was made until March 1960, when student activists at Texas Southern
University launched sit-ins at the nearby Weingarten grocery store lunch counter. The
student protest never targeted the Houston school system, but their impact prompted
‘36Quintard Taylor, In Search ofthe Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West,
1528-1 990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
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business and political elites to seek a peaceful solution to the desegregation crisis.
Federal Judge Ben C. Connally ruled in August 1960, that the district implement a grade-
per-year desegregation plan. However, by 1964 only 3 percent of Houston’s thirty-nine
thousand African-American students attended desegregated schools.139 Consequently,
attorney Barbara Jordan and the Reverend William Lawson called for a boycott of the
city’s high schools. The boycott and demonstration immediately prompted the school
district to accelerate its timetable for desegregation of the sixth, seventh, and tenth
grades. This, in turn, prompted middle-class white parents to withdraw their children
from local public schools with the departure of middle-class whites (and by the 1970s,
blacks), integrated education seemed remote.
Post-Civil Rights Era Texas, 1970 and Beyond
The economic boom that followed World War II brought renewed population
growth to Texas and a continuation of the movement from rural to urban areas within the
state. In the 1 970s, black Texans increased their numbers 43 percent to nearly 1.4 million
over the same period of time, but their percentage of the total population declined — from
13 to 12 percent. By contrast, the Latino population, defmed as Texans who spoke
Spanish or had Spanish surnames, doubled to more than 2 million, some 18 percent of the
population. Regardless of the growth, Texas continued in the 1970s to have a largely
southern population. According to census data, in 1970 a great majority of Texans had
southern roots and among those born elsewhere, more came from the South than from all
139William Henry Kellar, “Make Haste Slowly: A History of School Desegregation in Houston,
Texas” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Houston, 1994).
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the rest of the United States combined. Excluding the Latino population, nearly two of
every three Texans had ties to the South. Additionally, by 1970, eight of every ten
Texans lived in a town of 2,500 or more residents.
Houston had become the state’s largest city and Dallas kept pace as a close
second. However, more than 2 million of the state’s people had an average of less than
$3 per day to meet their physical needs, amounting to a poverty rate of more than 18
percent and ranking Texas the 12th poorest state. Geographically, the poorest sections
were south Texas and the Brazos River Valley.
As the political importance of blacks rose within the nation, African Americans in
Texas began to move into positions of leadership in the Democratic Party and run for
office. William J. Durham of Dallas, one of the most effective black lawyers in the state,
became a member of the State Democratic Executive Committee in the late 1950s, and
Barbara Jordan entered politics in Houston by campaigning for John F. Kennedy. Jordan
ran for a seat in the Texas House of Representatives in 1962 and 1964, losing both. After
Jordan’s second defeat, several Supreme Court decisions turned the tide. First, in Baker
v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the Court ruled that members of both houses
of state legislatures had to be elected from districts with approximately the same number
of voters. This “one-man, one-vote” rule ended the at-large system and increased the
chances of blacks to win in largely minority districts. Second, in 1966 the Court decided
that the poll tax, which the 24th Amendment (1964) afready abolished as a voting
requirement in federal elections, was illegal in state and local elections as well. Jordan
ran for the state senate in 1966 from a newly drawn single-member district and won,
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making her the first black woman to serve in the Texas Senate. In 1972, she became the
first black woman from the South to win a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Blacks also began to win offices in local and city govermnents. At the beginning
of the 1970s, forty-two African Americans served at the local level, and others held city
council seats in Austin, Bryan, Fort Worth, Galveston, Hearne, Houston, Huntsville,
Malakoff, Port Arthur, San Antonio, Waco, and Wichita Falls.
While they pushed successfully for the right to vote and hold public office,
African Americans in Texas also sought equal access to higher education. At the urging
of Dallas lawyer William J. Durham and Houston activist Lulu White, Heman M. Sweatt,
a Houston postal worker, applied for admission to the University of Texas law school in
1946 and was denied admission. Sweatt brought suit in a Texas district court, which
ruled that the state had six months to provide an “equal” law education to the plaintiff.
The govermnent reacted by setting up a temporary law school for blacks that operated
first in Houston and then moved to the basement of a building near the state capitol in
Austin. Also, the legislature provided an appropriation to take over the Houston College
for Negroes and expand it into the Texas State University for Negroes (later Texas
Southern University). Sweatt and his lawyers, including Durham and Thurgood Marshall
of the national NAACP, decided to challenge not only the lack of “equal” facilities but
segregation itself. After losing at every level in Texas state courts, they took their case to
the United States Supreme Court in 1949.
The court’s ruling in Sweatt v. Painter did not destroy the doctrine of “separate
but equal,” but it left the courts only a short step from deciding that separate was
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inherently unequal—thereby ending segregation. Eventually, black professors joined the
faculties of the University of Texas and Rice University in the mid-sixties. Smaller state
institutions such as North Texas State College in Denton and Texas A & I in Kingsville
integrated their athletic teams in the late 195 Os.
By 1970, more than 75 percent of Texas’s black students attended schools that
were integrated to some degree, and during the 1970—1971 school year, a federal judge
combined the last nine all-black school districts in East Texas with adjoining white or
biracial districts. Also in 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court approved busing of students to
reduce de facto school segregation that resulted from racial separation in residential
housing.
In the 1970s, politically, Democrats controlled the state, generally providing a
conservative government that kept taxes low, gave business some help and little
regulation, and offered only minimal social services. The economy drew support from
agriculture and oil, but it depended more heavily than ever on manufacturing, commerce,
and fmance. Moreover, electronics and other high-tech industries, health-support
enterprises, and service businesses have risen to positions of vital importance. Socially,
the once-dominant southern Anglos share the state on a more equal footing with African
Americans, Mexican Americans, Asian immigrants, and many new arrivals from across
the United States.
Political life in Texas began to change, at least on the surface. In 1978, Bill
Clements, a Republican, won the governorship, giving his party its first such victory in
more than a century and ushering in what many see as two-party government in the state.
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Democratic candidates for governor won in 1982 and 1990; Republicans in 1986, 1994,
1998, and 2002. The parties also shared other executive offices and achieved a fairly
even balance in the legislature. African Americans continue to be an enduring feature in
electoral politics throughout the state of Texas. However, some observers think that
instead of becoming a two-party state, Texas is actually in a period of transition from
one-party rule by conservative Democrats to one-party rule by conservative Republicans;
therefore, the sociopolitical fate ofAfrican Americans in the state is far from secure.
Conclusions
Historically, blacks have resided in the eastern region of Texas, so a history of
black in Texas provides insight into the social and political contexts of the eastern region
of the state. While similarities exist between the history of blacks in Texas and blacks in
the South, a number of historical circumstances are unique to Texas and include the
following observations:
1. Texas was considered a safe haven for slaveholders wanting to hide their slaves
during the Civil War.
2. The interior of the state was never penetrated by Union soldiers during the Civil
War.
3. Throughout Texas history the presence of individuals of Latino descent has
infused a contrasting dynamic to approaches to race within the state.
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4. Like other southern states, Texas faced steep challenges in the struggle for civil
rights; but unlike other states, whites aggressively utilized legislative and judicial
strategies to thwart integration and black political empowerment.
5. Although blacks reside throughout the state, they are overwhelmingly
concentrated in the eastern region of the state.
6. Geographically, Texas is uniquely located; Louisiana and other southern states are
to the east, New Mexico and other western states are to the west, and the country
of Mexico is to the south. Although its legacy of slavery clearly identifies Texas
as a southern state, Texas history is informed by its precarious locale.
The above mentioned realities have shaped past and present realities in the lives of blacks
in Texas. Chapter 4 precedes with an outline the design of the study and builds on the





This attitudinal case study was designed to examine the relationship between the
self-identified political ideological orientation and political attitudes of blacks in East
Texas. Survey questionnaires were administered during the months of June and July in
2004, and February and March of 2005. Out of the 1,000 questionnaires administered,
451 were returned and 405 were valid for evaluation in the study. Questionnaires
excluded were either less than half completed or from respondents who resided outside of
the region under evaluation. In this chapter, data collected were analyzed to answer the
research questions and evaluate the research hypothesis.
Overview of Sample Population
All of the survey respondents considered in this study resided in the eastern
region of Texas as defined by the study, and this was determined by the postal ZIP code
provided by respondents. Twenty-nine of the respondents did not provide postal ZIP
codes but were included in the study based on the postal cancellation stamp on the return
envelopes (see table 16). Two hundred and sixty three of the respondents were female (a
valid percentage of 71.7) and 104 of the respondents were male (a valid percentage of
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16928.3); 38 of the respondents did not indicate gender (see table 17). This unusually
high number of female respondents skews the study toward a female bias, but the
researcher believes that a significant number ofmale respondents were included in the
study (more than a 25 valid percentage).
The utilization of valid percentages for analysis reveals that five percent of the
respondents indicated that they are between the ages of 18 and 30 years; 11.5 percent are
between the ages of3l and 40 years; 16.8 percent are between the ages of4l and 50
years; 28.6 percent are between the ages of5l and 60; and 38.3 percent are 61 years or
older (see table 18). This trend indicates that more than half (66.9 percent) of the
respondents are aged 50 years or older, which skews the fmdings toward the perspectives
of a more aged population. Additionally, a little more than 28 percent of the respondents
attended some college, 29.7 percent indicated that they graduated from college, 2.8
percent indicated that they fmished technical school, and almost 30 percent indicated that
they possessed a graduate degree (see table 19). A little over 55 percent indicated that
they were married, 17.8 percent single, 12.8 percent divorced, and 13.6 percent widowed
(see table 20). The fact that a significant number of the survey population was older may
explain why 64 percent indicated that they did not have any children in the household.
Those respondents that indicated children living within the household typically indicated
one child or two children (see table 21).
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TABLE 16
Provided East Texas Postal ZIP Code
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
Valid Yes 376 92.8 92.8 92.8
No ZIP provided; 29 7.2 7.2 100.0
cancellation stamp
Total 405 100.0 100.0
TABLE 17
Gender
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
Valid Female 263 64.9 71.7 71.7
Male 104 25.7 28.3 100.0
Total 367 90.6 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Valid 18-21 7 1.7 1.1
22-25 4 1.0 .7
26-29 8 2.0 2.2
30-35 27 6.7 6.6
36-40 18 4.4 3.7
41-45 22 5.4 5.9
46-50 44 10.9 9.6
51-55 58 13.8 14.4
56-60 54 14.1 14.8
61-65 40 10.6 11.1
65andover 110 28.6 29.9
Total 392 95.8 100.0




















Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
Valid No formal 1 .2 .3 .3
education
Some high school 4 1.0 1.0 1.3
Highschool 39 9.6 10.0 11.3
graduate
Some college 111 27.4 28.4 39.6
College graduate 116 28.6 29.7 69.3
Technical school 11 2.7 2.8 72.1
Graduate school 109 26.9 27.9 100.0
Total 391 96.5 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
Valid Married 213 52.6 55.8 55.8
Single 68 16.8 17.8 73.6
Divorced 49 12.1 12.8 86.4
Widowed 52 12.8 13.8 100.0
Total 382 94.3 100.0




Number of Children in Household
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Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 0 248 61.2 61.7 61.7
1 65 16.0 16.2 77.9
2 61 15.1 15.2 93.0
3 20 4.9 5.0 98.0
4 6 1.5 1.5 99.5
5 .2 .2 99.8
6 .2 .2 100.0
Total 402 99.3 100.0
Missing No answer 3 .7
Total 405 100.0
Social Stratification and Class
A little more than 23.4 percent of the respondents in this study indicated an
annual household income of $39,999 or less. Almost 24 percent of the respondents
indicated that their household income range was between $40,000 and $59,000 year.
Additionally, 36.3 percent of the respondents indicated at household income of over
$60,000 per year (see table 22).
When asked about their financial prosperity, 45.7 percent of the respondents
indicated that they agreed or somewhat agreed that they had prospered during the last two
years of George Bush’s presidential administration. Almost 38 percent of respondents
indicated that they somewhat disagreed or disagreed with the statement that they had
fmancially prospered (see table 23). When asked about their economic outlook for the
next year, more respondents were optimistic; 59 percent indicated that they expected to
prosper within the next year, compared with a little more than 24 percent who were
skeptical (see table 24).
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These data about household income range and fmancial prosperity indicate
that among the respondents who answered these questions, the modal household income
is $40-49,999 (see figure 4); but, when income ranges are collapsed, household income is
bulbous on both the high and low end of the economic spectrum. Additionally, more
respondents possessed an optimistic outlook on their fmancial situation. Although less
than 10 percentage points separate those who believed that they economically prospered
in the past two years (2002-2003 and 2003-2004) from those who disagreed, more than




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid $19,999 or less 30 7.4 8.8 8.8
$20-29,999 33 8.1 9.7 18.6
$30-39,999 32 7.9 9.4 28.0
$40-49,999 49 12.1 14.5 42.5
850-59,999 48 11.9 14.2 56.6
$60-69,999 35 8.6 10.3 67.0
$70-79,999 26 6.4 7.7 74.6
$80-89,999 29 7.2 8.6 83.2
$90-95,999 15 3.7 4.4 87.6
$96,000 or more 42 10.4 12.4 100.0
Total 339 83.7 100.0
















Fig. 4. Household Income Range Bar Chart
TABLE 23
Financially Prospered in the Past Two Years
, Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
Valid Agree 79 19.5 21.1 21.1
Somewhat agree 92 22.7 24.6 45.7
Neutral 61 15.1 16.3 62.0
Somewhat disagree 42 10.4 11.2 73.3
Disagree 100 24.7 26.7 100.0
Total 374 92.3 100.0
Missing No answer 31 7.7
Total 405 100.0
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Will Financially Prosper Within One Year
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
Valid Agree 117 28.9 31.6 31.6
Somewhat agree 102 25.2 27.6 59.2
Neutral 62 15.3 16.8 75.9
Somewhat disagree 25 6.2 6.8 82.7
Disagree 64 15.8 17.3 100.0
Total 370 91.4 100.0
Missing No answer 35 8.6
Total 405 100.0
Religiosity
Eighty-nine percent of the respondents in this study indicated that they attend
religious services almost every week or more (see table 25). Almost 10 percent (9.6
percent) of the respondents indicated that they attended services a few times a month, a
few times a year, or not at all. The mean response was that one attends a religious service




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
Valid Never/no religious 7 1.7 1.8 1.8
preference ____________________________
Few times a year 19 4.7 4.9 6.7
Once or twice a month 13 3.2 3.4 10.1
Almost every week 87 21.5 22.4 32.5
Every week 130 32.1 33.5 66.0
Multiple times per week 132 32.6 34.0 100.0
Total 388 95.8 100.0




The respondents were asked to answer several questions related to their religious
sense or sense of morality. The following tables (tables 26 through 28) indicate their
response to the issues of returning prayer to schools, abortion, and gay marriage. In
response to the question “Indicate whether you believe returning prayer to schools would
be (1) effective, (2) somewhat effective, (3) neutral, (4) somewhat ineffective, or (5)
ineffective at improving communities,” based on the corresponding Likert scale, the
mean was 1.74, the mode was 1, the standard deviation was 1.33, and the variance was
1.77. More than 80 percent of respondents agreed to varying degrees that prayer should
be allowed in schools. The response to the question “Indicate whether you (1) agree, (2)
somewhat agree, (3) neutral, (4) somewhat disagree, or (5) disagree with a woman’s right
to choose to terminate a pregnancy,” based on the corresponding Likert scale, the mean
was 2.19, the median was 1, the standard deviation was 1.56, and the variance was 2.45.
Almost 66 percent agreed to varying degrees that a woman should have the right to
choose. Almost 25 percent (24.9 percent) disagreed with the statement.
A key moral issue during the 2004 presidential election was that of gay marriage.
More than eight state ballots contained referendums to amend state constitutions to defme
marriage as the legal union between a man and a woman. It has been asserted by political
analysts that gay marriage was a moral issue used by Bush to obtain support from the
religious community. The respondents to this study overwhelmingly opposed gay
marriages (88.9 percent), and were indicated by the following statistics: a mean of 4.65, a
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Kurtosis was 6.870 with a standard error of Kurtosis at .290.
TABLE 26
Returning Prayer to Schools
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
Valid Effective 273 67.4 69.8 69.8
Somewhat effective 41 10.1 10.5 80.3
Neutral 26 6.4 6.6 87.0
Somewhat 8 2.0 2.0 89.0
ineffective
Ineffective 43 10.6 11.0 100.0
Total 391 96.5 100.0
Missing No answer 14 3.5
Total 405 100.0
TABLE 27
A Woman Should Have the Right to Choose to Have an Abortion
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
Valid Agree 160 39.5 56.1 56.1
Somewhat agree 28 6.9 9.8 66.0
Neutral 26 6.4 9.1 75.1
Somewhat disagree 24 5.9 8.4 83.5
Disagree 47 11.6 16.5 100.0
Total 285 70.4 100.0
Missing No answer 120 29.6
Total 405 100.0
median of 5, a standard deviation of .983, and a variance of .967. Additionally, the
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TABLE 28
Gay Marriages Should be Allowed
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 12 3.0 4.3 4.3
Somewhat agree 6 1.5 2.1 6.4
Neutral 13 3.2 4.6 11.1
Somewhat disagree 6 1.5 2.1 13.2
Disagree 243 60.0 86.8 100.0
Total 280 69.1 100.0
Missing No answer 125 30.9
Total 405 100.0
Government Responsiveness/Alienation
A majority of the respondents indicated a level of belief in the responsiveness of
public officials to their individual voice — 59.7 percent either agreed or somewhat agreed
(see table 29). While level of support does not indicate overwhelming confidence in the
responsiveness ofpublic officials, the level of alienation at 28.7 percent is lower than
what has been indicated in similar studies. When asked about whether they believed that
most of the time they could trust government to do what is right, majority of the
respondents’ perception of government was negative. Almost 50 percent of the
respondents disagreed with the statement and 24 percent somewhat disagreed; almost 75
percent of the respondents expressed a level of distrust in the ability of the government to
do what is right most of the time (see table 30). The mean response was somewhat




Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative Percent
Percent
Valid Agree 128 31.6 33.1 33.1
Somewhat agree 103 25.4 26.6 59.7
Neutral 45 11.1 11.6 71.3
Somewhat 63 15.6 16.3 87.6
disagree
Disagree 48 11.9 12.4 100.0
Total 387 95.6 100.0
Missing No answer 18 4.4
Total 405 100.0
TABLE 30
Most of the Time I Can Trust Government to Do Right
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 14 3.5 3.6 3.6
Somewhat agree 40 9.9 10.3 14.0
Neutral 50 12.3 12.9 26.9
Somewhat 92 22.7 23.8 50.6
disagree
Disagree 191 47.2 49.4 100.0
Total 387 95.6 100.0
Missing No answer 18 4.4
Total 405 100.0
Economic Liberalism
When the survey respondents were to respond to the statement “To improve their
condition in this country, blacks need government intervention at all levels,” the majority
agreed to varying degrees (see table 31). The mean was 2.71 and the mode was 2,
indicating that while a significant number of respondents agreed with government
180
intervention, support was largely weak. Moreover, 21.7 percent disagreed and over
13 percent somewhat disagreed with the statement. Clearly, this statement was divisive.
TABLE 31
Government Intervention
______ Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 118 29.1 30.5 30.5
Somewhat agree 97 24.0 25.1 55.6
Neutral 36 8.9 9.3 64.9
Somewhat 52 12.8 13.4 78.3
disagree
Disagree 84 20.7 21.7 100.0
Total 387 95.6 100.0
Missing No answer 18 4.4
Total 405 100.0
In a measure of the respondents’ opinion about the effectiveness ofparticular
strategies for improving society, it was revealed that an overwhelming majority of the
respondents (71.7 percent) indicated support for public programs to train the poor and
disadvantaged for jobs (see table 32). This support is also evidenced by a mean of 2.21
and a median of 2. However, support was lukewarm for providing mixed-income
housing options. The combined support was 54.9 percent, but 25 percent believed that
such options would be somewhat effective. A large percentage (20.1 percent) were
neutral about the option, leading the researcher to believe that respondents (a) may have
been reluctant to consider mixed-income housing ineffective, (b) may not have been
confronted with the idea before, or (C) simply had no opinion about the question (see
table 33). When asked whether they believed that the United States should adopt a
national health care system, more than 73 percent agreed (see table 34). The mean was
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1.43 and the median was 1.00, indicating significant support for such policy. The
conclusion can be drawn from the above discussed policy options that while blacks tend
to support an economically liberal government, support for specific programs varies.
TABLE 32
Public Programs to Train the Poor and Disadvantaged for Jobs
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
ci Effective 155 38.3 39.5 39.5 —
Somewhat effective 126 31.1 32.1 71.7
Neutral 20 4.9 5.1 76.8 —
Somewhat ineffective 57 14.1 14.5 91.3
Ineffective 34 8.4 8.7 100.0
Total 392 96.8 100.00
Missing No answer 13 3.2
Total 405 100.0
TABLE 33
Providing Mixed-Income Housing Options
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
Valid Effective 62 15.3 16.8 16.8
Somewhat effective 140 34.6 38.0 54.9
Neutral 74 18.3 20.1 75.0
Somewhat ineffective 52 12.8 14.1 89.1
Ineffective 40 9.9 10.9 100.0
Total 368 90.9 100.0




United States Should Adopt a National Health Care System
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 294 72.6 74.4 74.4
Somewhat agree 66 16.3 16.7 91.1
Neutral 13 3.2 3.3 94.4
Somewhat 10 2.5 2.5 97.0
disagree
Disagree 12 3.0 3.0 100.0
Total 395 97.5 100.0
Missing No answer 10 2.5
Total 405 100.0
Partisanship
Half of the survey was administered the summer prior to the 2004 presidential
election and the remain half was administered up to six months after the election, and
over 98 percent of the respondents indicated that they were registered to vote at the time
of the survey (see table 35). When asked to self-identify their ideological orientation on a
scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, a plurality of the
respondents self-identified as moderate (see table 36); this is supported by a mean of 3.86
and a median of 4.00. Almost 25 percent (24.8 percent) of the respondents identified
themselves as either slightly conservative, conservative, or extremely conservative; 21.0
percent identified themselves as either slightly liberal, liberal, or extremely liberal. It is
interesting to note that respondents appear to be almost evenly distributed on both sides
of the majority moderate orientation. The standard deviation was 1.370 and the variance
was 1.876.
When asked whether they agreed with the statement that there is little difference
between the Democratic and Republican parties, majority (68.6 percent) indicated that
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there is a discernable difference between the parties (see table 37). However, 28.3
percent thought that there was little difference between the parties. Interestingly, the
mean was 3.80 and the median was 5.00; the standard deviation was 1.5 18, while the
variance was 2.304. More than 95 percent indicated that they most closely identify with
the Democratic party, 98.1 percent indicated that they most often vote for the Democratic




Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
Valid Yes 383 94.6 98.0 98.0
No 8 2.0 2.0 100.0
Total 391 96.5 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
Valid Extremely liberal 9 2.2 2.8 2.8
Liberal 61 15.1 19.1 21.9
Slightly liberal 29 7.2 9.1 31.0
Moderate 141 34.8 44.2 75.2
Slightly conservative 29 7.2 9.1 84.3
Conservative 46 11.4 14.4 98.7
Extremely conservative 4 1.0 1.3 100.0
Total 319 78.8 100.0
Missing Don’t know 13 3.2





Perceived Difference between the Democratic and Republican Parties
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 50 12.3 13.0 13.0
Somewhat agree 59 14.6 15.3 28.2
Neutral 12 3.0 3.1 31.3
Somewhat disagree 61 15.1 15.8 47.2
Disagree 204 50.4 52.8 100.0
Total 386 95.3 100.0
Missing No answer 19 4.7
Total 405 100.0
TABLE 38
Party with Which One Most Closely Identifies
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Democratic 353 87.2 94.4 94.4
Republican 4 1.0 1.1 95.5
Both 3 .7 .8 96.3
Neither 9 2.2 2.4 98.7
Depends onthe 5 1.2 1.3 100.0
Issues
Total 374 92.3 100.0
Missing No Answer 31 7.7
Total 405 100.0
TABLE 39
Voted in 2000 Presidential Election
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes 369 91.1 94.4 94.4
No 22 5.4 5.6 100.0
Total 391 96.5 100.0




Party for Which One Votes Most Often
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Democratic 370 91.4 97.1 97.1
Republican 4 1.0 1.0 98.2
Other 5 1.2 1.3 99.5
Don’t know 2 .5 .5 100.0
Total 381 94.1 100.0
Missing No answer 24 5.9
Total 405 100.0
Third-Party Efforts
When asked whether blacks, other minorities, and women could pull together and
form an influential political alliance, over 90 percent agreed (see table 41). This
overwhelming support is evidenced by a mean of 1.11, median of 1.00, standard
deviation of .310, and variance of .096. One could argue that such a coalition afready
exists within the Democratic Party, but the question that would remain would be whether
the party is responsive the agendas of theses diverse groups. Recent history has shown
ebbs and flow in support shown to blacks who overwhelmingly support either party.
Currently, support for black issues has ebbed, raising, once again the specter of the
viability of a third party.
TABLE 41
Influential Political Alliance
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes 316 78.0 89.3 89.3
No 38 9.4 10.7 100.0
Total 354 87.4 100.0




School Busing and Affirmative Action
Two strategies that were gains by the civil rights movement were evaluated to
determine the respondents’ perception of them as strategies for social improvement. The
respondents support for busing as a social improvement strategy was over 50 percent
(52.9 percent), and the mean (2.84) and median (2.00) indicate that support is moderate
(see table 42). It is also worth noting that 37.1 percent indicated that busing is not an
effective strategy for social improvement, and 10 percent were neutral. However, 67.6
percent consider setting aside a certain proportion of government contracts for black-
owned businesses as effective strategy for improving society (see tables 43 and 44).
Almost 23 percent did not think this an effective strategy, and 9.6 percent were neutral.
TABLE 42
Busing as a Strategy for Social Improvement
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Effective 72 17.8 18.4 18.4
Somewhat 135 33.3 34.5 52.9
effective
Neutral 39 9.6 10.0 62.9
Somewhat 75 18.5 19.2 82.1
ineffective
Ineffective 70 17.3 17.9 100.0
Total 391 96.5 100.0




Government Contracts/Affirmative Action as a Strategy for Social Improvement
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
~Jid Effective 139 34.3 36.0 36.0
Somewhat 122 30.1 31.6 67.6
effective
Neutral 37 9.1 9.6 77.2
Somewhat 52 12.8 13.5 90.7
ineffective
Ineffective 36 8.9 9.3 100.0
Total 386 95.3 100.0
Missing No answer 19 4.7
Total 405 100.0
TABLE 44
Busing and Government Contracts/Affirmative Action
Bussing Gov Contracts - AA




Standard Deviation 1.403 1.326
Variance 1.968 1.758
Racial Inequality
Respondents were asked to respond to the statement, “This country would be
better off ifwe worried less about how equal black and white people are,” and
interestingly, more than 50 percent (56.0 percent) disagreed to varying degrees with the
statement (see table 45). Almost 36 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement.
The mean was 3.46, median was 4.00, standard deviation was 1.668, and variance was
2.782. These statistics underscore the negative perceptions of the respondents.
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When asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that whites
in today’s society do not benefit from past discrimination, therefore they should not be
held accountable, 64.4 percent of the respondents disagreed (see table 46). A little over
20 percent (21.7 percent) agreed with the statement. Frequency analysis revealed a mean
of 3.74, median of 4.00, standard deviation of 1.355, and deviation of 1.836. Similarly,
when asked about reparations (“The U.S. government owes black people repayment for
the legacy of slavery and racial discrimination”), 55.6 percent of the respondents agreed
that the government owes blacks repayment. While 15.9 percent were neutral, 28.5
percent disagreed with the statement (see table 47). The mean was 2.57, median was
2.00, standard deviation was 1.576, and variance was 2.485.
Demonstrating consistency with the above stated views, when asked whether they
agreed or disagreed with the statement that if black people do not do well in life, it is
because they do not work hard to get ahead, 59.9 percent of the respondents disagreed
(see table 48). Only 7.0 percent were neutral, and 33.1 percent agreed. Analysis of the




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 86 21.2 22.0 22.0
Somewhat agree 54 13.3 13.8 35.8
Neutral 28 6.9 7.2 43.0
Somewhat disagree 41 10.1 10.5 53.5
Disagree 182 44.9 46.5 100.0
_______ Total 391 96.5 100.0




Whites Accountable for Past
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 35 8.6 9.5 9.5
Somewhat agree 45 1 1.1 12.2 21.7
Neutral 51 12.6 13.9 35.6
Somewhat disagree 85 21.0 23.1 58.7
Disagree 152 37.5 41.3 100.0
Total 368 90.9 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 146 36.0 38.6 38.6
Somewhat agree 64 15.8 16.9 55.6
Neutral 60 14.8 15.9 71.4
Somewhat disagree 24 5.9 6.3 77.8
Disagree 84 20.7 22.2 100.0
Total 378 93.3 100.0
Missing No answer 27 6.7
Total 405 100.0
TABLE 48
Doing Well in Life - Hard Work
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 51 12.6 12.8 12.8
Somewhat agree 81 20.0 20.3 33.1
Neutral 28 6.9 7.0 40.1
Somewhat 72 17.8 18.0 58.1
disagree
Disagree 167 41.2 41.9 100.0
Total 399 98.5 100.0
Missing No answer 6 1.5
Total 405 100.0
190
Iraq War and Terrorism Policies
Respondents were asked directly whether or not they support the war in Iraq, and
overwhelmingly, the majority did not (85.7 percent). When asked whether or not they
agreed with the statement “I believe that Americans should support the President’s war
efforts against terrorism even if they disagree with him,” 49.1 percent disagreed and 37.1
percent agreed. Almost 14 percent (13.8 percent) of the respondents recorded a neutral
response. Frequency analysis revealed that respondents were clearly split in their
attitudes about supporting the President’s war efforts against terrorism even if individual
disagree with him — the mean was 3.31, median was 3.00, standard deviation was 1.543,
and variance was 2.38 1 (see tables 49-50)
Respondents were also asked about their attitudes towards terrorism policies.
Almost 44 percent (43.8 percent) of the respondents agreed that giving up some rights
and liberties are necessary to curb terrorism, while 46.2 percent disagreed. A similar
statement was presented to respondents, “Someone who expresses support for terrorists
should have their privileges and rights restricted,” and 65.7 percent agreed with the
statement while 26.5 percent disagreed. When asked about the acceptability ofprofiling
people ofArab or Middle Eastern descent, 59.6 disagreed with such policies but 29.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 4 1.0 1.4 1.4
Somewhat agree 9 2.2 3.2 4.6
Neutral 27 6.7 9.6 14.3
Somewhat disagree 24 5.9 8.6 22.9
Disagree 216 53.3 77.1 100.0
Total 280 69.1 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 48 11.9 17.5 17.5
Somewhat agree 54 13.3 19.6 37.1
Neutral 38 9.4 13.8 50.9
Somewhat disagree 36 8.9 13.1 64.0
Disagree 99 24.4 36.0 100.0
Total 275 67.9 100.0
Missing No answer 130 32.1
Total 405 100.0
TABLE 51
Profiling Arab/Middle Eastern Descent
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 45 11.1 1.9 11.9
Somewhat agree 65 16.0 7.2 29.0
Neutral 43 10.6 1.3 40.4
Somewhat disagree 74 18.3 9.5 59.9
Disagree 152 37.5 40.1 100.0
Total 379 93.6 100.0




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 198 48.9 51.8 51.8
Somewhat agree 53 13.1 13.9 65.7
Neutral 30 7.4 7.9 73.6
Somewhat disagree 32 7.9 8.4 81.9
Disagree 69 17.0 18.1 100.0
Total 382 94.3 100.0
Missing No answer 23 5.7
Total 405 100.0
TABLE 53
Give up Right to Curb Terrorism
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 61 15.1 16.6 16.6
Somewhat agree ioo 24.7 27.2 43.8
Neutral 37 9.1 10.1 53.8
Somewhat disagree 43 10.6 11.7 65.5
Disagree 127 31.4 34.5 100.0
Total 368 90.9 100.0
Missing No answer 37 9.1
Total 405 100.0
Immigration
Respondents were asked about their attitudes regarding immigrants and legal
noncitizens (see table 54). More than 50 percent of respondents agreed with the
statement that people from places like Mexico, Cuba, Vietnam, and China are taking jobs
away from black people; 34.7 percent disagreed with the statement. Frequency analysis
revealed a mean of 2.65, a median of 2.00, and a mode of 1; these data support the
researcher’s assertion that agreement with this statement was significant. When asked to
respond to indicate agreement or disagreement with the statement that noncitizens living
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legally in the U.S. should have the same rights as citizens, 69.7 percent disagreed and
24.4 percent agreed (see table 55). An analysis of frequency data shows a mean of 3.89,
median of 5.00, mode of 5, standard deviation of 1.482, and variance of 2.196. Clearly,
disagreement with this statement was significant.
TABLE 54
Immigrants Taking Jobs
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 130 32.1 33.4 33.4
_____ Somewhat agree 84 20.7 21.6 55.0
Neutral 40 9.9 10.3 65.3
Somewhat disagree 63 15.6 16.2 81.5
Disagree 72 17.8 18.5 100.0
Total 389 96.0 100.0
Missing No answer 16 4.0
Total 405 100.0
TABLE 55
Rights for Legal Noncitizens
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree 47 11.6 12.2 12.2
Somewhat agree 47 11.6 12.2 24.4
Neutral 23 5.7 6.0 30.3
Somewhat disagree 53 13.1 13.7 44.0
Disagree 216 53.3 56.0 100.0
Total 386 95.3 100.0
Missing No answer 19 4.7
Total 405 100.0
Conclusions
In summary, this chapter presented a frequency analysis of the respondents’
responses to the survey questions, thus allowing for an analysis of dependent variables.
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The purpose of this dissertation was to analyze the political attitudes of blacks in
East Texas to identify the relationship between ideological self-identification and
political attitudes and behavior. This attitudinal case study utilized survey questionnaires
that were administered during the months of June and July in 2004, and February and
March of 2005. Four hundred and five of the questionnaires were valid for evaluation in
the study. Data collected were analyzed to answer the research question and evaluate the
research hypothesis.
This chapter provides an assessment of the political attitudes of blacks in East
Texas by addressing the following overarching research questions: What correlation
exists between the political self-identification and political attitudes of blacks in the
eastern region of Texas? To answer this question, several statistical tests were conducted
to evaluate collected data beyond frequency analysis. The hypothesis of this dissertation
is as follows: Black political ideological self-identification is not a predictor ofpolitical






The primary objectives of this study were to determine the attitudes of blacks in
eastern Texas and the correlation between political identification and several attitudinal
and behavior variables. Therefore, bivariate analyses were conducted, and the
ideological orientation variable was cross-tabulated with the remaining variables to assess
the existing relationship and measure the strength of the association. Bivariate analysis
allows for the examination of relationships between variables to answer questions such as
“What is the effect of one variable on another?” and “Which characteristics of one
variable are generally associated with which characteristics of a second variable?”
Nominal by nominal tests (lambda, Goodman and Kruskal’s tau, Cramer’s V)
were conducted, as were ordinal by ordinal tests (gamma, and Somers’ d). These tests
were used to generate statistics to inform the analysis of the collected data. Lambda is a
measure of association that generates a proportional reduction in error interpretation and
is used with nominal variables or when one variable is nominal and the other is ordinal.
Goodman and Kruskal’s tau is similar to lambda in that it is an index of the strength of
association as well as an indicator ofhow much knowledge of the independent-dependent
variable relationship improves the ability to predict the dependent variable. Goodman
and Kruskal’s tau is particularly useful when it is difficult to establish which variable is
the dependent or the independent variable. Cramer’s V, a chi-square based test, is used
for contingency tables with more than four cells. The value of Cramer’s V ranges from 0
1J. Richard Kendrick, “Chapter 9” Analyzing Contingency Tables,” in Social Statistics: An
Introduction Using SPSSf0r Windows, 2~” ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2005), 273.
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to 1, and it also measures strength of association but does not have a proportional
reduction in error interpretation. Gamma, like lambda and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau,
has a proportional reduction in error interpretation but is a measure of association for
ordinal variables. Somers’ d, unlike gamma, has both a symmetric and an asymmetric
computation. Consequently, Somers’ d indicates weaker associations than does gamma.
The Pearson correlation coefficient and the Spearman correlation coefficient were
calculated for all of the variables. Both of these coefficients range in value from-ito +1.
The Pearson correlation coefficient is calculated using the actual data values, and the
Spearman correlation coefficient, a nonparametric alternative to the Pearson correlation
coefficient, replaces the actual data values with ranks.2
The chi-square association is not the best measure of association, in that its value
does not reveal much about the strength of the relationship between two variables.3
However, it serves as the basis for several commonly used measures of association.
These measures modify the chi-square so that it is not influenced by sample size and it
falls in the range from 0 to 1, with 0 corresponding to no association and ito perfect
association.4 The chi-square based measure used in this study was Cramer’s V.
Finally, inferences for associations between the variables are made through an
examination of the contingency tables generated from the cross-tabulations. Presented
below are the fmdings from the various tests and interpretations of that data.
2Marija J. Norusis, SPSS 10.0 Guide to Data Analysis (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
2000), 365.
3Marija J. Norusis, SPSS 10.0 Guide to Data Analysis (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
2000), 352.




1. Public Programs and Ideological Orientation. (N=31 1 of 405; 76.8% valid cases)
The contingency table reveals that 73 percent of the respondents, regardless of
ideological orientation, considered public programs to train the poor and disadvantaged
for jobs effective or somewhat effective. Of those who thought that such public
programs were effective or somewhat effective, 31 percent identified their ideological
orientation along the liberal end of the spectrum, and 24 percent were along the
conservative end, and the remainder defmed themselves as moderates. Additionally, of
those who considered such public programs ineffective or somewhat ineffective (23
percent of all respondents), 26 percent identified themselves along the conservative end
of the ideological spectrum and 38 percent were along the liberal end, and the remainder
were moderate. Respondents who were on the conservative end of the ideological
spectrum were less likely to support such public programs than were respondents on the
liberal end of the spectrum.
Lambda establishes that the relationship between support for public programs and
ideological orientation is weak. This weak relationship is demonstrated by a statistic of
.014 on a value range of 0 to 1; the closer the value of lambda is to 0 the weaker the
association, the closer it is to 1, the stronger the relationship. In relation to the errors one
might make in predicting support for public programs without establishing either variable
as the independent variable, a reduction in errors of about 1.4 percent can be made.
Another statistic that accompanies lambda is Goodman and Kruskal’s tau. The
Goodman Kruskal’s tau statistic was .025 with ideological orientation as the dependent
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variable and .019 with support for public programs as the dependent variable. The
proportional reduction in error (PRE) is low, and the association is very weak for both
options.
Gamma, like lambda, is a measure of association that has a PRE interpretation,
and is used as a symmetric measure for ordinal variables. The gamma statistic, -.0 16,
confirms the lambda analyses of association. The association is weak, with gamma much
closer to 0 than to 1. Knowing the association between the respondents’ ideological
orientation and support for public programs improves the ability to predict the
respondents’ level of support for public programs by 1.6 percent. Also, the relationship
is negative, meaning that the more likely a respondent was to be conservative, less likely
they were to support public programs. Additionally, the Cramer’s V statistic was .171,
indicating a weak association between the two variables.
The conclusion that can be drawn from these various statistical evaluations is that
there is a weak, negative relationship between ideological orientation and support for
public programs. Respondents on the liberal end of the spectrum were more likely than
those on the conservative end to consider public programs to train the poor and
disadvantaged for jobs as an effective strategy for the improvement of society;
conversely, those on the conservative end were more likely than those on the liberal end
to consider such public programs as ineffective.
2. Bussing and Ideological Orientation. (N=307 of 405; 75.8% valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate how effective they believed bussing children
from disadvantaged communities to schools in more advantaged communities was as a
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strategy for improving society. Fifty-four percent of respondents, regardless of
ideological orientation thought that bussing was effective or somewhat effective. A
plurality of these respondents was liberal to varying degrees (32.5 percent), and 24.5
percent were conservative to varying degrees. Of those who considered bussing to be
ineffective or somewhat ineffective (37 percent of all respondents) 22.5 percent identified
themselves along the conservative end of the ideological spectrum, and 22 percent
identified themselves along the liberal end. Forty-seven percent were moderate.
The lambda values indicate a weak relationship. As a result, in predicting support
for bussing without a defmed independent variable, the proportional reduction error is
minimal. Goodman and Kruskal’s tau indicates that the association between ideological
orientation and support for bussing reduces the proportion of errors one might make in
predicting the dependent variable by about 1.5 percent. The gamma statistic, -.016,
indicates a negative association and a weak relationship. Although Cramer’s V does not
provide a PRE, one can determine a weak association because on value range from 0 to 1,
a score of .147 is significantly low. Clearly, the contingency table indicates that
respondents with an ideological orientation on the liberal of the spectrum were more
likely to support bussing as a strategy for social improvement than were those on the
conservative end of the spectrum. Additionally, the statistical tests support the fmdings
of the contingency table and indicate that a weak relationship exists between ideological
orientation and support for bussing.
2013. Government Contracts and Ideological Orientation. (N=308 of 405; 76% valid
cases)
The contingency table shows that a majority of the respondents (68 percent ofall
respondents), regardless of the ideological orientation, thought that setting aside a certain
proportion ofgovernment contracts for black-owned businesses was an effective or
somewhat effective strategy for the improvement of society. However, 54 percent of
those placed their ideological orientation along the conservative end of the spectrum
considered such policy ineffective or somewhat ineffective, and 47 percent of those
placed their ideological orientation along the conservative end of the spectrum considered
such policy effective or somewhat effective. Respondents who placed their ideological
orientation along the liberal end of the ideological spectrum were pretty evenly divided
(68 percent effective and somewhat effective; 67 percent ineffective and somewhat
ineffective). Those with a moderate ideological orientation were more likely to consider
such policy effective or somewhat effective (66.7 percent of all moderate respondents
and 43 percent of all respondents.
The various statistical tests conducted on the two variables show a weak
association. The lambda statistics indicate a weak association, as do the Goodman and
Kruskal’s tau statistics. Knowing that the association is weak reduces the proportion of
error by about 2 percent. Gamma, .002, indicates a positive relationship but a weak
association between support for setting aside government contracts for minority
businesses and ideological orientation. The conclusion can be drawn from these data that
although a positive association exists between support for government contracts and
ideological orientation, the relationship is weak. The more liberal the respondent, the
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more likely they were to consider such policy effective; the more conservative the
respondent, the less effective they considered such policy.
4. Severe Penalties-Illicit Drugs and Ideological Orientation. (N~306 of 405; 75.6% valid
cases)
The contingency table yielded interesting results about the relationship between
ideological orientation and support for support for severe penalties for crimes involving
illicit drugs. Forty-one percent of the respondents, regardless of ideological orientation,
thought that severe penalties for crimes involving illicit drugs were ineffective or
somewhat ineffective, 33 percent identified themselves along the liberal end of the
ideological spectrum and 24 percent identified themselves along the conservative end; the
remainder was moderate. Similarly, of those who thought that severe penalties for crimes
involving illicit drugs were effective or somewhat effective (48 percent), 31 percent
identified themselves along the liberal end of the ideological spectrum and 27 percent
identified themselves along the conservative end; the remainder were moderate.
However, of the respondents who identified their ideological orientation along the liberal
end of the spectrum, a plurality considered severe penalties for crimes involving illicit
drugs to be ineffective or somewhat ineffective; whereas, a plurality of those who
identified their ideological orientation along the conservative end of the spectrum
considered such policies effective or somewhat effective.
The statistical tests support this observation. The lambda value indicates that a
weak relationship exists between support for severe penalties for crimes involving illicit
drugs, and knowing this reduces the error in predicting the independent variable by 4.7
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percent. Similarly, Goodman and Kruskal’s tau indicates that the association between
the two variables is pretty weak and knowing this reduces that proportion of errors one
might make in predicting the dependent variable by about 2 percent. Gamma, however,
indicates a negative relationship and confinns the weak association indicated by the
lambda statistics. Additionally, Cramer’s V indicates a weak association between the
variables. The conclusion can be reached from these data that although the association
between ideological orientation and support for severe penalties for crimes involving
illicit drugs is weak, a negative relationship between the variables can be determined.
Respondents at the liberal end of the ideological spectrum were less likely to support
severe penalties for crimes involving illicit drugs than were those at the conservative end
of the spectrum.
5. Racial Profiling and Ideological Orientation. (N=296 of 405; 73.1% valid cases)
The contingency table shows that the majority of the respondents (81 percent),
regardless of ideological orientation, did not support racial profiling. While 44 percent of
the respondents were moderate and overwhelmingly considered racial profiling to be
ineffective, ideological orientation seemed to make little difference in the respondents’
opposition to such a policy position. However, close observation does show that those
who were along the conservative end of the ideological spectrum were more likely than
those on the liberal end to consider such a policy effective or somewhat effective.
The statistical tests yielded the following results. A lambda statistic of 0 is
indicating no association between the variables of support for racial profiling and the
respondents’ ideological orientation. When there is no association between two
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variables, variations in responses in one category have no relationship to variations in
responses to the other. The Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics show a weak
association and negligible reduction in the proportion of errors one might make in
predicting the dependent variable. Gamma indicates that the association between support
for racial profiling and ideological orientation is positive. The relationship is weak, and
knowing this improves the ability to predict the respondents’ level of support for racial
profiling by almost 3 percent. Additionally, a Cramer’s V statistic of .140 indicates a
weak association between the two variables. The initial observations made of the
contingency table were supported by the statistical tests.
6. Mixed-Income Housing and Ideological Orientation. (N~294 of 405; 72.6% valid
cases)
The contingency table shows that a majority of the respondents, regardless of
ideological orientation, thought that mixed-income housing programs were a somewhat
effective strategy for improving society. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents who
located their ideological orientation (24 percent of all respondents) at the conservative
end of the spectrum thought that mixed-income housing programs were either effective or
somewhat effective, while 17 percent of the same group of respondents thought that such
programs were ineffective or somewhat ineffective. Thirty-five percent of the
respondents who located their ideological orientation at the liberal end of the ideological
spectrum (31 percent of all respondents) thought that mixed-income housing programs
were effective or somewhat effective, while 33 percent of the same group of respondents
thought that such programs were ineffective or somewhat ineffective. Of those who
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indicated a moderate ideological orientation (44 percent of all respondents), 52
percent considered such programs effective or somewhat effective; 22 percent were
neutral; and 25 percent thought that such programs were ineffective or somewhat
ineffective.
The lambda statistics indicates a weak association and knowing this only
improves the ability to predict attitudes based on ideological orientation by only 3
percent. Similarly, Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics indicate that the association
between ideological orientation and support for mixed-housing programs is weak,
reducing the proportion of errors one might make in predicting the dependent variable by
about 2 percent. Additionally, the Cramer’s V statistic is .15 1, which is a low value on a
scale of 0 to 1. Gamma and Somers’ d indicate that the association between the two
variables is positive, although the relationship is weak. Although the association between
the two variables is weak, it can be determined that respondents with an ideological
orientation at the liberal end of the spectrum were more likely to consider mixed-income
housing programs an effective strategy for the improvement of society than were
respondents at the conservative end of the spectrum.
7. Returning Prayer to Schools and Ideological Orientation. (N=308 of 405; 76% valid
cases)
Eighty percent of the respondents, regardless of ideological orientation, supported
returning prayer to schools. Eighty-three percent of respondents who located their
ideological orientation at the conservative end of spectrum supported returning prayer to
schools; 78 percent of the respondents on the liberal end of the ideological spectrum
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supported returning prayer to schools. Seventy percent of all moderates supported
returning prayer to schools. Clearly, those at the conservative end of the spectrum took a
much stronger position on the issue, although support for returning prayer to schools
came from all groups on the ideological spectrum.
The statistical tests yielded the following results. A lambda statistic of 0 is
indicating no association between the variables of support for returning prayer to schools
and the respondents’ ideological orientation. When there is no association between two
variables, variations in responses in one category have no relationship to variations in
responses to the other. The Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics show a weak
association and negligible reduction in the proportion of errors one might make in
predicting the dependent variable. Gamma indicates that the association between support
for returning prayer to schools and ideological orientation is negative. The relationship is
weak, and knowing this improves the ability to predict the respondents’ level of support
for returning prayer to schools by almost 11 percent. Additionally, a Cramer’s V statistic
of .110 indicates a weak association between the two variables. The conclusion can be
drawn that ideological orientation has little to no impact on attitudes regarding returning
prayer to schools. One can deduce, however, that respondents on the conservative end of
the spectrum were more likely than respondents on the liberal end to support returning
prayer to schools.
8. Increase Police Power and Ideological Orientation. (N=297 of 405; 73.3% valid cases)
Forty-three percent of the respondents, regardless of ideological orientation,
considered giving the police more power to arrest criminals an ineffective or somewhat
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ineffective strategy for improving society. Twenty-eight percent of these respondents
were at the liberal end of the ideological spectrum, and 22 percent were at the
conservative end; 28 percent were moderate. Of the 40 percent who considered such an
action to be effective or somewhat effective, 35 percent were at the liberal end of the
ideological spectrum, and 27 percent were at the conservative end; 38 percent were
moderate.
On the one hand, 43 percent all on the conservative end of the ideological
spectrum considered increasing police power to be effective or somewhat effective, while
45 percent of all on the liberal end thought the same; 34 percent of all moderates
considered increasing police power to be effective or somewhat effective. On the other
hand, 39 percent of all liberals considered such a policy to be ineffective or somewhat
ineffective; 37 percent of all conservatives thought the same. Forty-nine percent of all
moderates considered increasing police power to be ineffective or somewhat ineffective.
The statistical tests yielded the following results. The lambda statistic was .028,
indicating a weak association between the variables of support for increased police power
and the respondents’ ideological orientation. Variations in responses in one category
have a weak relationship to variations in responses to the other, and knowing the
relationship between the respondents’ ideological orientation and their attitudes about
increasing police power improved the ability to predict their attitudes about increasing
police power 5 percent. Additionally, a Cramer’s V statistic of .141 indicates a weak
association between the two variables. The Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics show a
weak association and about a 2 percent reduction in the proportion of errors one might
make in predicting the dependent variable. Gamma indicates that the association
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between support for increased police power and ideological orientation is negative
and that the relationship is weak. Knowing this improves the ability to predict the
respondents’ level of support for racial profiling by less than 1 percent. The Somers’ d
statistic also indicates a negative association and a weak relationship by a value of -.088.
These data indicate that while the association between the variables is very weak as
established by the various statistical tests, a negative relationship between ideological
orientation and support of increasing police power to arrest criminals as a strategy for
improving society can be established. Respondents with an ideological position on the
conservative end of the spectrum were more likely to support such a policy, although
opposition by those on the liberal end was weak.
9. National Healthcare and Ideological Orientation. (N=3 12 of 405; 77% valid cases)
Respondents were asked whether or not they agreed with the following statement:
The United States should adopt a national healthcare system. Seventy-four percent of all
respondents, regardless of ideological orientation, indicated agreement with the
statement. Ninety-one percent of the respondents indicated that they agreed or somewhat
agreed with the statement. Of those who disagreed (5 percent of all respondents), 31
percent were from the liberal end of the ideological spectnun, and 38 percent were from
the conservative end; 31 percent were moderate. Of those who agreed, 31 percent were
from the liberal end of the ideological spectrum, and 24 percent were from the
conservative end; 45 percent were moderate. Four percent of the respondents were
neutral; 45 percent were from the liberal end of the ideological spectrum, 18 percent from
the conservative end, and 36 percent were moderate.
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The lambda statistic, .004, indicates a weak association and a less than 1
percent reduction in errors when predicting the independent variable relationship. The
Cramer’s V statistic, .123, indicates a weak association between the variables. The
Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics also indicate a weak association and about a 1
percent reduction in the errors one might make when trying to predict the dependent
variable. A gamma value of .033 shows that while the relationship is positive, the
association is weak. Similarly, the Somers’ d statistic of .018 indicates a weak
relationship. Clearly, these data from the various statistical tests indicate a weak
association between ideological orientation and agreement with the adoption of a national
healthcare system; however, data do indicate that respondents on the liberal end of the
ideological spectrum were more likely to agree with the adoption of a national healthcare
system than were those on the conservative end.
10. Perceptions ofEquality and Ideological Orientation. (N=309 of 405; 76.3 valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the
following statement: This country would be better off ifwe worried less about how equal
black and white people are. The contingency table yields interesting results. Fifty-six
percent of the respondents, regardless of ideological orientation, disagreed with the
statement, and 38 percent of respondents agreed; 7 percent were neutral. Of those on the
liberal end of the ideological spectrum, 51 percent disagreed, 43 percent agreed, and 6
percent were neutral. Of those on the conservative end of the ideological spectrum, 57
percent disagreed, 34 percent agreed, and 9 percent were neutral. Of those who were
moderate, 57 percent disagreed, 36 percent agreed, and 6 percent were neutral. Cross-
r
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tabulation results show that while a plurality of respondents disagreed with the
statement, more respondents along the conservative end of the spectrum disagreed with
the statement and more along the liberal end agreed.
The lambda statistic was zero, indicating that there is no association between the
two variables and that variations in responses to one variable has no significance to the
other variable. Also, Cramer’s V, .115, indicates a weak association. The Goodman and
Kruskal’s tau statistics also indicated a very weak association between the two variables
and a 1 percent or less reduction in the errors that might occur when determining the
dependent variable. The gamma was .076; this indicates a positive association, but a very
weak relationship. Similarly, the Somers’ d statistic was .055 with an approximate
significance of 25.8 percent, indicating a very weak relationship. One can conclude from
all of these data that ideological orientation has little to no association with respondents’
response to the statement that this country would be better off ifwe worried less about
how equal are black people and white people. However, it can be determined that
respondents on the liberal end of the ideological spectrum were more likely to agree with
the statement than were those on the conservative end.
11. Immigrants Taking Jobs and Ideological Orientation. (N=309 of 405; 76.3% valid
cases)
Respondents were asked whether or not they agreed with the statement that
people who come to the U.S. from places like Mexico, Cuba, Vietnam, and China are
taking jobs away from black people. The contingency table shows that although a
plurality of the respondents agreed with this statement, ideological orientation was not a
211significant determinant. Fifty-four percent of all respondents agreed at varying levels
with the statement; 37 percent disagreed to varying levels; and 10 percent were neutral.
Of the respondents with an ideological orientation located on the liberal end of the
spectrum, 52 percent agreed, 38 percent disagreed, and 9 percent were neutral. Of the
respondents with an ideological orientation located on the conservative end of the
spectrum, 61 percent agreed, 34 percent disagreed, and 5 percent were neutral. Of those
who indicated that their ideological orientation was moderate, 51 percent agreed, 36
percent disagreed, and 12 percent were neutral. Clearly, although a plurality of the
respondents agreed with the statement that immigrants are taking jobs away from blacks,
those located on the conservative end of the ideological spectrum were likely to agree
with the statement than were those on the liberal end or moderates.
The lambda statistic of .010 indicates that the association between the two
variables is weak, and the proportion or errors one would make trying to determine the
dependent variable not knowing anything about the association between the independent
and dependent variables is only 1 percent. Similarly, Cramer’s V. .119, indicates a weak
association between the variables. Goodman and Kruskal’s tau indicates a weak
relationship and a positive association. Knowing this association between the
independent and dependent variables reduces the proportion of errors one might make in
predicting the dependent variable by about 1 percent. Gamma, however, indicates a
negative association; knowing this association improves the ability to predict the
respondents’ agreement or disagreement with the statement that immigrants take jobs
away from blacks by almost 6 percent. Similarly, Somers’ d statistical test indicates a
negative relationship, and a 4 percent reduction in error. The conclusion can be drawn
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that all of the statistical tests found a weak association between ideological
orientation and the belief that immigrants are taking jobs from blacks. Regardless of
ideological orientation, a plurality of the respondents agreed with the statement that
immigrants take jobs away from blacks. However, the negative relationship indicates
that respondents with an ideological orientation on the conservative end of the ideological
spectrum are more likely than those on the liberal end to agree with the statement.
12. Doing Well in Life—Work Hard and Ideological Orientation. (N316 of 405; 78%
valid cases)
Respondents were asked whether or not they agreed with the following statement:
If black people do not do well in life, it is because they do not work hard to get ahead.
The contingency table shows that a plurality of the respondents, regardless of ideological
orientation, disagreed with the statement (60 percent). Thirty-five percent of
respondents, regardless of ideological orientation, agreed with the statement; 6 percent
were neutral. Of the respondents who located their ideological orientation on the liberal
end of the spectrum, 60 percent disagreed, 36 percent agreed, and 4 percent were neutral.
Of the respondents who located their ideological orientation on the conservative end of
the spectrum, 56 percent disagreed, 35 percent agreed, and 9 percent were neutral. Of
those who indicated a moderate ideological orientation, 61 percent disagreed, 34 percent
agreed, and 5 percent disagreed. Upon close examination, one can see that those on the
liberal end of the spectrum were slightly more likely to disagree with the statement that if
blacks do not do well in life, it is because they do not work hard to get ahead.
213
Lambda and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau indicate a weak association and less
than 1 percent reduction in errors when predicting the independent and dependent
variables, respectively. Gamma and Somers’ d, however, indicate a negative association
and a weak relationship. The measures of association yield low values; thus, the
association between the variables is weak and the relationship is negative. One can
conclude from these data that the observations made from the contingency table are
correct, and that respondents on the conservative end of the spectrum were more likely to
agree with the statement that if black people do not do well in life it is because they do
not work hard to get ahead.
13. Government Intervention and Ideological Orientation. çN3O5 of 405; 75.3% valid
cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they agreed with the following
statement: To improve their conditions in this country, blacks need government
intervention at all levels. The contingency table shows that a significant number of
respondents agreed with the statement (59 percent), regardless of their ideological
orientation. Of the respondents who located their ideological orientation along the liberal
end of the spectrum, 64 percent agreed, 28 percent disagreed, and 8 percent were neutral.
Of the respondents who located their ideological orientation along the conservative end
of the spectrum, 59 percent agreed, 34 percent disagreed, and 7 percent were neutral. Of
the respondents who indicated that their ideological orientation was moderate, 55 percent
agreed, 38 percent disagreed, and 8 percent were neutral. The cross-tabulation shows that
although a plurality of respondents agreed with the statement that blacks need
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government intervention at all levels to improve their conditions in this country, those
on the liberal end of the spectrum were more likely to agree than were those on the
conservative end.
The lambda statistic, .023, reveals a weak association between ideological
orientation and support for government intervention at all levels. Knowing the
association between the two variables as established by lambda only improves the ability
to predict the independent variable by about 4 percent. Similarly, Cramer’s V, .146,
indicates a weak association between the variables. Goodman and Kruskal’s tau also
indicates a weak association, thus reducing the proportion of errors in predicting the
dependent variable by about 2 percent. Gamma confirms the lambda analysis and
analysis of the contingency table. The association is positive, and the relationship is
weak. Respondents on the liberal end of the ideological spectrum were more likely to
agree with statement that blacks need government intervention at all levels to improve
their conditions in this country than were those on the conservative end.
14. Government Reparations and Ideological Orientation. (N=304 of 405; 75.1% of valid
cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with
the statement that the government owes black people repayment for the legacy of slavery
and racial discrimination. Cross-tabulation yielded interesting results; although a
plurality of the respondents indicated some level of agreement with the statement (56
percent), those on the conservative end of the ideological spectrum indicated agreement
at a higher percentage level (61 percent of all on the conservative end) than did those on
215
the liberal end (59 percent) or moderates (52 percent). However, moderates
disagreed at a higher percentage level (32 percent) than did those on the conservative end
of the spectrum (29 percent) or those on the liberal end (23 percent). Also, those on the
conservative end of the spectrum were less likely to be neutral (11 percent) than were
those on the liberal end (18 percent) or moderates (16 percent). Clearly, the connection
between the variables is complicated: those on the conservative end of the spectrum were
more likely to support government reparations than were those on the liberal end, and
those on the conservative end of the spectrum were more likely to oppose government
reparations than were those on the liberal end. To better understand the relationship
between the variables, statistical tests were needed.
The lambda statistics found that a weak association between the variables;
knowing this only improves the ability to predict the independent variable by less than 1
percent. Similarly, Cramer’s V, .141, indicates a weak association between the variables.
Goodman and Kruskal’s tau also indicates a weak association between the variables;
knowing this reduces the proportion of errors in predicting the dependent variable by 2.5
percent. The gamma statistic indicates a weak association and a positive relationship.
One can conclude that although the association between the variables is weak and
it is difficult to establish an independent or dependent variable because of this weak
association, the relationship is positive. Respondents with an ideological orientation on
the liberal end of the ideological spectrum had a greater tendency than those on the
conservative end toward supporting governmental reparation; whereas, respondents with
an ideological orientation on the conservative end of the spectrum had a greater tendency
than did those on the liberal end toward opposing governmental reparations.
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15. Whites Accountable for Past and Ideological Orientation. (N=296 of 405; 73.1%
valid cases)
The contingency table shows that a majority of the respondents (64 percent),
regardless of their ideological orientation, disagreed with the statement that whites in
today’s society do not benefit from past discrimination; therefore, they should not be held
accountable. Interestingly, of these respondents, 68 percent located themselves on the
conservative end of the ideological spectrum, 64 percent were moderate, and 61 percent
located themselves on the conservative end of the spectrum. Twenty-one percent of the
respondents, regardless of ideological orientation, agreed to varying degrees with the
statement that whites do not benefit from past discrimination and should not be held
accountable. Twenty-four percent of those in agreement were located on the liberal end
of the ideological spectrum, 20 percent were moderates, and 20 percent were located on
the conservative end of the spectrum. Fifteen percent of the respondents were neutral.
The lambda statistics indicate that no association can be established between the
variables, meaning the variation in ideological orientation does not impact perspectives
on the accountability of whites for past discrimination. Goodman and Kruskal’s tau
indicates a weak association between the two variables with a proportional error of 1
percent when either variable is established as the dependent variable. The gamma
statistic indicates a weak association and a positive relationship between the variables.
Similarly, the Cramer’s V statistic also indicates a weak association. One can conclude
that although a majority of the respondents believed whites do benefit from past
discrimination and should be held accountable, respondents who located their ideological
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orientation on the conservative end of the spectrum were more likely than were those
on the liberal end to believe this.
16. Financially Prospered in the Past Two Years and Ideological Orientation. (N=303 of
405; 74.8% valid cases)
Although a plurality of respondents agreed to varying degrees with the statement
that they prospered fmancially in the past two years, more respondents indicated that they
disagreed with the statement. Additionally, 16 percent of the respondents, regardless of
ideological orientation, indicated that they were neutral; this was five percentage points
higher than those who somewhat agreed. When those who identified themselves as
ideologically moderate are controlled, then those on the liberal end of the spectrum are
more likely to disagree with the statement and those on the conservative end of the
spectrum are more likely to agree with the statement. The lambda tests indicate a weak
association between the variables, as does Goodman Kruskal’s tau. Gamma confirms the
fmdings from the contingency table that a negative relationship exists between the
variables. Also, gamma and Cramer’s V indicate that a weak association exists between
the variables.
17. Financially Prosper in the Next One Year and Ideological Orientation. (N294 of
405; 72.6% valid cases)
The contingency table shows that a majority of the respondents (60 percent),
regardless of ideological orientation, agreed to varying degrees that they would prosper
fmancially in the next year. This optimism exists across ideological orientation, although
those who identified with the conservative end of the ideological spectrum were more
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skeptical (by at least 14 percentage points). Sixty-four percent of those who thought
that they would fmancially prosper in the next year were from the liberal end of the
ideological spectrum, compared with 61 percent of those on the conservative end, and 56
percent were moderates. Of those who disagreed to varying degrees, 39 percent were
from the conservative end of the spectrum, 22 percent from the liberal end, and 25
percent were moderates. Those who identified themselves as moderates were also more
likely to be neutral (19 percent) compared with 14 percent of those who were on the
liberal end of the spectrum, and 11 percent of those on the conservative end.
Lambda, Goodman and Kruskal’s tau, Cramer’s V and Somer’s d indicate a weak
association between the variables. Gamma also indicated a weak association and a
positive relationship between the variables. These statistical tests confirm the
observations made of the contingency table: those who considered themselves to be more
liberal are more likely than those who consider themselves to be more moderate to
believe that they will prosper in the next year.
18. Alienation and Ideological Orientation. (N307 of 405; 75.8% valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: I don’t think public officials care much about what people like me think. The
contingency table shows that a plurality of the respondents regardless of ideological
orientation agreed to varying degrees with the statement. The lambda, Cramer’s V, and
Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics indicate a weak association between the variables,
while the gamma and Somers’ d statistics indicate a weak association and a negative
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relationship. The more liberal the ideological orientation of the respondent, the more
likely they were to agree with the statement.
19. Trust Government and Ideological Orientation. (N~307 of 405; 75.8% valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: Most of the time I can trust that what government does is right. The
contingency table reveals that majority of the respondents disagreed with this statement,
regardless of ideological orientation. Lambda indicated no association between the
variables, while Goodman and Kruskal’s tau indicated a weak association with only a 2
percent reduction in error in predicting the dependent variable based on this variable
relationship. Gamma and Somers’ d statistics indicated a weak association and a positive
relationship between the variables. However, based on Kendall’s tau b and Spearman’s
rho the correlations between trust in government and ideological orientation were
significant at the .05 level in two-tailed tests.
20. Rights for Legal Noncitizens and Ideological Orientation. (N=307 of 405; 75.8%
valid cases)
Survey respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the
following statement: Noncitizens living legally in the U.S. should have the same legal
rights as citizens. The contingency table reveals that the more liberal the ideological
orientation of the respondent, the more likely the individual was to disagree with the
statement. Additionally, majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement. The
lambda, Cramer’s V, and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics indicate a weak
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association among the variables, with knowledge of this association resulting in only
a slight reduction in the error that may result from the determination of a dependent or
independent variable. Gamma and Somer’s d statistics also indicate a weak association,
and they indicate a positive relationship between the variables.
21. Giving up Some Rights and Liberties to Curb Terrorism and Ideological Orientation.
(N=297 of 405; 73.3% valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: Giving up some rights and liberties are necessary to curb terrorism. The
contingency table reveals that while a plurality of the respondents, regardless of
ideological orientation disagreed with the statement, a significant number of respondents
agreed. Lambda, Cramer’s V. and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau indicate a weak
association between the variables. Gamma and Somer’s d indicate a weak association
and a negative relationship, meaning that the more liberal the respondent, the more likely
they were to disagree with the statement.
22. Profiling People ofArab or Middle Eastern Descent and Ideological Orientation.
(N=305 of 405; 75.3% ofvalid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate either agreement or disagreement with the
following statement: Profiling people ofArab or Middle Eastern descent is an acceptable
way to catch people who might be involved in terrorist activities. The contingency table
shows that majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement. Lambda, Cramer’s
V, and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics indicate a weak association between the
[
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variables; gamma and Somers’ d statistics indicate a weak association and a negative
relationship between the variables. The more liberal the ideological orientation of the
respondent, the more likely the respondent is to disagree with the profiling of people of
Arab or Middle Eastern descent as a way to catch terrorists and potential terrorists.
23. Restricting Rights of Terrorist Supports and Ideological Orientation. (N=308 of 405;
76% ofvalid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: Someone who expresses support for terrorists should have their privileges and
rights restricted. The contingency table reveals that a majority of the respondents agreed
with the statement. The lambda statistics indicate no association between the variables;
Cramer’s V and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics indicate a weak association.
Gamma and Somers’ d statistics indicate a weak association and a negative relationship.
Data indicate that the more conservative the respondent, the more likely the individual
was to agree with the restricting the rights and privileges of individuals who express
support for terrorists, although most of the respondents agreed with the statement
regardless of their orientation.
24. Difference between Democratic and Republican Parties and Ideology Orientation.
(N31 1 of 405; 76.8% valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: There is little difference between the Democratic and Republican parties. The
contingency table reveals that a majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement.
However, respondents that identified their ideological orientation along the liberal end of
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the ideological spectrum were more likely to disagree with the statement, whereas
those on the conservative end of the spectrum were more likely to agree with the
statement. The lambda statistics indicate that there is no association between the
variables; therefore, variations in one variable have no association with variations in the
other variable. Cramer’s V and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics indicate that the
association between the variables is weak. The gamma and Somer’s d statistics reveal a
weak association between variables and indicate that a negative relationship exists.
These data confirm the observations made of the contingency table.
25. Woman’s Right to Choose and Ideological Orientation. (N=235 of 405; 58% of valid
cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: A woman should have the right to choose whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy. The contingency table reveals that majority of the respondents agreed with
the statement. However, respondents’ whose ideological orientation is on the
conservative end of the ideological spectrum were more likely to disagree with the
statement, and respondents’ whose ideological orientation was more liberal were more
likely to agree with the statement. Lambda and Cramer’s V statistics reveal a weak
association between the variables. Goodman and Kruskal’s tau also indicates a weak
association, and knowing this reduces the proportion of errors one might make in
predicting the dependent variable by about 5 percent. Gamma and Somers’ d statistics
reveal that the association is indeed weak between the variables, and that the relationship
is positive. These data confirm the observations made of the contingency table.
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26. Stem-cell Research and Ideological Orientation. (N=224 of 405; 55.3% valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: Stem-cell research should be permitted if it will save lives. The contingency
table reveals that a majority of the respondents agreed with the statement, although to
varying degrees. Clearly, the more liberal the respondent, the more likely they were to
agree with the statement. Those respondents who identified their ideological orientation
along the conservative end of the political ideological spectrum were also likely to agree
with statement, but those who identified themselves as “conservative” were more likely
to disagree. Lambda and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau indicate a weak association
between the variables, as does Cramer’s V. Gamma and Somers’ d also indicate a weak
association and a positive relationship.
27. Gay Marriage and Ideological Orientation. (N=230 of 405; 56.8% valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the
following statement: The right to marry should be extended to include gay and lesbian
couples. The contingency table indicates that majority of the respondents disagreed with
this statement. The lambda and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics indicate a weak
association between the ideological orientation and support for gay marriages.
Additionally, gamma and Somers’ d statistics show a weak association between the
variables and a positive relationship.
22428. Support for War in Iraq and Ideological Orientation. (N=234 of405; 57.8% valid
cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: I support for the war in Iraq. The contingency table shows that regardless of
ideological orientation, the respondents overwhelming disagreed with the statement.
Lambda and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau statistics indicate a weak association between
the variables. Gamma and Somers’ d statistics indicate a weak association and a negative
relationship.
29. President’s War Efforts and Ideological Orientation. (N=230 of 405; 56.7% of cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: I believe that Americans should support the President’s war efforts against
terrorism even if they disagree with him. From the results the contingency table, one can
see that a plurality of the respondents disagreed with the statement. Lambda, Cramer’s
V, and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau indicate a weak association between the two
variables. Gamma and Somers’ d indicate a weak association and a negative relationship
between ideological orientation and support for the president’s war efforts against
terrorism even if one disagrees with him.
30. Closest Party Identification and Ideological Orientation. (N=309 of 405; 76.3% of
cases)
Respondents were asked the following: With which party do you most closely
identif~r? A clear majority, regardless of ideological orientation, indicated that they most
closely identified with the Democratic party. Lambda, Cramer’s V, and Goodman and
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Kruskal’s tau statistics indicate a weak association between the variables. While
Somers’ d statistics indicate a weak association and a positive relationship, gamma
indicates a moderate association and a positive relationship.
31. Frequency Discuss Politics and Ideological Orientation. (N=315 of 405; 77.8% of
valid cases)
Respondents were asked how often they discussed politics with family, friends, or
neighbors. Majority of the respondents, regardless of ideological orientation, indicated
that they discussed politics frequently or sometimes. It is worth noting that respondents
who were more liberal were more likely to indicate that they discussed politics
frequently, while those who were more conservative were more likely to indicate that
they discussed politics sometimes. Lambda, Cramer’s V, and Goodman and Kruskal’s
tau statistics indicate that there is a weak association between the two variables, and
knowing these fmdings results in a slight reduction in error (2 percent) when predicting
the dependent variable. Gamma and Somers’ d statistics indicate a weak association
between the variables and a positive relationship.
32. Registered to Vote and Ideological Orientation. (N318 of 405; 78.5% valid cases)
Respondents were asked whether or not they were registered to vote, and the
contingency table shows that, regardless of ideological orientation, a clear majority of the
respondents indicated that they were registered to vote. Lambda statistics indicate that
there is no association between the variables, meaning that changes in one variable have
no affect on the other variable. Goodman and Kruskal’s tau and Cramer’s V statistics
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also indicate a rather weak association between ideological orientation and whether
one is registered to vote. Gamma and Somers’ d statistics support these fmdings and
indicate a positive relationship between the variables.
33. Voted in 2000 and Ideological Orientation. (N=315 of 405; 77.5% valid cases)
Respondents were asked whether or not they voted in the 2000 presidential
election, and almost 99 percent of the respondents, regardless of ideological orientation
indicated that they had voted. The lambda statistics indicate that there is no association
between the variables. Goodman and Kruskal’s tau and Cramer’s V indicate a weak
association between the variables. Gamma and Somers’ d statistics indicate a very weak
association and a negative relationship between the two variables.
34. Party for Which One Votes Most Often and Ideological Orientation. (Nz312 of 405;
77% valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate the party for which they vote most often, and
the contingency table shows that 97 percent of the respondents most often voted for the
Democratic Party, regardless of their ideological orientation. Lambda, Goodman and
Kruskal’s tau, and Cramer’s V statistics indicate a very weak association between the
variables. Gamma and Somers’ d statistics indicate a weak association and a positive
relationship between the variables.
35. Influential Political Alliance and Ideological Orientation. (N=292 of 405; 72.1% valid
cases)
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Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they believed an
influential political alliance could be formed if blacks, other minorities, the poor, and
women pulled together. Almost 89 percent of the respondents, regardless of ideological
orientation, indicated belief that such an alliance could be formed. Lambda statistics
indicate no association between the variables; Cramer’s V and Goodman and Kruskal’s
tau indicate a very weak association. Gamma and Somers’ d statistics indicate a weak
association and a positive relationship between ideological orientation and belief that an
influential political alliance could be formed between blacks, other minorities, the poor,
and women.
36. Attendance to Religious Services and Ideological Orientation. (N=313 of 405; 77.3%
valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate the frequency with which they attended
religious services, and regardless of ideological orientation, 65 percent of the respondents
indicated that they attended religious services every week or multiple times a week.
Ninety percent of the respondents, regardless of ideological orientation, indicated that
they attended religious services almost every week, every week, or multiple times a
week. Lambda, Goodman and Kruskal’s tau, and Cramer’s V indicate a weak association
between the variables; gamma and Somers’ d indicate a weak association and a positive
relationship between the variables.
37. Gender and Ideological Orientation. (N=305 of 405; 75.3% valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate their gender, and the contingency table
reveals interesting results. Forty-four percent of all respondents were moderate (46
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percent women and 40 percent men); thus, a plurality of the respondents were
moderate. Thirty-one percent of all respondents located themselves along the liberal end
of the ideological spectrum (26 percent women and 37 percent men); whereas, 25 percent
of all respondents located themselves along the conservative end of the ideological
spectrum (26 percent women and 23 percent men). Other than moderate, more
respondents identified their ideological orientation as liberal, regardless of gender.
Correlation statistics could not be calculated due to data type.
38. Age Range and Ideological Orientation. (N=316 of 405; 78% valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate their age range, and the contingency table
yields significant findings. Respondents under 30 years of age made up 4 percent of the
respondents used in the cross-tabulation and were more likely to be liberal (4 percent of
the liberal spectrum total). More respondents in the 30-35 aged range identified
themselves as “conservative,” and within this age range more were likely to identify
themselves along the conservative spectrum (14 percent of the liberal spectrum total).
Respondents aged 65 years and over were more likely to identify as moderate (52 percent
did so), but 32 percent identified their ideological orientation along the liberal end of the
spectrum. Those respondents aged between 41 and 60 years (46 percent of the
respondents) were the most moderate; 46 percent of the respondents in this range
indicated that they were ideologically moderate, 29 percent identified their ideological
orientation along the liberal end of the spectrum, and 27 percent identified their
ideological orientation along the conservative end of the spectrum (the total does not
equal zero due to rounding). Data from the lambda, Cramer’s V, and Goodman and
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Kruskal’s tau statistical tests indicate a weak association between the variables.
Gamma and Somers’ d indicate a weak association and a negative relationship between
ideological orientation and age.
39. Educational Attainment and Ideological Orientation. (N=316 of 405; 78% valid
cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate the highest educational level achieved, and
the contingency table yields some interesting results. Fifty percent of respondents that
indicated high school were moderate (27 percent were on the liberal end of the spectrum
and 23 percent were on the conservative end of the spectrum). Those who graduated
from college were also most likely to be moderate, but they also indicated a greater
likeithood to be conservative than liberal. Respondents who attended some college and
those who fmished technical school were also most likely to be moderate, but were more
likely to be liberal than conservative. Similarly, respondents who completed graduate
school were most likely to be moderate, but were more likely to liberal than conservative.
Cramer’s V statistic, .130, indicates a weak association, as do the lambda and Goodman
and Kruskal’s tau statistics. Gamma and Somers’ d statistics indicate a weak association
and a negative relationship between the variables. One can conclude that although the
variables are very weakly linked, the higher the educational level attained, the more
likely the respondent is to be liberal.
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40. Household Income Range and Ideological Orientation. (N=286 of 405; 70.6%
valid cases)
Respondents were asked to indicate the range within which their household
income fit. Respondents in each of the income ranges was most likely to identify their
ideological orientation as moderate, except for those in the $30,000-39,999 income range;
they were most likely to identify their ideological orientation as liberal. However,
respondents with a household income of less than $19,999 were more likely to be
conservative, as were respondents with a household income of $50,000-59,999 and those
with a household income ofmore than $96,000. Additionally, respondent in the $3 0,000-
39,999 income range were 26 percentage points more likely to be liberal than
conservative, the highest percentage difference in the cross-tabulation. The Cramer’s V
statistic, .170, was very low on a scale of 0 to 1, indicating a very weak association
between the variables. The lambda and Goodman and Kruskal’s tau also indicated a
weak association between the variables, with a less than 4 percent reduction in error
when predicting the dependent variable. Similarly, gamma and Somers’ d indicate a
weak association and a positive relationship between household income range and
ideological orientation. One can conclude that although the variables are weakly linked,
one can see that the lower the household income range of the respondents, the more likely
they were to be liberal.
Summary of Bivariate Analyses
Table 56 provides a summary of the fmdings from the various statistical tests
performed for bivariate analysis. The table reveals that based on the data revealed from
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the tests conducted on the dataset, the independent variable (self-identified
ideological orientation) has only a weak association with the dependent variables. One
can, then, deduce that ideological orientation has limited association with the examined
dependent variables, and based on this relationship one should use caution when
attributing the political attitudes of the respondents in any significant way to ideological
orientation.
More information about the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables was revealed by the bivariate analyses. However, the relationship between the
variables should not be overstated because the strength of association is weak, meaning
that any directional pull is moderated by the existence of a weak association. To further
assist with analysis of association and relationship, the variables were recoded and data
analysis is presented in the subsequent section.
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TABLE 56
Summary of Association and Relationship between the
Independent and Dependent Variables
Dependent Association with Self-Identjfled Relationship with Self-
Variables Ideological Orientation Identified Ideological
(Weak or Strong) Orientation
(Negative or Positive)
1. Public Programs Weak Negative
2. Bussing Weak Negative
3. Government Contracts and Affirmative Weak Positive
Action
4. Severe Penalties for Crimes Involving Weak Negative
Illicit Drugs
5. Racial Profiling Weak Negative
6. Mixed-Income Housing Weak Positive
7. Returning Prayer to Schools Weak Negative
8. Increase Police Power Weak Negative
9. National Healthcare Program Weak Positive
10. Perceptions of Equality Weak Positive
11. Immigrants Taking Jobs Weak Positive
12. Doing Well in Life— Working Hard Weak Negative
13. Governmental Intervention Weak Positive
14. Government Reparations Weak Positive
15. Whites Accountable for Past Weak Positive
16. Financially Prospered in Past Two Weak Negative
Years
~ 17. Financially Prosper in the Next One Weak Positive
Year
18. Alienation Weak Negative
19. Trust in Government Weak Positive
20. Rights for Legal Noncitizens Weak Positive
21. Giving up Some Rights and Liberties to Weak Negative
Curb Terrorism
22. Profiling People of Arab and Middle Weak Negative
Eastern Descent
23. Restricting Rights of Those who Weak Negative
Support Terrorists
24. Difference between Democratic and Weak Negative
Republican Parties
25. Woman’s Right to Choose to Terminate Weak Positive
a Pregnancy
26. Gay Marriage Weak Positive
27. Support for the War in Iraq Weak Negative
28. Support for President’s War Efforts Weak Negative
29. Closest Party Affiliation Weak Positive
30. Frequency Discusses Politics Weak Positive
31. Registered to Vote Weak Positive
32. Voted in 2000 Weak Negative
33. Party for Which One Most Often Votes Weak Positive
34. Influential Political Alliances Weak Positive
35. Attendance to Religious Services Weak Positive
36. Age Weak Negative
37. Educational Attainment Weak Negative
38. Household Income Weak Positive
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Analyses of Recoded Variables
Bivariate analysis of the variables yielded significant information about the
association and relationship between the independent and dependent variables. However,
recoding the variables so that the Likert scales used to evaluate the respondents’
responses yielded interesting fmdings with striking clarity. SPSS was used to bind and
recode variable values, and to recode variables. The following discussion and
illustrations highlight the significant fmdings.
Independent Variable:
Self-identified ideological orientation was recoded so that respondents were
identified as liberal, moderate, or conservative. Liberal was recoded as 1, moderate was
recoded as 2, and conservative was recoded as 3. Table 57 provides a frequency analysis
of the recoded variable. A plurality of the respondents identified themselves as moderate.
It is worth noting that 21.2 percent of the total respondent to this variable are classified as
missing, more than those who identified themselves as conservative and almost as many
as those who identified themselves as liberal. One can only speculate about the reasons
for the high percentage of missing responses — respondents may not have believed that
their views were captured by the spectrum presented, respondents may have been unclear
about the meaning of the spectrum, or possibly respondents may have been reluctant to
respond to the question. If one excludes the missing responses from analysis, it is
significant that almost 25 percent of respondents identify their ideological orientation as
conservative. The histogram (figure 5) provided illustrates the clustering of the





Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 99 24.4 31.0 31.0
Moderate 141 34.8 44.2 75.2
Conservative 79 19.5 24.8 100.0
Total 319 78.8 100.0
Missing 9 86 21.2
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 5. Histogram of Ideological Orientation Recoded.
Self-identified ideological orientation is compared and evaluated in relationship and
strength with the dependent variables.
Dependent Variables
1. Public Programs and Ideological Orientation
The dependent variable public programs was recoded so that support for public
programs is represented by the liberal value and opposition to public programs is
represented by the conservative value. An evaluation of the recoded variable shows that
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a majority of the respondents provided a response that could be considered liberal,




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 281 69.4 71.7 7t7
Neutral 20 4.9 5.1 76.8
Conservative 91 22.5 23.2 100.0
Total 392 96.8 100.0
Missing 9 13 3.2
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 6. Histogram ofPublic Programs Recoded.
An evaluation of the Pearson correlation coefficient shows that relationship is












Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Public Programs




IdeQiogical Orientation Pearson Correlation 1 -.017
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .764




Public Programs Pearson Correlation -.017 1
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .764





The dependent variable busing was recoded similarly to the recoded public
programs variable. Support for busing was reclassified as liberal and opposition was
reclassified as conservative (see table 60). The histogram reveals that although a
plurality of the respondents articulated positions that could be considered liberal, the





Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 207 51.1 52.9 52.9
Neutral 39 9.6 10.0 62.9
Conservative 145 35.8 37.1 100.0
Total 391 96.5 100.0
Missing 9 14 3.5
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 7. Histogram of Busing Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient revealed a weak, positive relationship between
the independent variable and this dependent variable (see table 61). One can conclude
from these data that those who provided a response to this variable that can be classified
as liberal are more likely have a liberal ideological orientation, but the strength of this
relationship is weak. Therefore, caution should be used when trying to establish any
meaningful connection between the independent and dependent variables.
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TABLE 61
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Busing Recoded




Kendall’s tau_b Ideological Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .014
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) . .788
N 319 307
Bussing Recoded Correlation Coefficient .014 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .788
N 307 391
Spearman’s rho Ideological Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .015
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) . .787
N 319 307
Bussing Recoded Correlation Coefficient .015 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .787
N 307 391
3. Government Contracts and Affirmative Action
The dependent variable that evaluates opinions about the administration of
government contracts and affirmative action programs that had the net effect of
benefiting blacks was recoded so that the value of 1 represents a liberal perspective, 2
represents a neutral position, and 3 represents a conservative perspective. A plurality of
the respondents articulated a position that could be classified as a liberal position, and the
histogram reveals that the mean score is 1.55 (see table 62 and figure 8).
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TABLE 62
Govt Contracts and AA Recoded
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 261 64.4 67.6 67.6
Neutral 37 9.1 9.6 77.2
Conservative 88 21.7 22.8 100.0
Total 386 95.3 100.0
Missing 9 19 4.7
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 8. Histogram of Government Contracts and Affirmative Action Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient reveals that a positive but weak relationship
exists between the independent variable and this dependent variable. Those who
articulate what could be classified as a liberal position regarding government contracts
and affirmative action are also likely to identify their ideological orientation as liberal.
However, because the correlation between the variables is weak, one should exercise
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Mean = 1.55




Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Government Contracts and Affirmative Action




Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 .019
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .736




Govt Contracts and Pearson Correlation .019 1
AA Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .736




4. Severe Penalties for Crimes Involving Illicit Drugs
The dependent variable designed to evaluate attitudes about severe penalties for
crimes involving illicit drugs was recoded so that the value of 1 represents responses that
could be considered liberal, 2 indicates a neutral position, and 3 represents responses that
could be considered conservative. A frequency analysis reveals that although a plurality
of the respondents articulated a liberal response, a significant number of the respondents
articulated a conservative response to the question related to the variable (see table 64).
Additionally, those that articulated a neutral position comprised almost 12 percent of the
respondents, meaning that the mean score of 1.94 and the standard deviation of 0.938
demonstrate the division of position shown by the respondents (see figure 9).
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TABLE 64
Severe Penalties Illicit Drugs Recoded
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 183 45.2 47.2 47.2
Neutral 46 11.4 11.9 59.0
Conservative 159 39.3 41.0 100.0
Total 388 95.8 100.0
Missing 9 17 4.2
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 9. Histogram for Severe Penalties Involving Illicit Drugs Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient shows that a negative, but relatively weak
relationship exists between the independent variable and this dependent variable.
Respondents who articulated a response that could be considered liberal are less likely to
support severe penalties for crimes involving illicit drugs; however, this negative




0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Severe Penalties - Illicit Drugs
Recoded
Mean= 1.94




Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Severe Penalties for Crimes Involving Illicit Drugs





Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 -.031
Orientation Recoded S1g. (2-tailed) .589




Severe Penalties - Pearson Correlation -.031 1
Illicit Drugs Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .589





The variable designed to evaluate attitudes about racial profiling was recoded so
that the value of 1 represents a conservative response, 2 represents a neutral position, and
3 represents a liberal response. A frequency analysis reveals that a plurality of the
respondents articulated a liberal position, indicating opposition to racial profiling
practices (see table 66). The histogram illustrates the relationship between the responses
and indicates a mean score of 2.66 (see figure 10). Even with a standard deviation of





Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 45 11.1 12.2 12.2
Neutral 37 9.1 10.0 22.2
Liberal 288 71.1 77.8 100.0
Total 370 91.4 100.0
Missing 9 35 8.6
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 10. Histogram for Racial Profiling Recoded.
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The Pearson correlation coefficient reveals that the relationship that exists
between the independent variable and this dependent variable is negative but weak (see
table 67). While respondents who articulated opposition to racial profiling are more
likely to be liberal, ideological orientation makes little difference because of the
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Ideological Orientation Pearson Correlation 1 -.024
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .681




Racial Profiling Pearson Correlation -.024 1
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .681





The variable used to evaluate attitudes about mixed-income housing was recoded
so that the value of 1 represents responses that could be considered liberal, 2 indicates
neutral responses, and 3 represents responses that could considered conservative. An
analysis of the frequency distribution table reveals that although a plurality of the
respondents possess an affirmative posture regarding mixed-income housing, those who
were opposed to such policies (a conservative position) were almost matched by those
who were neutral on the issue (see table 68). The high neutral response rate could
indicate ambivalence toward mixed-income housing policies, a general lack of
responsiveness to the issue, or that mixed-income housing is a nonissue for the






Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 202 49.9 54.9 54.9
~ Neutral 74 18.3 20.1 75.0
Conservative 92 22.7 25.0 100.0
Total 368 90.9 100.0
Missing 9 37 9.1
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 11. Histogram for Mixed-Income Housing Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient reveals that a positive, but weak relationship
exists between the independent variable and this dependent variable (see table 69).
Respondents who were likely to support mixed-income housing policies (a liberal
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relationship between the ideological orientation and attitudes on mixed-income
housing policies is weak and should not be a significant factor when assessing causation.
TABLE 69





Ideological Orientation Pearson Correlation 1 .009
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .882




Mixed Housing Pearson Correlation .009 1
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .882




7. Returning Prayer to Schools
The variable designed to measure attitudes regarding returning prayer to schools
was recoded so that the value of 1 represents conservative responses, 2 indicates neutral
responses, and 3 represents liberal responses. The frequency distribution table for
responses to the evaluative statement for this variable indicates that a majority of the
respondents articulated a conservative position, which provided support for returning
prayer to schools (see table 70). The histogram illustrates the relationship between the
variable responses (see figure 12).
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TABLE 71
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Returning Prayer to Schools Recoded





Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 -.027
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .636




Returning Prayer to Pearson Correlation -.027 1
Schools Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .636




8. Increasing Police Power
The variable used to evaluate attitudes about increasing police power was recoded
so that the value of 1 represents responses that are conservative articulations, 2 indicates
a neutral position, and 3 represents responses that are liberal in nature. The frequency
distribution table for the responses to the variable reveals that the respondents were
almost evenly divided between conservative and liberal positions regarding increasing
police power, although more respondents supported an increase in police power (a
conservative position). However, almost 16 percent of the respondents articulated a
neutral position (see table 71). It is unclear whether the neutrality of the respondent is
due to ambivalence, unresponsiveness or lack ofposition. The fact that so many of the
respondents indicated a neutral attitude about increased police power challenges the
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potential claim that a plurality of the respondents supported increasing police power.
The histogram shows that a mean score of 1.99 with a standard deviation of .919 speaks
to a relatively even division between the respondents on the issue (see figure 13).
TABLE 72
Increased Police Power Recoded
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 160 39.5 42.6 42.6
Neutral 59 14.6 15.7 58.2
Liberal 157 38.8 41.8 100.0
Total 376 92.8 100.0
Missing 9 29 7.2
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 13. Histogram for Increased Police Power Recoded.
An evaluation of the Pearson correlation coefficient reveals a positive relationship
between the independent variable and this dependent variable (see table 73). However,
the division between liberal and conservative responses is not a clear reflection of the
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ideological orientation of the respondents because the relationship between the
variables is weak and relatively msigmficant
TABLE 73





Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 .012
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .832




Increased Police Pearson Correlation .012 1
Power Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .832





The variable used to evaluate attitudes about a national healthcare program were
recoded with the value of 1 representing liberal articulations, 2 indicating neutral
positions, and 3 representing conservative articulations. The frequency distribution table
(see table 74) shows that a clear majority of the respondents supported the
implementation of a national healthcare program (a liberal position). A mean score of
1.14 and a standard deviation of .485 reflects that substantial support indicated by the





Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 360 88.9 91.1 91.1
Neutral 13 3.2 3.3 94.4
Conservative 22 5.4 5.6 100.0
Total 395 97.5 100.0
Missing 9 10 2.5
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 14. Histogram for National Healthcare Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient indicates a positive relationship between the
independent variable and this dependent variable (see table 75). However, the
overwhelming support of the respondents, regardless of ideological orientation, for a
liberal policy decision reinforces the fmdings that the association between the variables is





0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
National Healthcare Recoded
Mean = 1.14









Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 .019
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) •745




National Healthcare Pearson Correlation .019 1
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .745




10. Perceptions of Equality
The variable used to evaluate perceptions of equality was recoded so that the
value of 1 represents conservative articulations, 2 indicates neutral position, 3 represent
liberal articulations. The frequency distribution reveals that a plurality of the
respondents maintained a liberal position (see table 76 and figure 15).
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TABLE 76
Perceptions of Equality Recoded
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 140 34.6 35.8 35.8
Neutral 28 6.9 7.2 43.0
Liberal 223 55.1 57.0 100.0
Total 391 96.5 100.0
Missing 9 14 3.5
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 15. Histogram ofEquality Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient reveals that a positive relationship exists
between the independent variable and this dependent variable (see table 77).
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Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 .059
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .304




Perceptions of Pearson Correlation .059 1
Equality Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .304




11. Immigrants Take Jobs
The variable used to assess attitudes about immigrants and employment was
recoded so that the value of 1 represents conservative articulations, 2 captures neutral
responses, and 3 represents liberal articulations. From the frequency distribution table
(see table 78) one can see that a plurality of the respondents articulated conservative
responses (a belief that immigrants are taking jobs away from blacks). A mean of 1.8 and
standard deviation of .926 shows that while almost 35 percent of the respondents
articulated a liberal position and slightly more than 10 percent assumed a neutral posture,
the responses are skewed toward a conservative position (see figure 16).
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TABLE 78
Immigrants Take Jobs Recoded
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 214 52.8 55.0 55.0
Neutral 40 9.9 10.3 65.3
Liberal 135 33.3 34•7 100.0
Total 389 96.0 100.0
Missing 9 16 4.0
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 16. Histogram for Immigrants Take Jobs Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient shows that the relationship between the
independent variable and this dependent variable is negative (see figure 79).
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Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 -.044
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .442




Immigrants Take Pearson Correlation -.044 1
Jobs Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .442




12. Doing Well in Life -- Hard Work
The variable used to evaluate attitudes about blacks failing to do well in life due
to a lack of hard work was also recoded. The value of 1 represents conservative
articulations, 2 represents neutral perspectives, and 3 represents liberal articulations.
From the frequency distribution table (see table 80) one can see that a plurality of the
respondents supported what could be considered a liberal position (disagreement with the
statement that if blacks do not get ahead in life it is because they do not work bard).
However, a significant number of the respondents maintained a conservative posture on
the issue, as illustrated by the histogram (see figure 17).
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Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 132 32.6 33.1 33.1
Neutral 28 6.9 7.0 40.1
Liberal 239 59.0 59.9 100.0
Total 399 98.5 100.0
~issing 9 6 1.5
Total 405 100.0
Mean = 2.27
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 ~ Std.Dev. = 0.927








The Pearson correlation coefficient shows that a negative relationship exists
between the independent variable and this dependent variable (see table 81).
Additionally, the correlation between the variables is weak.
TABLE 80
Doing Well in Life-Work Hard Recoded
Fig. 17. Histogram of Doing Well in Life—Hard Work Recoded.
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TABLE 81






Ideological Orientation Pearson Correlation 1 -.007
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .900




Doing Well in Life-Work Pearson Correlation -.007 1
Hard Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .900





The variable used to measure attitudes about the need for government intervention
to advance the progress of blacks was also recoded. The value of 1 represents liberal
articulations, 2 represents neutral positions, and 3 represents conservative articulations.
One can see from the frequency distribution table (see table 82) that a plurality of the
respondents articulated a liberal perspective (general agreement that governmental
intervention is needed at all levels to advance the progress of blacks). It is worth noting






Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 215 53.1 55.6 55.6
Neutral 36 8.9 9.3 64.9
Conservative 136 33.6 35.1 100.0
Total 387 95.6 100.0
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Fig. 18. Histogram for Government Intervention Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient shows that a positive but weak relationship









Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 .047
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .411




Government Pearson Correlation .047 1
Intervention Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .411




15. Whites Accountable for Past
The variable used to evaluate attitudes about whether whites should be held
accountable for past discrimination was recoded so that the value of 1 reflects
conservative positions, 2 reflects neutral views, and 3 reflects liberal positions. The
frequency distribution table (see table 84) shows that a plurality of the respondents
articulated a liberal perspective (that whites should be held accountable for past
discrimination). It is worth noting that almost 22 percent of the respondents articulated a
conservative perspective and almost 14 percent maintained a neutral posture (see figure
19). Additionally, almost 10 percent of respondents abstained from responding to the
question; therefore, 23 percent of true views of respondents are unknown and this is 1.3
percent more than registered a conservative perspective.
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TABLE 84
Whites Accountable for Past Recoded
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 80 19.8 21.7 21.7
Neutral 51 12.6 13.9 35.6
Liberal 237 58.5 64.4 100.0
Total 368 90.9 100.0
Missing 9 37 9.1
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 19. Histogram for Whites Accountable for Past Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient shows that a positive but weak relationship
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Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 .045
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .443




Whites Accountable Pearson Correlation .045 1
for Past Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .443




16. Financially Prospered in the Past Two Years
The variable used to assess attitudes about past fmancial prosperity over the past
two years was recoded so that value of 1 represents conservative articulations, 2
represents neutral positions, and 3 represents liberal articulations. The frequency
distribution table reveals that a plurality of the respondents articulated a conservative
position (indicating fmancial prosperity during a recession), but a significant number of
the respondents maintained a liberal or neutral posture (see table 86 and figure 20).
TABLE 86
Finan. Prospered in Past 2 Yrs Recoded
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Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 171 42.2 45.7 45.7
Neutral 61 15.1 16.3 62.0
Liberal 142 35.1 38.0 100.0
Total 374 92.3 100.0
Missing 9 31 7.7
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 20. Histogram for Financially Prospered in the Past Two Years Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient shows that the relationship between the
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Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Financially Prospered in the Past Two Years
Recoded and Ideological Orientation Recoded
Finan.
Ideological Prospered
Orientation in Past 2 Yrs
Recoded Recoded
Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 -.015
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .793




Finan. Prospered in Pearson Correlation -.015 1
Past 2 Yrs Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .793




17. Financially Prosper in the Next One Year
The variable used to measure perspectives on the possible fmancial prosperity one
year from the administration of the survey was recoded so that the value of 1 reflects
conservative perspectives, 2 reflects neutral perspectives, and 3 reflects liberal
perspectives. A plurality of the respondents registered what could be considered a
conservative response (they expect to fmancially prosper within the next one year).
However, it is worth noting that almost 17 percent of respondents indicated a neutral
position and a little less than 9 percent of the responses are recorded as missing (see table
88). Despite the clearly recorded optimism underlies marked skepticism (see figure 21).
265
TABLE 88
Finan. Prosper in Next 1 Yr. Recoded
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 219 54.1 59.2 59.2
Neutral 62 15.3 16.8 75.9
Liberal 89 22.0 24.1 100.0
Total 370 91.4 100.0
Missing 9 35 8.6
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 21. Histogram for Financially Prosper in the Next One Year Recoded
The Pearson correlation coefficient reveals that although a positive relationship
exists between the independent variable and the dependent variables, the correlation is
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Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Financially Prosper in the Next One Year Recoded
and Ideological Orientation Recoded
Finan.
Ideological Prosper in
Orientation Next 1 Yr.
Recoded Recoded
Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 .050
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .391




Finan. Prosper in Pearson Correlation .050 1
Next 1 Yr. Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .391




18. Public Officials Care about Voice
The variable used to measure attitudes regarding the perceptions of
responsiveness on the part ofpublic officials to the voice of the public was recoded so
that the value of 1 represents conservative articulations, 2 represents neutral positions,
and 3 represents liberal articulations. Table 90 reveals that a plurality of the respondents
indicated a conservative position, meaning that they belief that public officials care about
their voice. Figure 22 illustrates the relationship between the variable responses.
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TABLE 90
Public Officials Care About Voice Recoded
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 231 57.0 59.7 59.7
Neutral 45 11.1 11.6 71.3
Liberal iii 27.4 28.7 100.0
Total 387 95.6 100.0
Missing 9 18 4.4
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 22. Histogram for Public Officials Care about Voice Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient indicates that the relationship between the
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Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Public Officials Care about Voice Recoded





Ideological Pearson Correlation i -.071
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .213




Public Officials Care Pearson Correlation -.071 1
About Voice Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .213




19. Trust in Government
The variable used to measure trust in government was recoded so that the value of
1 represents conservative views, 2 represents neutral views, and 3 represents liberal
views. The frequency distribution table (see table 92) shows that a majority of the
respondents articulated a liberal position (meaning that they did not trust the government
to always do what is right). It is worth noting that almost 13 percent of the respondents
indicated a neutral response and 14 percent articulated a conservative position and figure





Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 54 13.3 14.0 14.0
Neutral 50 12.3 12.9 26.9
Liberal 283 69.9 73.1 100.0
Total 387 95.6 100.0
Missing 9 18 4.4
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 23. Histogram for Trust Government Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient reveals that a positive and relatively strong
relationship exists between the independent variable and this dependent variable. The
correlation between ideological orientation and trust in government is significant to the
















Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 .120*
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .035




Trust Government Pearson Correlation .120* 1
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .035




~. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
20. Rights for Legal Noncitizens
The variable used to evaluate attitudes about the extension of rights to legal
noncitizens was recoded so that the value of 1 represents liberal positions, 2 represents
neutral positions, and 3 represents conservative positions. The frequency distribution
table shows that almost 70 percent of the respondents articulated what could be
considered a conservative perspective (they did not believe that the rights of citizens
should be extended to legal noncitizens). Slightly more than 24 percent maintained what
could be considered a liberal view, in that the rights given to citizens should be extended
to legal noncitizens, as shown in table 94 and illustrated in figure 24.
TABLE 94
Rights for Legal Noncitizens Recoded
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 94 23.2 24.4 24.4
Neutral 23 5.7 6.0 30.3
Conservative 269 66.4 69.7 100.0
Total 386 95.3 100.0
Missing 9 19 4.7
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 24. Histogram for Rights for Legal Noncitizens Recoded.
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The Pearson correlation coefficient shows that the relationship between the
independent variable and this dependent variable is positive. However, the correlation
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Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 .109
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .056




Rights for Legal Pearson Correlation .109 1
Noncitizens Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .056




21. Give up Some Rights and Liberties to Curb Terrorism
The variable used to measure attitudes regarding giving up some rights and
liberties to curb terrorism was recoded so that the value of 1 represents conservative
perspectives, 2 represents neutral positions, and 3 represents liberal perspectives. The
frequency distribution reveals some interesting fmdings. Although slightly more than 46
percent maintained a liberal position on the issue (disagreed with the need to give up
some rights and liberties to curb terrorism), almost 44 percent of the respondents
maintained a conservative position (agreed with the need to give up some rights and
liberties to curb terrorism). Slightly more than 10 percent of the respondents registered a
neutral position on the issue, and slightly more than 9 percent of the respondents were
categorized as missing. Both of these categories are significant and should be included in
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the evaluation, particularly those whose responses were missing because they could
push either position into a plurality, as indicated in table 96. The histogram illustrates the
near-even divide between the conservative and liberal positions (see figure 25).
TABLE 96
Give Up Some Rights to Curb Terrorism Recoded
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 161 39.8 43.8 43.8
Neutral 37 9.1 10.1 53.8
Liberal 170 42.0 46.2 100.0
Total 368 90.9 100.0




0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 Mean = 2.02
Std. Dev. = 0.949
Give Up Some Rights to Curb Terrorism Recoded N = 368
Fig. 25. Histogram for Give up Some Rights and Liberties to Curb Terrorism Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient reveals a negative and weak relationship
between the independent variable and this dependent variable (see table 97).
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TABLE 97
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Give up Some Rights and Liberties to Curb






Ideological Orientation Pearson Correlation 1 -.034
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .554




Give Up Some Rights to Pearson Correlation -.034 1
Curb Terrorism Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .554




22. Profiling of People of Arab and Middle Eastern Descent
The variable used to gauge attitudes about the profiling ofpeople ofArab or
Middle Eastern descent was also recoded. The value of 1 represents conservative
articulations, 2 represents neutral positions, and 3 represents liberal articulations. The
frequency distribution shows that 59.6 percent of the respondents indicated what could be
considered a liberal position, meaning that they opposed the profiling of people of Arab
and Middle Eastern descent. However, almost 30 percent indicated what could be
considered a conservative position, meaning that they approved this form ofprofiling





Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 110 27.2 29.0 29.0
Neutral 43 10.6 11.3 40.4
Liberal 226 55.8 59.6 100.0
Total 379 93.6 100.0
Missing 9 26 6.4
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 26. Histogram for Profiling of People ofArab and Middle Eastern Descent Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient indicates that a negative and weak relationship












Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Profiling of People of Arab and Middle Eastern




Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 -.041
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .478




Profiling Arab/M.E. Pearson Correlation -.041 1
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .478




23. Restricting Rights of Terrorist Supporters
The variable used to measure attitudes about the restriction of the rights of those
who support terrorists was also recoded. The value of 1 represents conservative
positions, 2 represents a neutral position, and 3 represents liberal positions. The
frequency distribution table reveals that 65.7 percent of the respondents articulated a
conservative position, meaning that they agreed with policies that restricted the rights of
those who support terrorists (see table 100). The histogram illustrates the relationship




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 251 62.0 65.7 65.7
Neutral 30 7.4 7.9 73.6
Liberal 101 24.9 26.4 100.0
Total 382 94.3 100.0
Missing 9 23 5.7
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 27. Histogram for Restricting Rights of Terrorist Supporters Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient indicates that the relationship between the
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Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Restricting Rights of Terrorist Supporters Recoded




Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 -.085
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .138




Terrorist Supporters Pearson Correlation -.085 1
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .138




24. A Woman’s Right to Choose Whether to Terminate a Pregnancy or Not
The variable that measures attitudes about a woman’s right to choose whether or
not to terminate a pregnancy was recoded so that the value of 1 represents liberal
positions, 2 represents a neutral position, and 3 represents conservative positions. The
frequency distribution table shows that 66 percent of the respondents articulated what
could be considered liberal positions; however, it is worth noting that 29.6 percent of the
respondents were recorded as missing—more than was recorded for the conservative
articulation (see table 102 and figure 28).
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TABLE 102
Woman’s Right to Choose Recoded
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 188 46.4 66.0 66.0
Neutral 26 6.4 9.1 75.1
Conservative 71 17.5 24.9 100.0
Total 285 70.4 100.0
Missing 9 120 29.6
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 28. Histogram for a Woman’s Right to Choose Whether to Terminate a Pregnancy or
Not Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient indicates that the relationship between the
independent variable and this dependent variable is positive. The correlation between the
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Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for a Woman’s Right to Choose Whether to Terminate





Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 .172**
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .008




Woman’s Right to Pearson Correlation .1 72** 1
Choose Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .008




‘~‘. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
25. Gay Marriage
The variable used to evaluate attitudes about gay marriage was recoded so that the
value of 1 represents liberal positions, 2 represents a neutral position, and 3 represents
conservative position. The frequency distribution table shows that a majority of the
respondents articulated what could be considered a conservative position. It is worth
noting that 30.9 percent of the respondents were classified as missing, although only 4.6




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 18 4.4 6.4 6.4
Neutral 13 3.2 4.6 11.1
Conservative 249 61.5 88.9 100.0
Total 280 69.1 100.0







O~ I I Mean=2.82
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 Std. Dev. = 0.523
Gay Marriage Recoded N = 280
Fig. 29. Histogram for Gay Marriage Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient indicates that the relationship between the
independent variable and this dependent variable is positive. The correlation between the




Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Gay Marriage Recoded




Ideological Orientation Pearson Correlation 1 .160*
Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .015




Gay Marriage Recoded Pearson Correlation .160* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .015




~. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
26. Support for the Iraq War
The variable used to measure support for the war in Iraq was recoded so that the
value of 1 represents conservative positions, 2 represents a neutral position, and 3
represents liberal positions. The frequency distribution table reveals that a majority of
the respondents indicated a liberal position on the issue, meaning that they opposed the





Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Conservative 13 3.2 4.6 4.6
Neutral 27 6.7 9.6 14.3
Liberal 240 59.3 85.7 100.0
Total 280 69.1 100.0
Missing 9 125 30.9
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 30. Histogram for Support for the Iraq War Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient reveals that the relationship between the
independent variable and this dependent variable is negative and weak; therefore, the
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Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient for Support for the Iraq War Recoded




Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 -.037
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .575




Iraq War Recoded Pearson Correlation -.037 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .575




27. Influential Political Alliance -
The variable the measured attitudes about the possibility of an influential political
alliance being created by an alliance between blacks, the poor, and women was also
recoded. The value of 1 represents liberal positions and 2 represents conservative. The
frequency distribution table reveals that almost 90 percent indicated a liberal position,
meaning that they believed that an influential political alliance could be formed. It is
worth noting that 12.6 percent of the respondents are noted as missing, and this is more
than the number that indicated a conservative position (see table 108 and figure 31).
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TABLE 108
Influential Political Alliance Recoded
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Liberal 316 78.0 89.3 89.3
Conservative 38 9.4 10.7 100.0
Total 354 87.4 100.0
Missing 9 51 12.6
Total 405 100.0
Fig. 31. Histogram for Influential Political Alliance Recoded.
The Pearson correlation coefficient reveals that the relationship between the
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Ideological Pearson Correlation 1 .090
Orientation Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .125




Influential Political Pearson Correlation .090 1
Alliance Recoded Sig. (2-tailed) .125





An attitudinal case study was employed, utilizing both an examination of the
history of blacks in Texas and a survey questionnaire of blacks in the eastern region of
Texas, to answer the following research questions: What are the attitudes of blacks in the
eastern region of Texas on specific political issues? What correlation exists between the
political self-identification and the political attitudes of blacks in the eastern region of
Texas? Various statistical tests were conducted to evaluate the hypothesis: Black
political ideological self-identification is not a predictor of political attitudes. Various
analyses of these data yielded interesting and notable fmdings, and the conclusions listed
below can be drawn from the study.
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1. An overwhelming majority of the respondents indicated that they either
identified with or voted consistently for candidates from the Democratic Party.
This connection to the Democratic Party can be identified as what Paul Frymer
describes as electoral capture.
2. Although the respondents most closely identified with the Democratic Party, a
plurality of them indicated that they had a moderate ideological orientation.
3. While the identification ofpolitical party affiliation did not predict political
attitudes, self-identified ideological orientation was shown to be a minimal
predictor ofpolitical attitudes, but such knowledge can be helpful in
understanding political behavior.
4. The idea that party ideology provides people’s attitudes with structure does not
prove true in the case of the respondents to this study. Where attitudes toward
different issues should be ideologically consistent or correlated with one another,
they are not; in fact, on some issues they are more closely aligned with the
ideology espoused by the Republican Party (for example: abortion, gay marriage,
immigration).
The findings of this study clearly reveal that the ideological orientation ofAfrican
Americans in East Texas is not a consistent predictor of political attitudes; other factors
contribute. However, knowledge of ideological orientation helps to explain particular
attitudes toward policies and issues. Utilization of a contextual-linkage analytical
framework to analyze the political attitudes of blacks in the eastern region of Texas
provides depth to the understanding of the respondents’ attitudinal responses.
Additionally, it is necessary to evaluate the historical influences on the political attitudes
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of blacks in the eastern region ofTexas, the role of race as a political cleavage, and
the implications of the research fmdings for Texas politics and black politics.
When the political attitudes ofblacks in the eastern region of Texas are compared
with the political attitudes of blacks measured in national studies and polls, one can see
that the political attitudes of blacks measured in this study align with black views on a
national level but with slight variation. The respondents from Texas, while liberal in
their ideological and attitudinal orientations, exhibit greater moderation in their views,
and one could describe the collectiye as moderate liberals. However, on issues of
immigration and those related to conceptions ofmorality (except regarding abortion), the
respondents tended toward a greater conservatism than noted among the black population
in national studies.
Historical Influences on Political Attitudes
The historical experiences of blacks in East Texas are similar to that of other
blacks in the South. Common experiences with other blacks in the South include a
legacy of slavery, black codes preceded by Jim Crow laws, civil rights activism, and
mass movement of the black population from rural to urban centers. This common
historical experience broadens the applicability of the findings. However, the
experiences of blacks in East Texas provide a distinctive reality. Factors that help
differentiate the experiences of blacks in Texas from those in other states are the
following:
1. Texas served as a refugee state during the Civil War, and this had implications:
(a) the inner portion of the state was not penetrated by Union soldiers, so there
I
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were fewer slave revolts and fewer black Union soldiers; (b) slaveholders
from other states viewed Texas as a safe-haven that would foster and protect a
slaveholding culture; (c) when the Emancipation Proclamation was announced,
refugee slaves were freed in Texas and some stayed while others migrated.
2. Slaveholding was primarily contained to the eastern region of Texas and the
major urban centers of the state are overwhelmingly in this region. As a result,
blacks in Texas overwhelmingly reside in the eastern region, rather than being
wholly disperse throughout the state.
3. Texas politicians aggressively sought to limit the political and educational access
of blacks in the state; hence, the NAACP brought a number of cases to the U.S.
Supreme Court on behalf of Texas blacks. Additionally, Texas played a critical
role in the procurement of national civil rights legislation.
4. Significant rural-to-urban migration took place in the state and contributed to
overpopulated inner city black neighborhoods, particularly in Houston, and this
has had policy implications.
5. African Americans are not the only racial minority in the state. Latinos
numerically outnumber blacks which can increase the competition for finite
resources, push the black agenda to the margins, and provide coalition or alliance
building opportunities, while increasing feelings of group threat.
Historical Context as Political Variable
Matthews and Protho found that individual variables are less important than
environmental variables as affects on individuals who have strong group identify.
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Individual variables have a role in the formulation ofpolitical attitudes, but other
factors like race and the historical treatment of race within a sociopolitical context are
also powerful attitudinal and behavioral determinants. Survey data from respondents and
a historical analysis of blacks in Texas indicate that while ideological orientation can
inform one’s explanation of attitudinal positions, the significance of ideological
orientation is minimal in comparison to other factors like race, historical context, and
religious influence that have been identified in other studies as factors that contribute to
the black attitudinal positions. Thus, one can assert that the contextual complexities of
historical influences have contributed to the formation of the political attitudes of blacks
in Texas. Additionally, bivariant analysis shows that income and educational attainment
had a minimal impact on ideological orientation, and overall self-identified political
ideological orientation had a minimal correlation with the concepts and values evaluated
in this study.
Mismatch between Party Identification and Ideological Orientation
It is significant that party identification has limited usefulness in understanding
the ideological orientation ofblacks in East Texas. Other studies found this to be true
among other black populations — party identification is significant when identifying the
location of black perspectives on the broad political spectrum; however, there appears to
be a spectrum imbedded in the larger spectrum, and it is an examination of this that yields
more discrete information about the ideological orientation of blacks.
Survey data show that within the liberal political ideology, most respondents
considered themselves to be moderate. Although several indicated that they were liberal
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or extremely liberal, a few also indicated that they were conservative or extremely
conservative.
One limitation of this study is that it does not determine exactly where on the
liberal end of the spectrum the ideological orientation of the respondents should be
placed. However, the usefulness of knowing the various shades of ideological orientation
among black populations should not be understated. Black ideological orientation is
located all along the ideological spectrum, even though there is a monoaffiliation with the
Democratic Party.
It is unrealistic to assert that there will be a major realignment of black voters
from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party for several reasons. First, although
black respondents indicated positions similar to those identified as conservative on a
number of issues related to values, on economic issues and social improvement strategies,
there remains a liberal bias that clashes with the policy direction of the Republican Party.
Second, the Republican Party has not indicated a willingness to elevate black political
concerns to policy concerns. The Republican Party is willing to embrace those who
accept or identify with its current agenda.
However, blacks continue to be electoral captives of the Democratic Party. It is
unclear what will serve as a catalyst to motivate the black masses to remove their support
from the Democratic Party toward a third party or independent party. Additionally, it is
unclear what would promote a change in the relative influence of blacks with either party.
A plurality of the survey respondents indicated that they believed that blacks, minorities,
the poor, and women could form an influential political alliance; the challenge would be
to transform this optimism into a viable political product.
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The Linkage of Contextual Variables
Hanes Walton asserts that context can serve/function as a variable, and this
dissertation found this to be true. Although Walton specifically refers to political
contexts, historical contexts and racial context are linked in their influence on black
political reality. This research recognizes that linkages exist between various contexts
and utilizes the contextual-linkage analytic framework to evaluate the political and social
reality of the respondents. The common characteristics of the politics of race and the
impact of regionalism lie at the core of the nature of black politics and black political
behavior and must be accounted for in political analysis. The fmdings of this study
indicate that the historical realities of black life in Texas have solidified group
identification as a valid and valued perspective. As well, the respondents have not moved
beyond this group position to an individualist context that may allow them to act and
respond to social and political stimuli in terms of class interests rather than group
interests. An individualist context may be the linkage point that, if broken, would allow
the black voter to escape the electoral capture identified by Paul Frymer. However,
within Texas, blacks are a numerical minority to whites and Latinos, making it prudent to
pool together political resources to affect the political processes in the state rather then
engaging in an individualist approach. Among the study respondents, a group identity
context trumps an individual identity context, although clearly an individual identity
context exists as evidenced by varied self-identified political ideological orientations that
could be placed along the full continuum of ideological orientations.
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Lack of Citizen Linkages to Black Political Organizations
One of the critiques ofpolitical behavioralism is the overemphasis on individual-
level causation and a lack ofattention to the dimensionality of influence. An important
dimension of and interactive connection in black politics is the individual and the
organizational linkage. Particularly in a southern regional context, the individual-
organizational linkage has played a central role as black voters have mobilized to push
for the increased recognition of their political voices. The articulation of the black
political voice in Texas continues to occur in black churches under the leadership of
socially conscious ministers, and in organizations like the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Urban League, particularly the Dallas
and Houston chapters. However, consultation with some members of the political elite
within metropolitan areas of Texas revealed that the citizen linkage to grassroots and
established political clubs that introduce blacks to politics or train them to become
candidates for political office is stunted because very few, if any such organizations exist
outside of those affiliated with or supported by the major political parties. Aside from the
spurious outcropping of reactionary organizations that mobilize to address short-term
concerns and the social activism of local ministers, there is little political organizing
taking place within the state with the intention of servicing the black population. Dallas
Urban League executive officer Beverly Mitchell-Brooks observed this same reality and
stated, “We don’t gather together to discuss the issues. . . . We’re so busy surviving in our
own zones that we don’t see the importance of strategizing.”5
5Gromer Jeffers, Jr., “Political Talent Emerges in Suburbs: Communities Gain Potential Black
Leaders, While City Loses Out,” The Dallas Morning News (12:00 pm CDT, 29Jun2005),
www.dallasnews.com
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Within Texas, black citizens are confronted by multiple challenges to political
inclusion. The critical link ofpolitical organizations is compromised within Texas, thus
posing a potential threat to the linkage between black citizens and political leadership.
The mechanism that is traditionally used to groom and grow next-generation political
leaders, serves as a mobilizing force within the community, and can function as a
sounding-board and tool ofpolitical accountability is crippled by its scant existence. This
has a crippling effect on black communities within the state. The group cohesion that is
expressed and exhibited by the black communities lacks a diverse support network.
Race as Political Cleavage and Component ofPolitical Context
Jordan and Kadalie note that race continues to be an important political cleavage;
although measures of white attitudes over time have charted a trend toward improved
attitudes towards blacks and racial issues, race continues to be a central issue for African
Americans in a political context. Several theories have been put forth to explain and
challenge the validity of these phenomena in a political context.
Paul Sniderman and Philip Tetlock proffer the concept ofprincipled conservatism
as a challenge to assertions that race continues to influence the political context. Four
points offered by Sniderman and Tetlock outline principled conservatism.
1. Racism is not the core or most important factor in the modem politics of race.
The discourse has shifted toward a nonracial, rational view that some social
policies exact high costs that sensible people would reject.
2. Ifwhites object to race-specific policies it has more to do with broad American
values than racism or prejudice. Whites are rejecting the programmatic initiatives
295ofblacks because they perceive these initiatives to violate their core sense of
values that are rooted in a Protestant work ethic, the Declaration of Independence,
and core American values.
3. Racial issues only matter to the politically unsophisticated.
4. Conservatism is less a statement about race than a value assessment.
Although ideology does often make an independent contribution to race-related policy
views, it is as much a value assessment as it is a statement on race.
Social dominance theory asserts that in all social systems group-based inequalities
exist. A critical factor in the operation of a system of inequality is an individual
difference factor that can also be labeled a social dominance orientation Social
dominance orientation is a desire to establish and maintain group~based inequality in
favor of one’s own group. In such an instance, race is but one arena ofgroup conflict,
exploitation, and domination. Ofparticular significance is that in a system of inequality
maladaptjve behavior can develop among the oppressed which can lead to self-
handicapping and self-sabotage. Social dominance theory can be used to explain why
blacks continue to identif~y with the Democratic Party despite the marginalization of their
agenda items and the minimal gains. In response to social domination constructs African
Americans have utilized the political strategy ofunifying as a group and operating from a
group position rather than an individual position.
Additionally, the situationalist tradition asserts that to induce change the
enviromnent or political context must be altered. Efforts to shift beliefs should be
abandoned because attitudes are situational responses. The analysis of the historical
context of the black East Texans in the study shows that the attitudes expressed are borne
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out ofpolitical and historical contexts, as much as an individual context. Some
scholars have theorized that alterations in the political context may cause a shift in the
situational response of the group to which the individual identifies, but data have shown
that shifts in education and income have not been enough to radically alter the group
political perspectives of blacks.
Accounting for Racial Inequality
When one recognizes race as a political cleavage and component ofpolitical
context, the question, as raised by Lee Sigelman and Susan Welch, becomes: How do
blacks account for racial inequality? In many respects, the core sociopolitical values of
black and white Americans are similar to one another, but blacks tend to be more
concerned about the issue of inequality than are whites. Sigelman and Welch point to
literature that identifS’ contradictory cardinal elements of the American political culture —
that people should get ahead on their own merit through hard work, support for free
enterprise, and commitment to equality — and found no difference in black or white
acceptance of economic individualism or support for free enterprise, but does uncover a
gap in black and white beliefs about economic opportunity.
When trying to locate the responsibility for racial inequality, one can conceive of
three contributing dynamics: the dispositional, the situational, and the systemic.6 A
dispositional analysis asserts that it is the fault of the individual — certain character flaws
have contributed to the creation of their reality. The emphasis is on the context of the
6Philip Zimbardo, “Understanding How Good Apples are Corrupted by Bad Barrels at Abu Gharib
and Stanford Prisons,” Lecture given at the Summer Institute in Political Psychology at Stanford
University, Palo Alto, CA, 20 July 2005.
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situation in a situational analysis. Social psychologist Philip Zimbardo asserts that
individuals respond to situational stimuli and, regardless of their character, values, and
beliefs, individuals can end up feeling helpless and captive to the context of the
situation.7 A systemic analysis asserts that the labyrinth of laws, policies, and rules that
emanate from and are within institutions and ideologies create situations and
environments that foster inequality and inequities.
Verba and Orren assert that blacks are more likely to blame the system, rather
than the poor or blacks for their existence ofpoverty. Data from this study found that the
East Texas respondents, regardless of ideological orientation, overwhelmingly disagreed
with the statement that this country would be better off ifwe worried less about how
equal black and white people are, and they were likely to support government programs
that aided the impoverished and were likely to consider programs that extended aid and
opportunity to the poor and blacks as effective tools for the improvement of society.
When asked about their economic outlook, the respondents were more likely to be
optimistic and displayed an optimistic retrospective assessment of their past economic
situation. When asked whether blacks do not get ahead because they do not work hard,
the respondents overwhelmingly disagreed. Responses to these questions indicate that
the respondents recognize a need for a continuous dialogue about race, believe that the
system is more to blame than the individual for their disadvantaged situation, and yet
they are hopeful about the prospects for their own economic successes.
7Philip Zimbardo, “Understanding How Good Apples are Corrupted by Bad Barrels at Abu Gharib
and Stanford Prisons,” Lecture given at the Summer Institute in Political Psychology at Stanford
University, Palo Alto, CA, 20 July 2005.
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Implications for Texas Politics: A Matter of Voice and Representation
The Office of the Texas State Demographer offers numerous scenarios for the
projected growth of the state’s population by racial category, and the most conservative
scenario projects that Latinos will outnumber Anglos in the state by 2035 and that Anglos
will be a minority within the state by 2010. Most Texans have accepted that Anglos will
be inevitably replaced by blacks and Latinos as numerically dominant within the state,
and politicians and political groups have been jockeying for position within state politics
to strengthen their positions. The shifting demographic dynamics of the state provides
insight into two of the major challenges confronting politicians and the electorate -- voice
and representation.
The dual issues of voice and representation were thrust to the fore of Texas
politics when members of the state legislature attempted to redraw the boundaries of
congressional districts following the 2000 census based on the new population figures. In
2001, the process produced a stand-off in Texas when the Republican state Senate and
the Democratic state House ofRepresentatives were unable to reach an agreement on a
redistricting map. As a result, a panel of federal judges formulated a compromise plan,
which more or less replicated the existing partisan balance in the state’s congressional
delegation: seventeen Democrats and thirteen Republicans. When Republicans took
control of the state House after the 2002 elections, Tom DeLay, a Houston-area
congressman who served as U.S. House Majority Leader until his indictment in 2005,
questioned the redistricting plan as outlined by the federal judges. DeLay said that the
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makeup of the congressional delegation did not reflect the state’s true political
orientation and pushed for the development of a new plan.
Since Texas law does not prohibit a mid-decade redistricting, the leadership of the
state government during the summer of 2003 tried to push through a new plan. One
attempt by Democrats to resist included fifty-one members of the house fleeing to
Oklahoma in May 2003, to deny a quorum. In July 2003, a dozen senators went to New
Mexico for the same purpose. Eventually, on October 13, 2003, the plan sponsored by
DeLay passed the state legislature. Six additional congressional seats were gained for
Texas Republicans to replace a 17-15 majority in the congressional delegation with a 21-
11 Republican majority.
Texas is one of the states that, because of historic discrimination ofminority
voters, is covered under the Voting Rights Act and must get U.S. Department of Justice
approval for any changes to voting schemes to ensure that minority votes are not diluted
or mishandled. An article in The Washington Post newspaper reported that a 73-page
previously undisclosed memorandum endorsed by career lawyers and two analysts at the
Department of Justice said that “the redistricting plan illegally diluted black and Hispanic
voting power in two congressional districts.”8 The memorandum also stated that the plan
eliminated several districts in which minorities had a substantial although not necessarily
decisive, influence in elections. The concerns and objections raised in the memorandum
8Dan Eggen, “Justice Staff saw Texas Districting as Illegal: Voting Rights Finding on Map Pushed
by DeLay was Overruled,” The Washington Post (www.washingtonpost.com, 2Dec2005), AO 1.
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were overruled by political appointees, and “the Justice Department approved the
plan, although staff lawyers concluded that it diluted minority voting rights.”9
DeLay’s plan was drawn so that it maximized the influence of southern white
voters and minimized the influence of black and Hispanic voters in both rural and urban
areas. In the Dallas/Tarrant county region, home to at least 640,000 blacks and 950,000
Latinos, DeLay’s plan impeded opportunities for minority voters to participate fully in
the political process and to elect candidates of their choice by fragmenting or cracking
minority communities, thereby submerging minority voters in districts dominated by
Anglo voters. Seven districts (congressional districts 1, 2, 4, 9, 10 11, and 17) in which
black and Latino voters play a critical role in determining the election of candidates in
general elections were also dismantled. The minority voters in these influence districts
are submerged within heavily Republican districts—often with Republican incumbents—
in which they will have no influence on the outcome of general elections and will be
represented by members of Congress who do not share their priorities or interests.
Figures 32 and 33 illustrate the dramatic change in Democratic and Republican
representation within the state between 2002 and 2004. Within the figures, blue
represents districts with a Democratic majority and red represents districts with a
Republican majority; the deeper the shade, the more solid the political stronghold.
Additionally, the figures illustrate the changes in the district shapes due to
gerrymandering. One can see that the eastern region of Texas and areas with a high
concentration of blacks indicate a Democratic majority district in 2002, but in 2004, the
districts have been diluted and reconfigured so that those Democratic districts that were
9”Supreme Court to Review Texas Political Map,” CNN (12Dec2005, 11:04 am EST, Associated
Press), www.cnn.com
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bordered by Republican majority districts are now weak Republican majority
districts. Additionally, districts that had supplied a Democratic majority in 2002 were
slightly reduced in size (El Paso) or divided in such a way that it appears boundaries
where redrawn specifically to add or remove specific voting precincts (Houston). In
other cases (Dallas-Fort Worth) strong Democratic majority districts were partitioned so

















Fig. 33: Map of Texas Congressional Districts, 2004.
Racial divisions and polarization in Texas are also maximized by this plan by
dividing the state primarily into Anglo-dominated Republican districts and relatively few
heavily minority Democratic districts. As a result, the Texas congressional delegate now
consists of twenty-one Anglo Republicans, six Latino Democrats, three black Democrats,
and only two remaining Anglo Democrats. It eliminates both competitive districts and





Representative Marc Veasey, a black Democrat, commented on the new districting
scheme, noting “that a disparate district ensures that the urban voters will have no voice.
If every African American in southeast Fort Worth voted, they would still be
overwhelmed by the Denton county voters in the district.”10 This sentiment has been
echoed by black and Latino Democratic politicians throughout the state.
It is expected that the four cases that have been filed with the Supreme Court will
be heard in March or April of 2006. The cases are outlined below:
1. Travis County v Perry — Argues that redistricting diluted Latino Democratic
votes in order to protect Hispanic Republican incumbent Rep. Henry Bonilla of
San Antonio.
2. LULAC v Perry — Questions whether the 2003 plan required the use of updated
census statistics and whether party affiliation is relevant when calculating the
dilution of minority voting.
3. Eddie Jackson v Perry — Asks three questions:
a. Whether the Equal Protection clause — stipulating that laws must
treat everyone the same — precludes repeated redistricting between
each ten-year census period solely for political purposes.
b. Whether the law allows the dismantling of a “majority-minority”
district of Latinos and blacks near Fort Worth when neither group
is dominant.
c. Whether it was legally permissible for Republicans to gerrymander
Latino voters through the drawing of district boundaries solely to
maximize Republican voting strength.
4. G.I. Forum v Perry — Argues that the Texas redistricting plan discriminates
against Latino voters by failing to create seven Latino-majority districts in South
Texas.
10JeffMosier, “East FW Residents Resent Redistricting: GOP Remap Leaves Area at Mercy of
Suburban North, Residents Say,” The Dallas Morning News (11:07 am CST, I 8Dec2005),
www.dallasnews.com
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Redistricting experts, political scientists, as well as Texas politicians and citizens will
be awaiting the outcome of the Supreme Court hearings. The implications for minority
voice and representation, particularly for blacks, extend beyond the state of Texas to the
nation.
Future Research Possibilities
Future research on black political attitudes in the eastern region of Texas might
include the following: (a) more emphasis on the historical context of the sample
population, (b) a comparative analysis with whites in the same region, (c) interview data
from the respondents, and (d) analysis of the linkage with political behavior. Very little
data exists on the present political reality of blacks in Texas, so the expansion of this
research will aid in the evaluation and assessment of black political incorporation in
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